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The Influenza Division provides the scientific and programmatic foundation and leadership for 
the diagnosis, prevention, and control of influenza domestically and internationally. 
In addition, the Influenza Division 
•	 Conducts global and domestic surveillance to guide vaccine formulation and understand 
the effect of influenza. 
•	 Develops policy for the prevention and control of influenza. 
•	 Conducts state-of-the-art research to better understand the evolution, antigenicity, 
genetic properties, antiviral susceptibility, transmissibility, pathogenicity, immune 
response, and other characteristics of influenza viruses in order to develop better tools 
for preventing and controlling influenza. 
•	 Provides international technical assistance for outbreak investigations, the expansion of 




The Influenza Division (formerly the Influenza Branch) has a long history of providing 
international technical assistance and support to the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
WHO National Influenza Centers (NICs) to enhance laboratory capacity. Because of limited 
resources, most support provided internationally was technical in nature and in collaboration 
with the WHO. For years, most of the technical assistance provided was through hands-on 
laboratory training of staff in other countries, the annual provision of WHO reagents kits 
produced and distributed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
and technical consultations for vaccine strain selections. In addition, the Influenza Branch 
conducted epidemiologic research, including vaccine studies and serologic assays, and provided 
international outbreak investigation assistance. 
In 1997, the first human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) in humans were reported in Hong 
Kong, and the branch played a key role in assisting with the outbreak investigations. The 
reemergence of fatal human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) in China in 2003 following  
severe accute respiratory syndrome (SARS) led to a growing concern that a pandemic of 
influenza might soon occur. 
In 2004, ongoing outbreaks of avian influenza and human cases of avian influenza in Vietnam 
and Thailand heightened the concern that a pandemic might emerge. These events fostered 
the beginning of a larger international program to improve global pandemic preparedness and 
enhance capacity for laboratory and epidemiologic surveillance of seasonal and avian influenza. 
The human outbreaks caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses in 2003 
and 2004 highlighted several important gaps that needed to be closed to improve the ability to 
rapidly identify avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential. 
These gaps included 




•	 Critical gaps in information, laboratory and 

epidemiologic training, and technology trans­
fer for rapid identification and analysis of avian 

influenza viruses in many affected countries.
 
•	 Long-standing obstacles and gaps in sharing 

information, resources, and specimens between 

agriculture and human health authorities.
 
Funding was made available in 2004 to begin to 
address global deficiencies in pandemic prepared­
ness. The U.S. government (HHS/CDC) committed 
resources and developed a multifaceted approach to 
enhance the existing WHO Global Influenza Program 
(GIP), as well as establish influenza surveillance in 
countries that did not participate in WHO’s GIP by 
providing training, staffing, direct assistance, supplies and reagents, and technical assistance. The 
program accomplished key goals by building on existing programs and infrastructure, includ­
ing the WHO and its regional offices, U.S. CDC’s Global Disease Detection (GDD) sites, 
2
 
International Emerging Infections Program 
(IEIP) sites, the Department of Defense’s 
international program sites, and by using 
the assistance of U.S. embassies. 
Over the past 5 years, the program 
has undergone remarkable growth (see 
maps) and expanded to provide support 
to more than 40 countries, all WHO 
regional offices and headquarters, and 
has developed partnerships with the 
Department of Defense, the United States 
Agency for International Development 
(USAID), Bureau of Engaving and 
Printing (BEP,) Cooperative for Assistance 
and Relief Everywhere (CARE), and other 
entities to enhance global surveillance and 
preparedness. We have placed more than 
20 permanent staff (see map) in the field to provide on-the-ground assistance and support to 
countries and WHO, and to augment the GDD program. 
Because different countries have varying needs, the program has been designed as a continuum 
to include improving surveillance, implementing burden of disease studies to measure the 
impact of influenza, and enhancing pandemic preparedness. By using data generated by 
surveillance, each country will be able to determine which populations are most vulnerable to 
influenza-related morbidity and mortality and, therefore, should receive influenza vaccine. On 
the basis of surveillance and other analyses, influenza vaccination policy can be formulated, and 
issues related to vaccine production can be examined in each country and through a regional 
perspective. By collaborating with WHO, the United States and other countries with influenza 
vaccination programs can share information on developing vaccination policies and technologies 
for developing influenza vaccine production. Thus, the resources and efforts to improve 
influenza surveillance will pay future dividends by aiding in developing vaccine policy, vaccine 
production, pandemic planning, and preparedness overall. 
On April 13, 2009, the first case of 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus infection in the 
United States was identified. Subsequent cases were quickly identified in Mexico and other 
countries. The influenza virus identified in these early cases was unique and contained a 
combination of gene segments that had not been previously reported in animals or humans. 
As of March 2010, laboratory-confirmed infections with 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza had 
been identified in 212 countries and overseas territories and have been associated with more 
than 15,000 deaths reported worldwide to WHO. The H1N1 pandemic allowed many of the 
countries that we work with to showcase the progress they have made. First-time investigations 
of influenza were conducted in response to the pandemic, and laboratories that previously could 
not identify influenza were able to diagnose pandemic H1N1 by using molecular techniques. 
Many countries that had not reported influenza routinely before were able then to report 
consistently and contribute to the global picture of influenza during the pandemic. 
Although the response to the H1N1 pandemic was an opportunity to show recent progress, 
avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks still pose a significant and ongoing global health threat. 
To sustain the gains made during 2009, a broad-based commitment to build and maintain 
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sustainable (and eventually self-sustainable) influenza surveillance globally requires dedicated 
annualized resources and staffing. It is our hope that these U.S. HHS/CDC resources and 
technical assistance will act as a catalyst for affected countries, neighboring countries, and 
donor countries to commit resources to establish long-term influenza surveillance, prevention 
and control, and pandemic preparedness activities as high priorities. In addition, we envision 
that each affected country will use the technical assistance and resources available to improve 
surveillance, develop influenza vaccination policy, plan for the use of influenza vaccine both 
annually and during a pandemic, and work closely with regional and international partners to 
further preparedness. 
This program has implications 
beyond influenza. The capacity that 
is being developed for laboratory 
and epidemiologic surveillance has 
served as the basis for the diagnosis 
and investigation of other infectious 
diseases. Laboratory equipment and 
training has enabled the diagnosis 
and investigation of other diseases. 
Likewise, by implementing a global 
rapid response training program, 
U.S. CDC has trained or provided 
materials to train thousands of 
people globally. These courses 
have enabled the teams trained to 
participate in outbreaks for the 
recent pandemic and for many other 
pathogens, including Rift Valley 
fever, Ebola, and other respiratory 
diseases. Evidence shows that the 
technical assistance provided by the 
Influenza Division assists countries 
in increasing their capacity necessary 
for compliance with the new 
International Health Regulations 
(IHR). 
Our generic approach and a focus 
on seasonal and avian influenza 
contribute greatly to the global 
capacity for laboratory, epidemiology, and overall preparedness for emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases. The Influenza Division’s international program has contributed greatly 
to global capacity and readiness, but there is still much work to do. This report is the second 
annual update on the Influenza Division’s international activities. 
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U.S. CDC International Activities and Support, FY 2004 
Cooperative Agreement WHO Cooperative Agreement DoD Collaborations 
U.S. CDC International Activities and Support, FY 2007 
U.S. CDC International Activities and Support
FY 2004
U.S. CDC International Activities and Support
FY 2007
Cooperative Agreement WHO Cooperative Agreement U.S. CDC Influenza International Assignees 
Direct Funding GDD Sites DoD Collaborations 
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U.S. CDC International Activities and Support, FY 2009 
Cooperative Agreement Indirect Funding 
Epidemiologist Veterinary Epidemiologist (recruiting) Sustainability Cooperative 
Agreement Direct Funding Lab oratorian Veterinary Epidemiologist 
Laboratorian (Proposed) Pub lic Hea lth Adviso r GDD Sites Laboratory Systems (recruiting) DoD Collaborations 
U.S. CDC Field Assignee, FY 2009 
U.S. CDC International Activities and Support
FY 2009
U.S. CDC International Field Assignee
FY 2009
Epidemiologist (Proposed) WHOCooperative Ag reement 
Epidemiologist (Proposed) Veterinary E pidemiolog ist (Recruiting) Indirect Funding Cooperative Agreement 
Epidemiologist Public Health Advisor Sustainability Cooperative Agreement Direct Funding 




U.S. CDC and WHO 
Collaborations—Influenza 
March 2009 
The U.S. HHS/CDC Influenza Division has maintained cooperative agreements with WHO 
headquarters and the PAHO and WPRO regional offices for many years to address seasonal 
and pandemic influenza. In 2006, new cooperative agreements were put in place with SEARO, 
AFRO, EMRO, and EURO. The main purpose of the cooperative agreements has been to 
address global and regional preparedness needs for influenza—seasonal, pandemic, and 
avian—and to support enhancement of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network. 
Through these collaborations, standard guidelines for surveillance have been developed 
and used in many countries and the national disease burden has been estimated. This effort 
effectively increased the number of countries participating in global influenza surveillance and 
has enhanced the global and local capacity for early pandemic warning, effective response, and 
communication. This work helped countries respond to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
The U.S. CDC Influenza Division has provided funding and technical support to WHO 
headquarters in 2009 for multiple projects related to influenza: 
•	 Influenza Pandemic Preparedness 
WHO conducted an inventory of 180 nations and distributed a tool kit to support 
countries in designing and conducting pandemic exercises. WHO pandemic influenza 
guidance is under revision. 
•	 Animal-Human Interface Influenza Surveillance 
A workgroup has been expanded and meets the critically important mandate of 
improving surveillance and collaboration at the animal-human interface. Environmental 
surveillance for birds was conducted in Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Egypt, and pilot 
tools were developed for risk assessment of human infection. Work has been carried 
out in multiple countries, and relationships with the Office of International Education 
(OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have been strengthened. 
•	 Strengthening Influenza Surveillance Nationally and Globally 
Developing international standards for surveillance is planned. The international 
standards will integrate seasonal and avian influenza goals, develop educational materials 
for medical care workers, and integrate epidemiologic and laboratory surveillance. Work 
to develop pandemic surveillance guidelines has been conducted in collaboration with 
other international experts. 
•	 Influenza Surveillance Laboratories 
A process to look at improving the overall functioning of the Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network is underway. The process involves an assessment of the evolving 
needs of the system, which is particularly important given the spread of avian influenza 
and the emergence of 2009 H1N1 influenza virus. On-site consultations targeted 
countries in need of support. Critical work to develop a new platform for sharing 




           
             
          
            
         
            
            
            
           
            
             
 
 
               
        
•	 External Quality Assessment Program (EQAP) 
EQAP is critical to implementing quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) for 
RT-PCR, the method of choice for identification of H5 viruses, because of the 
laboratory biosafety conditions available in most countries (biosafety level 2 [BSL-2]). 
The objectives are to establish external quality control for the detection of influenza 
viruses, to monitor quality and standards of performance for NICs, and to promote 
good laboratory practices. The work with the EQAP has been ongoing and diagnostic 
QA assessment panels for PCR have been shipped out every 6 months for the past 3 
years. An increasing number of countries are participating. 
•	 Facilitating Early Response and Laboratory Confirmation 
This project addresses issues with the specimen delivery system. Our grant supports a full-
time staff member dedicated to facilitating shipments, keeping records, and enhancing the 
system setup. Preplacement of materials in some regional offices is planned to enhance the 
timeliness of distributing materials to laboratories worldwide. Virus sharing issues have 
been ongoing, and much time has been dedicated to platforms for sharing information. 
•	 Pandemic Influenza Rapid Response and Early Containment 
Work has been ongoing to update and publish new guidelines for containment. These 
activities strengthen the global pandemic preparedness by outlining standard operating 
procedures for global partners in the areas of logistics, management and rapid deployment 
of antiviral drugs, clearances, waivers and licensure of antiviral drugs and nonpharmaceuti­
cal interventions in countries, deployment of teams, and other important procedures. 
•	 Pandemic Risk Communication 
WHO conducted training for representatives from 150 member states in outbreak 
communication, provided training to journalists to improve quality of outbreak 
coverage, developed the Outbreak Communication Planning Guidelines, initiated the 
WHO Global Health Security Network, and supported development of an emergency 
communication simulation (exercise) tool kit. 
•	 WHO Biosafety and Laboratory Capacity and Strengthening Programs 
These programs have developed a pilot training tool to use (Train-the-Trainers Manual) as 
a means for laboratory personnel and their managers to improve biosafety practices around 
the world. Biosafety training seminars were conducted. The workshops have provided a 
forum for national health authorities and directors of national, central human and animal 
laboratories to meet subject matter experts in biosafety and biosecurity, as well as other 
national authorities from the same region with ongoing experience in these issues. 
•	 South-East Asia and Western Pacific Pandemic Influenza Stockpile Development 
We have provided continued support for the regional WHO stockpile. The 3 

components of this project are
 
ˏ	 Establishing an avian and pandemic influenza countermeasure stockpile modeled 
on commercial pharmaceutical distribution systems. 
ˏ	 Planning the release, shipment, receipt, and distribution of stockpiled materials to 
countries of SEARO and WPRO. 
ˏ	 Training and exercise drills for member states of SEARO and WPRO for the receipt 




Global Disease Detection and the 
Influenza Division 
The U.S. CDC’s Influenza Division and GDD have worked together since 2004 to decrease 
the threat of future pandemics. Together with partners, they have connected their technical 
expertise, international presence, and resources to develop an integrated global network to 
meet GDD’s congressional mandate to “…mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic public 
health event, whether by an intentional act of terrorism, or the natural emergence of a deadly 
infectious virus….” Congress, 2004. 
GDD and the Influenza Division protect the health of Americans and the global community 
from the spread of infectious disease threats by contributing to a global system of disease 
protection in support of WHO and the newly revised International Health Regulations (IHR). 
The goals of this partnership are to 
•	 Establish connected global systems and centers throughout every WHO region in order 
to detect and respond to new disease threats, including influenza. 
•	 Support a U.S. government response to infectious disease and influenza pandemics. 
•	 Support other countries’ responses by decreasing the time it takes to detect, report, and 
contain or mitigate the spread of infectious disease. 
U.S. CDC’s Global Response to Pandemic 2009 
H1N1 Influenza 
Beginning in early April 2009, U.S. CDC analysts received the first reports of unusual 
outbreaks of pneumonia in parts of Mexico. Within days, the Influenza Division and GDD 
recruited epidemiology, laboratory, quarantine, communication, logistics, and policy experts 
from around the agency to join the international team that has become the epicenter of CDC’s 
global response to 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 The U.S. CDC’s Influenza Division led the agency’s response to the pandemic both 
domestically and globally with support from experts at U.S. CDC headquarters and in 
40 countries in which U.S. CDC supports influenza preparedness. 
•	 The GDD operations center monitored reports of 2009 H1N1 infections and associated 
deaths, including countries that had not yet officially reported cases to WHO. 
•	 U.S. CDC staff who were assigned to more than 50 countries, including 6 GDD 
regional centers (one in each WHO region), provided real-time reports on influenza 
trends in their host countries. 
GDD Regional Centers 
A central focus of GDD is establishing and expanding GDD regional centers. As a network, 
GDD regional centers coordinate with local, regional, and global public health entities to 
rapidly detect, accurately identify, and promptly contain emerging infectious diseases and 
bioterrorist threats that occur internationally. 
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CDC’s Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program
GDD Regional Centers
During 2004–2009, U.S. CDC launched and developed 6 GDD regional centers, 1 in each 
of the WHO regions. Regional centers are located in China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Guatemala, and Thailand. In 2009, India was identified as the location for the 7th GDD 
regional center, and initial activities are underway. 













Location of GDD Center 
Approximate Operational Reach of GDD Center 
(Note: dependent upon establishment of agreements with neighboring countries) 
GDD regional centers are selected in consultation with national and international partners. 
Centers assimilate the on-site expertise of full-time U.S. CDC assignees, Ministry of Health 
(MOH) staff and partners, and other resources to help the host country and surrounding 
region increase their own abilities to detect, confirm, and contain public health threats and 
emergencies of international concern. 
The Influenza Division provides support to 
GDD’s outbreak, laboratory, surveillance, 
training, and risk communication activities, 
and the division is a vested leader in defining 
regional center priorities in coordination 
with MOHs, including policy development. 
For example, by using data generated 
from the variety of surveillance systems 
developed through the National Center for 
Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
(NCIRD) and GDD’s collective resources 
and scientific scope, influenza vaccination 
was first recommended to Thailand in 
2008. Questions about vaccine policy can 
be approached on a country-by-country and regional basis to determine the populations that 
are most vulnerable to influenza-related morbidity and mortality and establish evidence-based 
decisions on who should receive influenza vaccine. 
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GDD Operations Center 
The GDD operations center is located at U.S. CDC’s headquarters in Atlanta and is an 
innovative unit that uses nontraditional surveillance methods to provide early warning about 
international disease threats. This event-based surveillance system is particularly effective at 
detecting disease occurrences in countries that have weak surveillance and reporting. Since 
2006, the GDD operations center has provided support to more than 30 outbreak responses in 
15 countries. 
The operations center is often the first to alert CDC U.S.-based programs or CDC international 
staff about a potential disease abnormality with potential to become a threat to the public’s 
health. Information is collected and analyzed from Internet-based media reports by using 
sophisticated text-mining and multilingual translation systems and then entered into a custom 
designed software application that also distributes daily reports to U.S. CDC programs. 
The operations center is U.S. CDC’s liaison with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GOARN) to receive and respond to requests for international assistance to control 
disease outbreaks. In addition, the operations center provides technical support and funds for out­
break response to U.S. CDC programs when host countries and WHO request U.S. assistance. 
Development of Public Health Capacity 
GDD Centers Core Capacities U.S. CDC Program Leads 
Emerging infectious disease detection response. IEIP 
Training in field epidemiology and laboratory 
methods. 
Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) 
Pandemic influenza preparedness and response. Influenza Division 
Zoonotic disease research and containment at 
the human-animal interface. 
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic 
Infectious Diseases 
Health communication and information 
technology. 
Two programs: 
Office of Communication•	 
Information Technology Services Office •	 
Laboratory systems and biosafety. Two programs: 
Division of Laboratory Systems •	 
Office of Health and Safety •	 
Extending Scientific Expertise 
GDD regional centers integrate and extend the abilities of diverse scientific disciplines and 
public health programs throughout U.S. CDC that are needed to create systems and solutions 
to better identify and control public health threats at the source of the problem. GDD is 
connected to more than 2,500 U.S. CDC experts in more than 50 countries. In addition, GDD 
provides tactical assistance through its Technical Support Corps, a cadre of technical experts that 
provide 24-hour, 7-day support to GDD regional centers and can facilitate aid to the field in 
the case of prolonged or complex emergencies. 
Currently, 14 subject matter experts throughout U.S. CDC are funded by GDD. Many are 
finding new protocols and efficiencies that are beginning to be shared between U.S. CDC pro­
grams and GDD centers. 
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GDD progress represents the collective achievements of the GDD regional centers and other U.S. 
CDC programs and partners and is reported cumulatively from January 2006 through October 
2009. 
GDD Influenza Activities 
Outbreak Response 
•	 GDD regional centers provided rapid response to more than 436 diseases in 2009. 
•	 Influenza-related infections accounted for 45% of total outbreaks. 
Surveillance 
•	 More than 4 million persons are under surveillance for pneumonia and other respiratory 
diseases, diarrhea, jaundice, febrile illness, and other syndromes. 
•	 In 2009, GDD centers tracked and analyzed all available surveillance data ranging from 
U.S. CDC’s event-based systems, sentinel sites, and population-based cohorts to detect 
outbreaks for pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza to evaluate interventions and make 
policy recommendations. 
Networking 
Since April 2009, as part of the international response to the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza 
outbreak, U.S. CDC has deployed 67 experts to 12 countries to assist with field investigations, 
laboratory setup and training, risk communication, mitigation strategies, case definitions, data 
management, logistics, clinical care, surveillance, and transmission studies. 
GDD Headquarters Leadership, Atlanta 
Scott Dowell, MD, MPH 
Division Director, Disease Detection and Emergency Response 
Ray Arthur, PhD 
Director, GDD Operations Center 
Stephanie Griswold, MPH 
GDD Program Manager 
GDD Regional Center Leadership 
GDD-Kenya: Established 2004 
Rob Breiman, MD, MPH 
GDD Country Coordinator 
Mark Katz, MD 
Influenza Lead 
GDD-Thailand: Established 2004 
Susan Maloney, MD, MPH 
GDD Country Coordinator 
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Mark Simmerman, MD, MPH 
Influenza Lead 
GDD-China: Established 2006 
Jeff McFarland, MD 
GDD Country Coordinator and Influenza Lead 
GDD-Central America and Panama (CAP): Established 2006 
Isabella Danel, MD, MPH 
GDD Country Coordinator 
Nivaldo Linares Pérez, MD, MSc, PhD 
Influenza Lead 
GDD-Egypt: Established 2006 
Erica Dueger, PhD, DVM 
GDD Country Coordinator 
Michael Demming, MD, MPH 
Influenza Lead 
GDD-Kazakhstan: Established 2008 
John Moran, MD, MPH 
Influenza Lead 
GDD-India: Selected in 2009 
Renu Lal, PhD 
Acting GDD Country Coordinator and Influenza Lead 










Africa Regional Office (AFRO)
 
Human Influenza Surveillance: AFRO 2010
 
U.S. CDC Assignee 
WHO AFRO Headquarters 
WHO Regional Lab 
GDD Site 
Proposed WHO National Influenza Center 
WHO National Influenza Center 
Pasteur Institute 
AFRO Member States 
Proposed Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
HHS/IPN CoAG 
Influenza Cooperative Agreement 0 250 500 1,000 1,500 
Miles 
The WHO AFRO coordinates and oversees activities among 46 member states in the AFRO 
region. In 2006, WHO listed 9 African countries with NICs that could detect influenza viruses 
and report epidemiologic findings to WHO. Laboratory assessments conducted in 2006 and 
2007 by WHO and U.S. CDC determined that only 5 of 9 NICs were active. 
The U.S. CDC signed a 5-year cooperative agreement in 2006 to help strengthen avian influ­
enza preparedness and response in the AFRO region. This involves expanding the NIC network 
to improve both diagnostic and epidemiologic capacities by working toward the following goals: 
•	 Enhancing epidemiologic and virologic surveillance for influenza, including highly 
pathogenic avian influenza. 
•	 Reinforcing response and containment of avian and pandemic influenza. 
•	 Strengthening preparedness and communication for avian and pandemic influenza. 
The U.S. CDC works with AFRO to expand the Global Influenza Surveillance Network 
(GISN) in the African region. In 2008, AFRO developed guidelines for sentinel site surveillance 
for influenza and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) and included surveillance for 
SARI within the Integrated Disease and Surveillance Response (IDSR) system. AFRO has 
recommended that all member states report SARI in their weekly reporting activities from the 
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district level. The states are asked to immediately report unusual SARI cases or clusters and 
suspected cases of influenza A virus (H5N1) or pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
All countries in the region have been reporting 2009 H1N1 influenza since May 2009. 
Countries in the western epidemiologic block of AFRO have been reporting human avian 
influenza cases weekly. As part of the WHO global response to 2009 H1N1 influenza, AFRO 
disseminated surveillance guidelines for novel influenza to all member states. These countries 
use U.S. CDC pandemic influenza funds to implement IDSR training, promote reporting 
of SARI and other notifiable diseases by clinicians, and enhance disease surveillance at 
international points of entry. 
Ten countries in the region (i.e., Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Gabon, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Togo) have begun or are planning to begin 
influenza testing. CDC pandemic influenza funds have supported the ongoing training of 
laboratory staff. In addition, workshops have been held on biosafety and laboratory security. 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Richard Davis, MSFS 
Project Officer 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A20 
Atlanta, GA 30333 
E-mail: rbdavis@cdc.gov 
Inzune Hwang, MD 
Epidemiologist 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Rd., MS A32 
Atlanta, GA 30333 
E-mail: Ihwange@cdc.gov 
CDC-Kenya Field Staff 
Mark Katz, MD 
Global Disease Detection Division 
CDC-Kenya 
KEMRI Headquarters 
Mbagathi Rd., off Mbagathi Way 
P.O. Box 606 




Celia Woodfill, PhD 
Avian Influenza Focal Point 
CSR/AFRO/WHO 







•	 Capital: Luanda •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 182.31 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 1,246,700 sq km live births; male: 194.38 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 169.64 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  13,068,161 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 67.4%; male:  0–14 years: 43.6% (male 2,760,264/ 
82.9%; female: 54.2% (2001 est.) female 2,707,665); 15–64 years: 53.6% (male 
3,416,914/female 3,302,552); 65 years or older: 2.7% •	 GDP: $114.6 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 151,609/female 192,353) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $9,100 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 37.92 
years; male: 36.99 years; female: 38.9 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Preparedness and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began FY 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
The National Institute of Public Health (INSP) is the central reference laboratory of the MOH. 
The INSP led the emergency response role for 2009 H1N1 influenza. The first Angola case was 
confirmed in September 2009 at the laboratory of the National Institute of Communicable 
Disease (NICD) in South Africa. U.S. CDC and NICD supported INSP to build the capacity 
of the laboratory and to provide on-the-job training on molecular biology techniques to 
diagnose 2009 H1N1 influenza on-site in Angola. 
Laboratory consultants from NICD South Africa provided additional support in Angola from 
October 2005 to October 2009 to test for pandemic and seasonal influenza at the Angola INSP. 
During this period, the consultants worked with 3 INSP laboratory technicians to test 159 
samples; 20 samples were positive for 2009 H1N1 influenza viruses, and 5 samples were positive 
for seasonal influenza H3N2. To date, 196 samples have been tested, and 36 are confirmed 
2009 H1N1 influenza cases. Since 2006, U.S. CDC has supported the INSP laboratory with 




Angola has 3 functioning sentinel surveillance sites supported by the avian and pandemic 
influenza cooperative agreement. The INSP molecular biology laboratory has the capacity to 
diagnose the influenza viruses by using real-time RT-PCR. 
The national influenza surveillance effort in Angola started in October 2008 through intensive 
on-site training activities with nurses, medical doctors, and laboratory technicians. The health 
workers were trained at the 3 selected sentinel sites: David Bernardino Pediatric Hospital, Josina 
Machel Central Hospital, and Uige Provincial Hospital. 
In May 2009, active surveillance started in these sentinel sites through SARI case identification 
and influenza-like illness (ILI) cases in outpatients. A data collection tool was developed by 
CDC South Africa; it was used by dedicated nurses who worked in the sentinel site facilities. 
They collected oral and nasal pharyngeal samples and transported them to the INSP, where they 
were packaged and sent to the South Africa NICD for confirmation during the early phases 
of surveillance activities. The surveillance system collects both epidemiologic information and 
laboratory specimens at the sentinel sites in Luanda and Uige provinces. 
Laboratory 
CDC Angola supports the molecular biology laboratory of INSP with training, laboratory 
equipment procurement, installation, and maintenance. Reagents and laboratory consumables 
are furnished to help with influenza surveillance activities. Consistent training of INSP 
laboratory technicians included hands-on work with molecular techniques, such as real-time 
RT-PCR for H5N1, 2009 H1N1 influenza, and seasonal influenza. In addition, laboratory 
standard operating procedures were developed to enhance quality measures. 
Laboratory databases, reporting systems, and mechanisms for shipping samples to reference 
laboratories were established. Ten INSP laboratory technicians received certification training on 
the shipment of dangerous goods (IATA approved). 
Preparedness 
Angola has a national preparedness plan that was collaboratively developed and updated with all 





U.S. CDC funding has sponsored the following trainings: 
•	 Laboratory training of 2 technicians at NICD South Africa on 2009 H1N1 influenza 
diagnosis in May 2009. 
•	 Specialized training to strengthen the capacity of the pandemic influenza Rapid 
Response Teams (RRTs). The RRTs were established and trained in Luanda in 
September 2008; they had 36 participants from the Ministries of Health and 
Agriculture and the Angola Armed Force. The 36 participants represented 15 of the 18 
provinces. 
•	 Twenty participants were trained in influenza sentinel surveillance; 2 hospitals in 
Luanda were selected as sentinel sites for SARI and ILI cases (Luanda, October 2008). 
Forty participants participated in on-the-job training at Josina Machel Hospital and 
David Bernardino Pediatric Hospital (October 2008–May 2009). 
•	 One hundred sixty participants from Uige and Huila provinces, where an additional 2 
sentinel sites were identified (October 2009), received training at a workshop. 
•	 Twenty-two provincial ministry of health and agriculture officers were trained in Uige 
Province in influenza sentinel surveillance (April 2009). 
•	 Seven health workers had on-the-job training at Uige hospital and provincial laboratory 
to implement SARI and ILI surveillance (August 2009). 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 CDC Angola and INSP played active roles in preparedness, communication strategies, 
and response efforts for outbreaks of public health concerns, such as the 2009 H1N1 
influenza epidemic. 
•	 CDC Angola participated in the MOH multidisciplinary technical team that was assist­
ing with the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak and offered a workshop for national and 
international stakeholders, including CDC influenza experts from South Africa. 
•	 INSP laboratory technicians travelled to the South Africa National Institute of 
Communicable Disease Respiratory Virus Unit to receive training in 2009 H1N1 
influenza diagnostic techniques. This collaborative effort supported INSP’s expansion of 
SARI illness and ILI surveillance activities at 3 sentinel sites. 
Several trainings were conducted by the INSP and CDC Angola and South Africa: 
•	 Trained 207 health workers in Luanda province on sample collection, preservation, and 
transportation. 
•	 Supported the interministerial commission’s work group of pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza. 
•	 Provided surveillance materials to selected sites and provinces (e.g., questionnaires, per­
sonal protective equipment [PPE] for the surveillance officers, sample collections, swabs, 
and viral transport media, including standard operating procedures and guidelines). 
•	 Provided 2009 H1N1 influenza workshops. 
•	 Provided information, education, and communication materials. 





Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Established 3 functional sentinel sites in Luanda and Uige provinces. 
•	 Supplied (U.S. CDC) reagents and needed equipment at the INSP laboratory to help 
with 2009 H1N1 influenza diagnoses. 
•	 Contributed to a more robust pandemic influenza response through successful capacity-
building activities that involved health workers at INSP laboratory and sentinel sites. 
•	 The National Institute of Public Health became the 4th laboratory in the Southern 
Africa region to diagnose and confirm 2009 H1N1 influenza cases on-site. 
Special Influenza Projects 
Discussions were initiated to establish partnerships and research projects involving the faculty, 
medical, and nursing students of the public university. 
Principal Collaborators 
Filomena Gomes Da Silva, Director 
Instituto Nacional de Saúde Pública 
Rua Amilcar Cabral,Maianga, Luanda 
Republica de Angola 
E-mail: filomenasilva5@yahoo.com.br 
Yolanda Cardoso, MSc, Virologist 
Instituto Nacional de Saúde Pública 
Rua Amilcar Cabral, Maianga, Luanda 
República de Angola 
E-mail: yolanda.insp@gmail.com
U.S. CDC Staff 
Francine Buranga 
Avian Influenza Coordinator 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Instituto Nacional de Saúde Pública 
Rua Amilcar Cabral, Maianga, Luanda 
República de Angola 
E-mail: francineb@ao.cdc.gov 
Margarida Rodrigues, PhD 
Laboratory Advisor CDC 
Instituto Nacional de Saúde Pública 
Rua Amilcar Cabral, Maianga, Luanda 
República de Angola 
E-mail: rodriguesm@ao.cdc.gov 
Xiomara Brown, MD, MPH 
Epidemiologist, GAP Chief of Party 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Instituto Nacional de Saúde Pública 
Rua Amilcar Cabral, Maianga, Luanda 





Democratic Republic of Congo
 
•	 Capital: Kinshasa •	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 53.98 
•	 Area: 2,345,410 sq km years; male: 52.22 years; female: 55.8 years (2008 est.) 
•	 Population: 70,916,439 •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 83.11 deaths/1,000 
•	 Age Structure: live births; male: 91.14 deaths/1,000 live births;  0–14 years: 47.1% (male 
female: 74.83 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 15,711,817/female 15,594,449); 15–64 years: 
50.4% (male 16,672,399/female 16,875,468); 65 •	 Literacy Rate: Total population: 67.2%; male: 
years or older: 2.5% (male 674,766/female 985,607) 80.9%; female: 54.1% (2001 est.) 
(2008 est.) •	 GDP: $21.08 billion (2008 est.) 
•	 GDP per Capita: $300 (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 3rd year of the agreement. 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been collaborating with the U.S. CDC on 
influenza control since 2006. The collaboration is through a cooperative agreement—Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza. A core of professionals (technical 
and administrative) and experts from the 4th directorate, Institut National de Recherche 
Biomédicale (INRB), and the Kinshasa School of Public Health work on the influenza 
surveillance network project. The team continues its close collaboration with the U.S. CDC 
avian influenza focal point and WHO and the national committee for avian influenza. 
International support has contributed to strengthen influenza surveillance and priority diseases 
in the country, notably, support from U.S. CDC to improve influenza laboratory diagnostic 
capacity. The agreement improves influenza laboratory testing capability and enhances 
preparedness and response capacity to influenza pandemic and other disease emergencies. 
Since its establishment in 1984, INRB continued to function despite many social and economic 
challenges within DRC. As of 1998, thanks to bilateral and multilateral collaborations with 
international donors, INRB enhanced its research infrastructure and improved the work 
capacity of its technicians and scientists. Currently, INRB is involved in the surveillance of 




The DRC has not detected human or animal cases of H5N1, but remains at high risk because 
of certain factors, such as its large geographic area, location in the direct pathway of wild bird 
migratory movements that originate from Asia and Europe, and the importation of poultry 
and products from other countries with H5N1. Another important factor is public knowledge 
of H5N1 influenza prevention. In addition, the recent emergence of 2009 H1N1 influenza 
worldwide causes fear, worry, and confusion among people in DRC. 
Ten countrywide sentinel sites were supported in FY 2009 to strengthen efficiency in 
detecting, reporting, sampling, testing, and shipping laboratory specimens to the national 
influenza laboratory. Support provided included tools and forms for data collection, laboratory 
consumables and supplies, phone credits, payment of shipping costs, and local transport. 
Over the past 3 years, the Kinshasa School of Public Health (KSPH), the INRB, and the MOH 
4th directorate in charge of disease control carried out surveillance activities, such as helping to 
•	 Write national plans for surveillance and response to avian and pandemic influenza. 
•	 Integrate human infection from avian influenza virus on the national list of surveillance 
diseases. 
•	 Adapt and disseminate documents about influenza case definition and notification, 
samples collection and shipment, and reporting. 
•	 Train medical biologists in PCR. 
•	 Train national and provincial sentinel site staff. 




•	 Analyze samples and reporting results. 
Laboratory 
INRB, DRC’s national reference laboratory, performs seasonal and pandemic influenza 
laboratory diagnostics. INRB has set up a database, purchased reagents and office equipment, 
and hired 2 staff to perform project functions. In FY 2009, INRB received an RT-PCR machine 
and reagents from CDC-Atlanta. The RT-PCR machine was set up, and staff were trained by a 
consultant contracted by CDC-Atlanta. A core of professionals (technical and administrative) 
and experts from the directorate, INRB, and the KSPH worked on the influenza surveillance 
network project. The team continues to work closely with the U.S. CDC avian influenza focal 
point, WHO, and the national committee for avian influenza. The main components of the 
INRB include 
•	 Clinical laboratory. 
•	 Applied research. 
•	 Laboratory-based disease surveillance. 
















Despite challenges to setting up and maintaining the influenza laboratory, influenza testing was 
conducted during FY 2009 with the following results: 
•	 A total of 1,016 samples were collected during FY 2009. 
ˏ A total of 360 samples were collected from patients with SARI. 
ˏ A total of 547 samples were collected from patients with ILI. 
ˏ A total of 109 samples were collected from patients who were not classified. 
•	 Of the 1,016 samples 
ˏ A total of 78 (8%) tested positive for influenza A. 
ˏ A total of 20 (2%) tested positive for influenza B, and 908 (90%) tested negative 
for influenza A or B. 
•	 Results show that A (H3N2) was the predominant strain circulating in 2008 and 2009. 
•	 Of the 78 patients with influenza A
 




ˏ	 Seventy-eight samples with influenza A were subtyped: 

› Forty-four cases of A/H3N2 (56%).
 
› Twelve cases of seasonal A/H1N1 (15%).
 
› Twelve cases of new H1N1 (15%).
 
› Six cases unclassified by real-time RT-PCR (8%).
 
› Four cases not analyzed (6%).
 
Preparedness 
The Avian Influenza National Plan was generated in 1996 and revised in June 2008 and March 
2009. The latest version is waiting to be adopted by the government. The plan’s goal is to 
•	 Prevent introduction of avian and pandemic influenza into the country. 
•	 Control outbreaks by key interventions, surveillance, stock importation controls, mass 
communications, trainings, disease containment activities, and compensation for lost 
poultry stock. 
The new revision aimed to adapt the national plan according to the current epidemiologic 
context and available resources. The plan was revised by the Avian Influenza National Technical 
Committee with all the commissions integrating the human and animal aspects of the surveil­
lance and response. The DRC government is considering the production of a distinct plan that 
will integrate influenza H5N1 and 2009 H1N1 influenza. The integrated plan is in process. 
Support to the MOH is being provided to conduct field assessments of weekly surveillance 
systems and to improve the preparedness planning and rapid response teams. A weekly database 
is managed by the MOH office in charge of surveillance diseases, and this data is shared global­
ly. In addition, the national technical committee organized 10 monthly meetings from October 






Training is provided by the KSPH to 
•	 Update the knowledge and skills of Congolese health professionals, as needed, to address 
health management priorities. 
•	 Enhance disease surveillance, health research, and operations research to gather and 
evaluate data and programs in the DRC. 
•	 Provide leadership and training on the use of information technology to the health 
program managers and policy makers in the DRC. 
•	 Train health care professionals from the influenza sentinel sites to ensure adequate 
performance in detecting, reporting, sampling, using rapid tests, managing cases, 
and reducing transmission risk at the sites. This activity was conducted by trained 
supervisors, including clinicians, medical biologists, and a laboratory technician. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
The outbreak of 2009 H1N1 influenza was a good opportunity to strengthen the national 
disease surveillance system. WHO helped to manage the outbreak by delivering 100,000 doses 
of antiviral medicine (Tamiflu) for the national H1N1 response. 
During the outbreak, messages were created and sent on a small scale according to developed 
communication strategies. These messages helped people distinguish between influenza A 
(H1N1) and avian influenza (AI). More of these messages will be designed and sent to the rest 
of DRC. 
Special Projects 
There is a great need to improve communication about influenza surveillance from Kinshasa to 
other areas throughout the DRC. An influenza hotline was set up in 2006 by INRB to provide 
awareness of influenza to the population, and it continues to provide the accurate information. 
The number of callers to the hotline declined before the HIN1 pandemic, but 84,200 callers 
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•	 Capital: Addis Ababa •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 82.64 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 1,127,127 sq km live births; male: 94.08 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 70.87 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 88,013,491 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 42.7%; male:  0–14 years: 46% (male 18,922,334/ •	
50.3%; female: 35.1% (2003 est.) female 19,017,593); 15–64 years: 51.4% (male 
20,749,002/female 21,656,509); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $63.44 billion (2008 est.) 
2.7% (male 947,323/female 1,252,077) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $800 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 54.99 
years; male: 52.54 years; female: 57.51 years  
(2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Preparedness and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began August 2007. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the influenza cooperative agreement. 
Surveillance 
•	 Established 3 sentinel sites in Addis Ababa that feed into the national influenza 

laboratory for ILI in clinic patients and SARI in hospital patients.
 
•	 Adapted and finalized sentinel surveillance implementation guidelines and protocol; 
ILI and SARI case definitions; and case-based, weekly aggregated, reporting formats for 
influenza sentinel surveillance in Ethiopia. 
Laboratory 
•	 Collected specimens in November 2008 from ILI sites and in January 2009 from SARI 
sites. To date, the number of specimens collected from ILI sites is 89 and from SARI 
sites is 132. 
•	 Analyzed, laboratory samples by using real-time PCR from ILI sites (60) and from SARI 
sites (47). 
•	 CDC-Kenya scientists gave an orientation on real-time PCR and troubleshooting, 
August 31, 2009 to September 10, 2009. 
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•	 Obtained certification of biologic safety cabinets in National Influenza Laboratory, 
September 2009. 
•	 Participated in WHO External Quality Assurance Program (EQAP) in July 2009 for the 
first time. 
•	 Presented Ethiopian National Influenza Lab at first NIC meeting in the AFRO region, 
Dakar, Senegal, November 2008. 
Preparedness 
•	 Reactivated the national task force for zoonotic diseases at the highest government 
level and reviewed the national pandemic preparedness and response plan involving all 
stakeholders. 
•	 Developed public awareness exercises. 
•	 Distributed standard case definitions. 
•	 Developed an influenza communication strategy. 
Training 
•	 Provided 2 rounds of training on specimen collection, storage, transportation, infection 
prevention and control, and epidemiology of avian influenza for 58 health care workers 
from selected influenza sentinel sites, September 2008 and January 2009. 
•	 Laboratory staff member participated in training workshop, “Safe Shipment of 
Infectious Substances,” Johannesburg, South Africa, March 9–11, 2009, organized by 
WHO. 
•	 Two laboratory staff members participated in training organized by CDC-Kenya, 
Kenya Medical Research Institute on real-time PCR diagnosis of 2009 H1N1 influenza, 
Nairobi, Kenya, June 2–4, 2009. 
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 H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Gave orientation on new influenza to 138 federal and regional health professionals, May 
2009, and to staff of St. Peter’s Hospital in Addis Ababa, the site identified for screening 
suspect cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Identified 31 federal and regional hospitals for the management of cases. 
•	 Distributed specimen collection materials to health facilities selected for screening cases 
of 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Distributed antiviral drugs (i.e., Tamiflu) and N95 masks to selected hospitals. 
•	 Identified isolation and treatment wards, primarily at St. Paul’s Hospital and later at St. 
Peter’s Tuberculosis Specialized Hospital, both located in Addis Ababa. 
•	 Initiated laboratory testing of suspect cases immediately after receiving 2009 H1N1 
influenza kits and consumable laboratory items from U.S. CDC, June 2009. 
•	 Screened more than 80 suspect cases; 10 cases were positive for 2009 H1N1 influenza. 




•	 Prepared and submitted an abstract for the Africa Influenza Scientific Symposium on 
2009 H1N1 influenza in Ethiopia. 
•	 Participated in briefings to the public on the threat of 2009 H1N1 influenza and 
laboratory status regarding testing for suspect cases. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 




•	 Laboratory participated in WHO EQAP for the first time. 
•	 Built capacity for real-time PCR testing of influenza viruses at the Ethiopian Health and 
Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI). 
Principal Collaborators 
Daddi Jima, MD, MPH 
Deputy Director General 
EHNRI 
P.O. Box 1242 
E-mail: daddij@ehnri.gov.et 
Workenesh Ayele, PhD 





U.S. CDC Staff 


















•	 Capital: Accra •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 49.89 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 238,533 sq km live births; male: 53.38 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 46.29 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.) 24,339,838 
 •	 Age Structure: •	 Literacy Rate: Total population: 57.9%; male: 0–14 years: 36.8% (male 4,529,594/ 
66.4%; female: 49.8% (2000 census) female 4,429,802); 15–64 years: 59.6% (male 
7,252,245/female 7,262,757); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $14.93 billion (2009 est.) 
3.6% (male 395,007/female 470,433) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,500 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 60.55 
years; male: 59.36 years; female: 61.78 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Indirect Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks in Collaboration with U.S. NAMRU-3 in Ghana 
Continuous global scrutiny of influenza viruses that cause illness in humans is required to detect
changes in the viruses and distinguish outbreaks that could lead to pandemics. Therefore, influenza
surveillance has been initiated by routinely monitoring acute respiratory illness in selected health 
institutions in Ghana. This surveillance is part of national preparedness efforts for the threat of
pandemic influenza with the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit-3 (NAMRU-3) and U.S. CDC. 
Surveillance 
Seasonal influenza surveillance was started at sentinel sites in Ghana in September 2007. Since 
then, more than 1,700 samples have been processed, and 100 isolates have been cultured. Before 
FY 2009, 289 samples had been processed and 28 isolates cultured. In FY 2009, this number 
rose to 1,380 samples processed and 65 isolates cultured. More than 100 samples each month 
have been processed consistently since April 2009. 
Laboratory 
The following lists quantities and types of samples processed: 
ILI 
•	 Processed 1,380 samples from 10 sentinel sites. 
•	 Cultured 65 isolates. 
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•	 Detected 4 antigenically distinct H3N2 viruses; the samples were sent to the WHO 
in London for further analysis. Several unusual H3N2 viruses were identified and 
sequenced. 
2009 H1N1 influenza 
•	 Processed 200 samples. 
•	 Fourteen samples were positive for pandemic H1N1. 
SARI 
•	 Processed 32 samples by DFA. 
•	 Two samples were 2 positive by DFA (i.e., RSV and influenza A H3). 
Avian influenza (AI) 
•	 Collected and processed 1,000 bird samples. 
Preparedness 
•	 Sensitization of Muslim pilgrims at Hajj village. Drugs for treating influenza have been 
left with the medical team to treat those who may contract influenza while in Mecca 
during the pilgrimage. 
•	 Undertook technical support visits and training for regional and district teams in 
surveillance and management of diseases by national teams in all 10 regions. 
•	 Continued surveillance and managed cases by regional and district teams. 
•	 Meetings of technical coordinating committees at national, regional, and district levels 
are ongoing. 
•	 Intensified public education through mass media (i.e., electronic, print). 
•	 Collected and transported samples from suspected cases to Noguchi for diagnosis is 
ongoing. 
•	 Distributed antiviral drugs for 2009 H1N1 influenza and materials for collecting 
specimens from suspected patients to all the regions. 
•	 Activated the communication strategy and distributed posters on 2009 H1N1 influenza 
to all the regions. 
•	 Directed all regional health directorates to work with media houses to secure free airtime 
in order to educate the public on the disease. 
•	 The School Health Education Program coordinators are taking steps to sensitize school 
children and to facilitate the detection of any case of fever with cough or sore throat for 
immediate notification. 
Training 
SARI (i.e., Global Emerging Infections Surveillance [GEIS], CDC) 
•	 Trained 144 hospital staff in research ethics. 
•	 Provided direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) test training for 10 hospital laboratory staff, 




•	 Provided surveillance protocol and epidemiologic training for more than 80 hospital 
staff, including 11 from the 37th military hospital. 
•	 Trained 25 health care workers in sample collection techniques for nasopharyngeal and 
oropharyngeal (NP/OP) swabs. 
Influenza (CDC-Atlanta) 
•	 Trained 30 participants from West African countries (i.e., Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone) in surveillance epidemiology and 
laboratory techniques at a regional training workshop funded by CDC-Atlanta. 
ILI 





•	 Provided training for 15 people from 5 countries (i.e., Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire) in Ghana at the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical 
Research (NMIMR). 
•	 Trained 76 health care workers from public and private facilities designated as pandemic 
clinics by the MOH in H1N1 case definitions and sample collection. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
The pandemic strain of 2009 H1N1 influenza was identified in Ghana in August 2009. To 
date, 345 samples have been collected from suspected cases, and contacts have been tested at the 
NMIMR laboratory; 38 positive cases of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza have been confirmed 
by the laboratory. From these 38 confirmed cases, 33 are from the Greater Accra region, 3 are 
from the Western region, and 2 are from the Ashanti region. No deaths have been recorded. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
In August 2009, a SARI protocol was implemented at the largest hospital in Ghana (i.e., Korle 
Bu Teaching Hospital), the 37th military hospital, and the Tema General Hospital through a 
collaboration among the U.S. CDC, the U.S. NAMRU-3, the Ghana Health Service (MOH), 
and the NMIMR in Ghana. 
Principal Collaborators 
Joseph Amankwa, MD 
Director of Public Health Division 
Ghana Health Service 
E-mail: jaamankwa@yahoo.com 
Lawson Ahadzie, MD 
Disease Surveillance Department 
Ghana Health Service 
E-mail: lahadzie@yahoo.com 
William Ampofo, MD 
Influenza Laboratory Coordinator 




U.S. NAMRU-3 and U.S. CDC Staff 
LCDR Karl Kronmann 
Officer-in-Charge 
U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3, Ghana Detachment 
Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research 
E-mail: kckronmann@yahoo.com or kronmannkc@state.gov 
Talla-Nzussouo Ndahwouh, MD 
Regional Avian and Pandemic Influenza Advisor 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No.3 










•	 Capital: Nairobi •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 56.01 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 582,650 sq km live births; male: 58.95 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 53.02 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 40,046,566 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 85.1%; male:  0–14 years: 42.2% (male 8,065,789/ 
90.6%; female: 79.7% (2003 est.) female 7,953,077); 15–64 years: 55.2% (male 
10,498,468/female 10,434,764); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $66.48 billion (2008 est.) 
2.6% (male 457,886/female 543,854) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,800 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 56.64 
years; male: 56.42 years; female: 56.87 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2004. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 5th year of the agreement. 
The Kenya Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (MOPHS) has a longstanding 
collaboration with U.S. CDC for influenza pandemic preparedness. The bilateral agreement 
between the Kenya MOPHS and U.S. CDC started in 2004; it has provided resources to create 
a national sentinel surveillance system for influenza, including 10 sentinel sites and a NIC. The 
collaboration has also supported work in infection control and risk communication relating to 
influenza pandemic preparedness. 
Surveillance 
The Kenya MOPHS and CDC-Kenya has maintained a national influenza sentinel surveillance 
system at 10 sites. Specimens are collected from patients with ILI and SARI at 7 provincial 
hospitals, 2 refugee camp hospitals, and the national referral hospital in Nairobi. Samples 
are tested at the NIC, part of the Kenya Medical Research Institute, and the CDC-Kenya 
International Emerging Infections Program laboratory. Every month, approximately 500 
samples are collected and tested. 
In early May 2009, following the first cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza in North America, the 
Kenya MOPHS undertook a campaign with CDC-Kenya, WHO-Kenya, and the U.S. Army 
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Medical Research Unit in Kenya to train clinicians at additional hospitals and clinics around 
the country in order to identify and collect samples from suspected H1N1 patients. Samples 
are tested at the NIC and CDC-Kenya laboratories daily. Additional surveillance and detection 
work undertaken included 
•	 Regional laboratory trainings for laboratory scientists in Africa. 
•	 National, provincial, and district-level trainings to support implementing the national 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system. 
•	 Periodic supervisory visits to sentinel surveillance and IDSR sites to monitor influenza 
surveillance. 
•	 Support for training of national MOPHS laboratorians in influenza laboratory testing, 
including hands-on rotations through the NIC in Nairobi. 
Preparedness 
With support from partners in Kenya, the Kenya MOPHS has devoted considerable effort to 
preparing the country for an influenza pandemic. The results of the work that took place over 
the past 3 to 4 years were clear when the pandemic emerged in Kenya in June 2009. Kenya was 
able to identify its 1st case of 2009 H1N1 influenza by testing at the NIC, and contact tracing 
was conducted with the help of staff from influenza sentinel surveillance sites throughout the 
country. The pandemic influenza task force met, and materials for risk communication to 
the public were developed. An enhanced training program was undertaken to train clinicians 
around the country about 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Training 
The Kenya MOPHS, the Kenya Ministry of Medical Services, the WHO, and CDC-Kenya have 
implemented training at provincial and district hospitals throughout Kenya to establish reporting
through the IDSR system. Additionally, the MOPHS has supported training on influenza 
laboratory testing, influenza surveillance, and infection control issues related to influenza. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Enhanced H1N1 surveillance in hospitals and clinics throughout Kenya. 
•	 Extensive contact tracing of initial cases of H1N1 in Kenya. 
•	 Development of communication materials for the public and guidelines for national 




Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Surveillance and detection for seasonal and 2009 H1N1 influenza at sites throughout 
Kenya. 
•	 National infection control training focusing on the development of national infection 
control guidelines. 
•	 Establishment of surveillance for hospital-acquired infections in 3 Kenyan hospitals. 
Principal Collaborator 
Charles Nzioka, MD 
Disease Surveillance and Response Deptartment 
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation 










GDD-Kenya center was established in 2004; it collaborates with Kenya’s MOH and is 
recognized as a strong resource for disease detection and response throughout East Africa. 
GDD-Kenya helps the country and the region detect and respond to serious public health 
threats, including cholera, Ebola, extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, influenza, Rift Valley 
fever, and typhoid. 
GDD-Kenya has extended its coverage to more than 10 countries in the region by developing 
regional public health leaders trained through the Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training 
(FELTP). Most of these graduates hold leadership positions in countries throughout the region, 
including Ghana, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. One of the 1st FELTP graduates is 
leading the program in Nigeria. 
Activities 
•	 Outbreak response. 




In 2009, GDD-Kenya earned recognition for its outstanding work in research, pathogen 
discovery, and training. GDD-Kenya discovered 3 pathogens that were new to the region and 
1 that was new to the world. In addition, they increased their laboratory testing capacity by 
81%. GDD-Kenya trained 13 FELTP graduates and more than 3,700 participants in short-
term regional and national trainings. GDD-Kenya responded to 31 outbreaks, of which 94% 
achieved a measurable public health impact. 
In-Country Field Staff 
Rob Breiman, MD, MPH 
GDD-Kenya Coordinator 
Mark Katz, MD, MPH 
Influenza Lead 
Principal U.S. CDC Program Collaborations In-Country 
•	 Influenza Preparedness, Detection, and Response Program. 
•	 IEIP. 
•	 FELTP. 
•	 Laboratory Systems and Biosafety. 







•	 Capital: Antananarivo •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 52.84 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 587,041 sq km live births; male: 57.69 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 47.84 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  21,281,844 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure: •	  Total population: 68.9%; male:  0–14 years: 43.3% (male 4,641,212/ 
75.5%; female: 62.5% (2003 est.) female 4,575,129); 15–64 years: 53.7% (male 
5,672,321/female 5,745,901); 65 years or older: 3% •	 GDP: $20.5 billion (2009 est.) 
(male 287,402/female 359,879) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,000 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 63.26 
years; male: 61.27 years; female: 65.3 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Seasonal, Pandemic, and Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 In FY 2009, Madagascar was awarded a new cooperative agreement. 
A new cooperative agreement is now in place with the NIC in Antananarivo on behalf of the 
MOH of the Republic of Madagascar. The agreement is designed to support execution of the 
existing Support Program for Integrated National Action Plans Against Avian and Human 
Influenza (SPINAP-AHI) and to complement and support ongoing AI activities. The project 
aims to support national efforts to address a possible pandemic of AI or emerging novel 
influenza viruses from a disease prevention and control perspective. In addition, the project will 
address preparedness for possible other emerging infections and SARI to 
•	 Monitor the emergence of pandemic viruses (including HPAI in humans). 
•	 Reduce morbidity and mortality from possible emerging respiratory infectious diseases 
by rapid detection and containment. 

















The project’s goals are 
•	 Preparedness and Communication 
ˏ Support and endorse a strategic plan for communication. 
ˏ Support a Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices study. 
ˏ Support the formulation of appropriate communication messages and material 
needed to address a potential pandemic.
 
ˏ Endorse the communication message.
 
ˏ Produce and disseminate communication materials.
 
•	 Surveillance and Detection 
ˏ Continue supporting the NIC in Madagascar. 
ˏ Expand ILI and SARI surveillance systems. 
ˏ Establish a communication network among sentinel sites, the MOH, and IPM. 
ˏ Recruit a local epidemiologist to monitor sentinel sites. 
ˏ Recruit a local staff person for database management. 
ˏ Implement SARI surveillance by dedicating a staff person for the surveillance and 
collection of specimens. 
•	 Response and Containment 
ˏ Revise component of National Rapid Response Training. 
ˏ Train Regional Rapid Response Teams (RRTs). 
ˏ Develop a national course for the field investigation practice of epidemiology. 
Project Investigator 
Jean-Michel Heraud, PhD 
Director of Virology 









•	 Capital: Abuja •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 95.74 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 923,768 sq km live births; male: 101.83 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 89.28 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 152,217,341 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  otal population: 68%; male: 75.7%;  0–14 years: 41.7% (male 31,171,949/ •	 T
female: 60.6% (2003 est.) female 29,806,204); 15–64 years: 55.3% (male 
41,243,003/female 39,611,565); 65 years or older: 3% •	 GDP: $328.1 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 2,152,318/female 2,270,267) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $2,200 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 46.53 
years; male: 45.78 years; female: 47.32 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 3rd year of the agreement. 
The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) has been collaborating with the U.S. CDC 
on influenza control since 2006. The collaboration is through a cooperative agreement— 
Support to Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza. 
The support has contributed to strengthening influenza surveillance and surveillance for other 
priority diseases in the country. Notably, influenza laboratory diagnostic capacity has improved 
remarkably since the beginning of the collaboration. The agreement has also enhanced the 
general level of preparedness and response capacity of the country to influenza pandemic and 
other disease emergencies. 
Surveillance 
Before beginning the cooperative agreement, Nigeria had a population-based surveillance 
system—the IDSR system. The surveillance system monitors the occurrence of 21 priority 
diseases in the country. With the threat of influenza pandemic, influenza A (H5N1) has been 
added to the list of the country’s priority diseases, bringing the total to 22 priority diseases. 
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The cooperative agreement has provided support to strengthen the IDSR system by training and 
providing supplies. In 2008, influenza sentinel surveillance was introduced in the country with 
the support of funds from the cooperative agreement. 
During FY 2009 (March–April), 3 sentinel surveillance sites were added to the initial pilot site 
established in 2008. Each of the sentinel sites monitors occurrences of ILI in their outpatient 
clinics and SARI among their hospitalized clients. The sites also support surveillance for 
influenza A (H5N1) and 2009 H1N1 influenza in the country. Samples collected from the 
sentinel sites are transported by a courier system to a centrally located National Influenza 
Reference Laboratory (NIRL) for analysis. 
In FY 2009, financial and technical support was provided to the Nigerian MOH for evaluating 
the possible implementation of the IDSR system across the country. Findings from the 
evaluation were shared with stakeholders, and recommendations were made to improve the 
surveillance system in the country. 
Laboratory 
Through the cooperative agreement, an NIRL was established in 2007, which became fully 
functional in 2008. In FY 2009, an additional PCR machine was donated by U.S. CDC to the 
NIRL. U.S. CDC also provides technical support, supplies, and reagents to the laboratory. The 
performance of the 2nd NIC in Nigeria was further boosted in FY 2009 by the donation of a 
PCR machine, training of laboratory personnel, and the provision of reagents. 
Preparedness 
Preparedness and response to influenza pandemic in Nigeria is guided by a policy document, 
The National Integrated Avian and Pandemic Influenza Plan, which was developed in 2007. In 
FY 2009, U.S. CDC provided technical and financial support for the revision of the document 
through the cooperative agreement. U.S. CDC also facilitated the request and subsequent 





Several trainings were conducted during FY 2009: 
•	 Trained 120 health workers (doctors, nurses, and pharmacists) per zone on clinical 
management of avian influenza. 
•	 Trained 20 laboratories scientists on PCR technique (didactic session and hands-on 
practice). 
•	 Trained 50 trainers (doctors, nurses, and pharmacists) for clinicians on identifying and 
managing cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Trained 80 state epidemiologists and avian influenza desk officers on case definition and 
surveillance for 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Trained 3 laboratory scientists from Nigeria on PCR diagnosis of 2009 H1N1 influenza 
in Accra, Ghana. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
After the emergence of 2009 H1N1 influenza and the subsequent declaration of an influenza 
pandemic by WHO’s Director General, several response activities were instituted by the 
cooperative agreement. 
•	 Adapted case definition, surveillance guidelines, and case tools. 
•	 Adapted 2009 H1N1 influenza case definition and surveillance guideline. 
•	 Developed 2009 H1N1 influenza case management protocol. 
•	 Adapted recommendations for antiviral use. 
•	 Trained clinicians on identifying and managing clinical cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Trained state epidemiologists and avian influenza desk officers from all the states on case 
definition and surveillance for 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Trained 3 laboratory scientists from Nigeria on PCR diagnosis of 2009 H1N1 influenza 
in Accra, Ghana. 
•	 Acquired kits for RT-PCR testing of 2009 H1N1 influenza from U.S. CDC. 
•	 Received and tested samples from suspected cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza across the 
country. 
•	 Revised the National Influenza Pandemic Response Plan to incorporate 2009 H1N1 
influenza concerns. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Commissioned and handed over a fully functional NIRL to the government of Nigeria 
by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria. 
•	 Activated 3 functional influenza sentinel surveillance sites. 
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Special Influenza Projects 
•	 Participated in grant management training. 
•	 Participated in Multinational Influenza Seasonal Mortality Study (MISMS) research 
workshop organized by NIH at Dakar, Senegal. 
•	 Facilitated regional training of influenza sentinel surveillance, Accra, Ghana. 
•	 Facilitated the Nigerian Field Epidemiology and Laboratory training program. 
•	 Facilitated the National MDR-TB Survey. 
Principal Collaborator 
Abdulsalami Nasidi, MD 
Federal Mininstry of Health of Nigeria 
Ahmadu Bello Way, Abuja, 
FCT, Nigeria 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Ekanem E. Ekanem MPH, PHD 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1st City Plaza, 3rd Floor, Herbert Macaulay Way, Abuja, Nigeria 
E-mail: Ekaneme@ngcdc.gov 
Ibrahim T. Dalhatu MD, MPA, FMCPH 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 





Republic of Côte d’Ivoire
 
•	 Capital: Yamoussoukro •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 69.76 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 322,460 sq km live births; male: 77.06 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 62.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 21,058,798 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  otal population: 48.7%; male: ears: 40.9% (male 4,161,238/ •	 T 0–14 y
60.8%; female: 38.6% (2000 est.) female 4,092,593); 15–64 years: 56.3% (male 
5,790,503/female 5,568,621); 65 years or older: 2.8% •	 GDP: $33.78 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 285,116/female 281,531) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,700 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 54.64 
years; male: 53.95 years; female: 55.35 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
The Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene (MSHP) of Côte d’Ivoire has obtained financial 
and technical support from U.S. CDC for pandemic preparedness and reinforcement of 
influenza surveillance. The National Institute for Public Hygiene (INHP) is the technical 
beneficiary of this cooperative agreement at the MSHP. 
During the 2008–2009 budget period, all planned operational activities were implemented. 
Implementation of these activities produced a number of results, namely reinforcing laboratory 
diagnostic capacities. Quick access to information and results has been improved by providing 
sentinel sites with surveillance and communication software. 
Surveillance 
Distribution of reporting tools and influenza surveillance policies to sentinel sites has become 
routine, and sample collection and transport to laboratories are operational. 
To ensure timely information and availability of laboratory results, the 4 sentinel sites were 
provided with a connection to the Internet. In addition to Web access, the laboratory received 
computer equipment (i.e., work station, printer, UPS). Two doctors participated in the 
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conference of the French Society for Public Health (Société Française de Santé Publique) in 
Nantes from September 29, 2008 to October 3, 2008 to share their experience with surveillance 
of potentially epidemic diseases. 
During November 28–December 24, 2008, a number of avian influenza risk cases were 
investigated. In the health districts of Port-Bouet, Treichville, Cocody-Bingerville, San-Pédro, 
Séguéla, Bouaké, and Agnibilékrou, 476 cases were investigated. 
Laboratory 
The NIC located at the Pasteur Institute of Côte d’Ivoire (IPCI) has been given reagents and 
laboratory materials through the cooperative agreement in order to fulfill its role as influenza 
reference laboratory, thereby reinforcing its operational capacity. The laboratory was able 
to analyze 889 influenza samples in 2008 and approximately 1,000 samples in 2009. As of 
September 27, 2009, the following results were achieved: 
•	 Twenty specimens positive for A (H1N1). 
•	 One hundred thirty-two specimens positive for A (H3N2). 
•	 Eighty-two specimens positive for influenza B. 
Preparedness 
•	 In June 2009, a series of sensitization sessions, which included 20 towns in North and 
South Côte d’Ivoire, imparted information to poultry business owners, community 
leaders, and the local authorities. During these sessions, leaflets and brochures 
explaining the influenza mechanism and preventive measures were developed and 
distributed to the population. 
•	 A journalist training workshop took place, and discussions with neighboring countries 
and partner organizations are occurring to determine the ideal dates for the planned 
cross-border meeting. 
Training 
•	 Health care workers who are involved in epidemiologic and biologic surveillance 
of influenza were trained at national and international workshops. Their capacities 
and skills for detection, care and treatment, data collection, and management were 
reinforced. 
•	 August 26, 2009–September 2, 2009, 40 health care workers were trained in 
epidemiologic surveillance. This training session was a response to the need to upgrade 
the skills of district health care workers for operations in the new sentinel surveillance 
sites of Bouaké, Korhogo, Soubré, and Daloa. 
•	 September 22–25, 2009, 28 health care workers from the sentinel sites of Agnibilékrou, 
Abengourou, Adzopé, and Akoupé were trained in H1N1 detection and care and 
treatment. 
•	 During October 12–23, 2009, 24 sentinel site laboratory technicians were trained in 
IPCI on sampling techniques, sample analysis (i.e., PCR), and cell culture. 
•	 To improve the quality of data recording and facilitate data analysis during epidemiologic 
surveillance at INHP, 12 health care workers were trained on the use of Epi-Info software 
during May 4–7, 2009 and July 6–9, 2009 (i.e., 2 sessions with 6 participants each). 
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During a supervisory visit to sentinel sites in July 2009, the daily constraints and needs of 
health care workers were analyzed. The visit allowed INHP MOH to answer health care worker 
questions and suggested solutions to enable them to operate more efficiently to improve their 
working skills. During the same month, an epidemiologist in charge of the surveillance of 
diseases with epidemic potential attended a 2-week epidemiologic training course at Paris XI 
University, France. Topics covered included 
•	 Supervising health care workers. 
•	 Building the capacity at the sentinel sites. 
•	 Training health district management on 2009 H1N1 influenza surveillance, care, and 
treatment. 
•	 Recruiting laboratory technicians. 
•	 Recruiting a medical epidemiologist. 
•	 Providing information to the public on prevention and transmission of 2009 H1N1 
influenza. 
H1N1 Response Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Reinforcement of surveillance has allowed detection, isolation, and care and treatment 
of confirmed 2009 H1N1 influenza cases. 
•	 During the past year, 3 H1N1 cases were detected and successfully treated. 
•	 A hotline has been set up by the INHP MOH to provide answers to questions and 
guidance to the public about the threat of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Implementing SARI surveillance with a site at each of the medical teaching hospitals of 
Abidjan (i.e., Treichville, Cocody, Yopougon). 
•	 Real-time PCR technique made available at the NIC (IPCI). 
•	 Training laboratory staff on the new H1N1 primers and probes developed by U.S. CDC. 
Principal Collaborators 
Odehouri-Koudou Paul, MD 
Project Investigator 
Director of Institut National d’Hygiene Publique 
Ministry of Health, Côte d’Ivoire 
E-mail: odehourik@yahoo.fr 
Coulibaly Daouda, MD 
Influenza Coordinator INHP MOH 
Disease Surveillance Chief 
Institut National d’Hygiene Publique 
Ministry of Health, Côte d’Ivoire 
BP V4 




Kadjo-Adje Herve, MD 
NIC Coordinator 
Laboratory of Respiratory Viruses 
Institut Pasteur Côte d’Ivoire 
E-mail: rvkdjo@yahoo.fr 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Talla-Nzussouo Ndahwouh, MD 
Regional Avian and Pandemic Influenza Advisor 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No.3 
Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research 





•	 Capital: Kigali •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 83.42 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 26,338 sq km live births; male: 88.53 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 78.16 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 11,055,976 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 70.4%; male:  0–14 years: 41.9% (male 2,143,479/ 
76.3%; female: 64.7% (2003 est.) female 2,124,588); 15–64 years: 55.7% (male 
2,826,557/female 2,842,020); 65 years or older: 2.4% •	 GDP: $8.909 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 99,721/female 149,698) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $900 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 49.76 
years; male: 48.56 years; female: 51 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Preparedness and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began FY 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
Surveillance 
Sentinel surveillance of seasonal influenza has been initiated in Rwanda. According to the 
national strategy, 6 active sentinel sites have been established in order to have 1 sentinel site for 
each province: 2 are the university hospitals in Kigali City and Butare city, and 4 are district 
hospitals (i.e., Kibagabaga, Gihundwe, Kibungo, and Ruhengeri). The site in Kigali City was 
established in July 2008, Kibungo in August 2008, Gihundwe in September 2008, Kibagabaga 
in December 2008, and Butare and Ruhengeri in May 2009. 
Surveillance is based on 5 case definitions: ILI, SARI, person under investigation of avian 
influenza, suspected avian influenza, and suspected novel influenza A (H1N1) 2009. In total, 
537 specimens for seasonal influenza surveillance were collected and tested. Fifteen percent of 
the specimens were positive for influenza. The predominant circulating strain was 2009 H1N1 
influenza, followed by influenza B and seasonal influenza A (H3N2). 
Laboratory 
The molecular biology unit of the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) is equipped with a real 
time RT-PCR 7500 ABI (Applied Biosystem Incorporation) to test influenza samples by typing 
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and subtyping seasonal influenza, avian influenza, and 2009 H1N1 influenza virus strains. 
Equipment that included a BSL-3 hood, CO2 incubator, refrigerated ultra centrifuge, and deep 
freezers (i.e., –80°C) was received in April 2009. 
Under the Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) signed with U.S. CDC, the NRL regularly 
receives primers, probes, and controls for influenza virus for detection and characterization. 
The panel includes influenza A, influenza B, human H1, human H3, Asian avian H5 (a), Asian 
avian H5 (b), RNase protein (RNP), human seasonal influenza virus positive control, influenza 
A (H5N1) virus real-time PCR positive control, and complete kits to test 2009 H1N1 influenza 
virus. The NRL is now fully equipped, and influenza samples have been tested since September 
2008. The NRL participated in the 5th WHO EQAP. In addition, aliquots are regularly sent 
to CDC-Kenya’s laboratory for quality control. The hood cabinet filters were maintained and 
certified in July 2009 by the South African company, Air Filter Maintenance Services (AFMS). 
Preparedness 
In August 2009, CDC-Rwanda; the Center for Treatment and Research on AIDS, Malaria, 
Tuberculosis, and Other Epidemics (TRAC Plus); the Rwanda Animal Resources Development 
Authority (RARDA); and NRL organized a pandemic influenza tabletop exercise at Kigali. 
The exercise brought together 52 representatives from various agencies in Rwanda. The key 
institutions present at the exercise included the MOH, CDC, TRAC Plus, the Rwanda 
Development Board, RARDA, the Rwanda Bureau of Standards, NRL, WHO, the Rwanda 
Information Agency, and the Central Procurement Office of Essential Medicines in Rwanda. 
The discussion-based exercise tested the National Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Operational 
Plan of Rwanda. It encompassed 6 sessions on the following selected topics pertaining to the 
pandemic influenza: disease surveillance, laboratory capacity to diagnose pandemic influenza 
strains, communication, health care planning and infection control, community disease control 
and prevention, and antiviral and vaccine dispensing and distribution. Overall, participants said 
the most valuable components of the exercise were discussing pandemic plan; identifying gaps, 
limitations, and concerns; and networking with other stakeholders in Rwanda on pandemic 
influenza. 
Participants indicated that the following areas needed improvement: 
•	 Community disease control and private clinic involvement in the national surveillance 
system. 
•	 Laboratory capacity to diagnose pandemic influenza strains. 
•	 Training and communication at the community level. 
•	 Elaborating SOPs and legal framework for patient isolation. 
Training 
•	 The influenza surveillance officer working for MOH TRAC Plus attended the first 
international Francophone train-the-trainer workshop on sentinel surveillance of 
influenza organized by U.S. CDC, Institute Pasteur Madagascar, and WHO AFRO 




•	 Two laboratory scientists at the National Veterinary Laboratory and the NRL had 
in-house refresher courses on testing seasonal influenza and use of 2009 H1N1 influenza 
kits by CDC-Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) laboratory technicians, 
September 2008. 
•	 The U.S. CDC avian influenza focal point person had a 2-week training course to 
prepare for a certificate in the epidemiology of emerging infectious diseases with the 
University of Iowa’s College of Public Health. The online course is ongoing. 
•	 Several health care workers have been trained in influenza surveillance at sentinel sites. 
Overall, 15 medical doctors, 72 nurses, and 11 laboratory technicians were trained. 
CDC-Rwanda and RARDA trained 62 veterinary and laboratory technicians on 
surveillance of avian influenza in poultry. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Updated the national operational plan for 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Held refresher training for rapid response teams. 
•	 Stockpiled supplies (i.e., 14,000 Tamiflu units, masks). 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 NRL tested and found seasonal influenza circulating strains. 
•	 Increased sentinel sites from 4 to 6. 
•	 Completed isolation facility at Kigali University Teaching Hospital. 
•	 Completed the tabletop exercise to test the operational plan. 
•	 Trained 62 veterinary and laboratory technicians on surveillance of avian influenza in 
poultry. 
•	 Developed an abstract on influenza sentinel surveillance in Rwanda, July 2008–June 
2009. 
Special Influenza Projects 
The NRL would like to become a NIC. Staff need training and an appropriate facility to 
perform seasonal influenza virus culture and isolation in order to be able share isolates with 
WHO collaborative centers. Further, the NRL wants to purchase a real-time RT-PCR machine 
to improve the timely reporting of influenza testing results. At present, no early warning system 
exists, but NRL plans to use the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. 
Principal Collaborators 
Jackson Sebeza, MD 
Project Investigator 
Director of EID Unit 
TRAC Plus 
Boulevard de la Revolution 





Director General, National Reference Laboratory 
Boulevard de la Revolution 
BP Kigali, Rwanda 
E-mail: oxm3@aol.com 
Theogene Rutagwenda, DVM, PhD 
Director General, RARDA 
PO Box 621 Kigali 
E-mail: rutagwendat2006@yahoo.com 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Pratima Raghunathan, PhD, MPH 
Country Director 
CDC Global AIDS Program, Rwanda 
c/o U.S. Embassy, Kigali 
2657 Avenue de la Gendarmerie 
P.O. Box 28, Kigali, Rwanda 
E-mail: raghunathanp@rw.cdc.gov 
David McAlister, PhD 
Laboratory Programs Manager 
CDC-Rwanda 
E-mail: mcalisterd@rw.cdc.gov 
David Lowrance, MD, MPH 
Medical Epidemiologist 
Global AIDS Program, CDC Rwanda 
E-mail: lowranced@rw.cdc.gov 
Jean Baptiste Koama, MD, MPH 
HMIS Coordinator 
CDC Global AIDS Program, Rwanda 
E-mail: koamajb@rw.cdc.gov 
Joseph Rukelibuga, DVM, MSc 
CDC-Rwanda 







•	 Capital: Pretoria (administrative capital) •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 45.11 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 1,219,912 sq km live births; male: 49.47 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 40.65 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 49,109,107 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  otal population: 86.4%; male: 87%;  0–14 y •	 Tears: 29.2% (male 7,147,151/ 
female: 85.7% (2003 est.) female 7,120,183); 15–64 years: 65.5% (male 
16,057,340/female 15,889,750); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $506.1 billion (2008 est.) 
5.3% (male 1,050,287/female 1,518,044) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $10,400 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 48.89 
years; male: 49.63 years; female: 48.15 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began August 2007. 
•	 FY 2008 was the 2nd year of the agreement. 
Surveillance 
Viral Watch Surveillance Program 
South Africa has a longstanding ILI surveillance program with 256 outpatient sentinel sites 
in all 9 provinces that includes both general medical practitioners and hospitals. In 2009, in 
response to 2009 H1N1 influenza, the program expanded to include additional hospital sites in 




SARI Surveillance Program 
SARI surveillance was introduced in 2009 with 4 public sector hospital-based sites as follows: 
•	 Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital—This urban hospital is located in Gauteng Province 
with a well-defined population (Soweto). 
•	 Edendale Hospital—This semi-urban hospital is located in KwaZulu-Natal Province. 
•	 Mapulaneng and Matikwana Hospitals—These rural hospitals are adjacent to the 
Agincourt demographic surveillance site in Mpumalanga Province, where annual 
population surveys on demographic factors (e.g., births, deaths, migrations) are 
captured. These surveys will allow for more accurate estimation of rates of SARI 
hospitalizations. 
•	 Detailed clinical and epidemiologic data, site laboratory results, patient outcomes, and 
specimens for detection of respiratory viruses (i.e., influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, 
adenovirus, human metapneumovirus, enterovirus, rhinovirus, and parainfluenza 1, 2, 
and 3), Streptococcus pneumoniae, and HIV infection are collected. This program enabled 


















SARI Surveillance in South Africa, 2009 
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Respiratory Consultations Surveillance System 
This program obtains data from national private sector health care providers on patients seen 
with ILI and pneumonia and aims to track the progression of the influenza season. 
Enhanced Surveillance Activities in Response to 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Enhanced surveillance was initiated at 9 public sector hospitals around the country to collect 
specimens for virologic surveillance from patients with SARIs. The severity of the epidemic 
was monitored and assessed by establishing a registry for all 2009 H1N1 influenza laboratory-
confirmed cases, severe cases, and deaths. The first 100 confirmed cases were also investigated. 
These interventions allowed risk factors for severe illness and death to be detected and the 
secondary attack rate, serial interval, and basic reproductive number (R0) to be estimated. 
Reporting Surveillance Data 
All surveillance programs manage data in real time, and weekly surveillance reports are 
disseminated to all stakeholders and published on the National Institute for Communicable 
Diseases (NICD) Web page (www.nicd.ac.za) during the influenza season or influenza outbreak 






The Respiratory Virus Unit (RVU) at the NICD is earmarked as a WHO regional reference 
laboratory for influenza and plays a key role in supporting the establishment of influenza labora­
tory and surveillance capacity in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
RVU and Virus Isolation Unit (VIU) have regularly been testing and typing influenza samples 
collected under the Viral-Watch, SARI, and the Pandemic H1N1 Enhanced Surveillance sys­
tems. The RVU performs laboratory surveillance, molecular diagnosis, and typing of influenza 
viruses and is tasked with investigating the annual influenza molecular epidemiology, genetic 
drift, and resistance testing as part of the annual WHO vaccine recommendations. The VIU 
performs isolation and antigenic typing of various viral pathogens, including influenza. Specific 
activities implemented by the RVU include 
•	 Developing standard methods for detecting H5 by real-time and conventional PCR. 
•	 Developing PCR capacity for detection of H7 and H9 subtypes. 
•	 Optimizing PCR-based detection method for detection of H275Y resistance that causes 
mutation in the H1N1 viruses. 
•	 Developing a new multiplex PCR (used for the screening all SARI samples) that can 
detect 9 different viruses, including influenza. 
•	 Developing guidance for establishing diagnostic capabilities for the 2009 H1N1 influ­
enza virus for confirmed severe cases and deaths. 
•	 Implementing molecular diagnostic trainings for avian, seasonal, and 2009 H1N1 influ­
enza offered upon request from several countries from the SADC region. 
•	 Technical support and confirmatory testing to other influenza laboratories in the region. 
•	 Testing for oseltamivir resistance in 2009 H1N1 influenza and few seasonal H1N1 
specimens for the 2009 season. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
In addition to the establishing enhanced surveillance programs for 2009 H1N1 influenza, the 
following activities were implemented: 
•	 Formulating national guidelines for health workers in collaboration with the National 
Department of Health and other partners. 
•	 Implementing provincial workshops in 7 of the 9 provinces to reinforce adherence to 
the pandemic response plans and health worker guidelines. 
•	 Providing advice on clinical case management and control measures, infection control 
guidance, and guidelines on appropriate specimen collection, including support with 
field work during outbreak investigations. 
•	 Supporting the development of a network of laboratories in public and private sectors. 
•	 Developing monthly and special communiqués to raise awareness and update clinicians 
about management of communicable diseases, including 2009 H1N1 influenza, which 
are distributed to approximately 18,000 health professionals and posted on the NICD 
Web page. 
•	 Compiling weekly 2009 H1N1 influenza situation reports and posting the reports on 
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•	 Capital: Dar es Salaam •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 70.46 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 945,087 sq km live births; male: 77.51 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 63.19 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 41,892,895 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 69.4%; male:  0–14 years: 43.5% (male 8,763,471/ •	
77.5%; female: 62.2% (2002 census) female 8,719,198); 15–64 years: 53.7% (male 
10,638,666/female 10,947,190); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $56.22 billion (2008 est.) 
2.8% (male 502,368/female 642,269) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,400 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 51.45 
years; male: 50.06 years; female: 52.88 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Preparedness and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began FY 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
Tanzania began avian and pandemic influenza preparedness and response activities in 2006 by 
constituting the National Multisectoral Taskforce and developing the national avian and 
pandemic influenza preparedness and response plan. In 2008, the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MOHSW) and U.S. CDC established the National Influenza Laboratory in 
Dar es Salaam and initiated the virologic and epidemiologic influenza sentinel surveillance in 
5 hospitals around the country to enhance the national ability for early detection of highly 
pathogenic influenza viruses. This surveillance enhancement contributed to the country’s timely 
response to Rift Valley fever in 2007 and 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Surveillance 
The influenza surveillance system in Tanzania uses both the IDSR system, which is based on 
reporting suspected cases of SARI, and sentinel surveillance, which is based on the laboratory 
confirmation of sampled patients meeting ILI standard case definitions and all SARI cases. 
•	 Established 5 influenza sentinel hospitals in 5 of the 21 regions in Tanzania. 
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•	 Held orientation for 78 multisectoral 

stakeholders, including policy makers and 100 

sentinel site managers on influenza surveillance.
 




•	 No confirmed influenza A (H5N1) outbreaks in 





With the emergence of 2009 H1N1 influenza globally, 
Tanzania contingency plans included 
•	 Screening travelers at international airports. 








•	 Storing and transporting materials. 
Laboratory 
The influenza laboratory network includes the 5 influenza sentinel laboratories, which are 
mainly specimen collection, storage, and transportation points, and the NIC, which is the only 
laboratory in Tanzania handling influenza activities. 
•	 Tested 350 samples from sentinel sites at the NIC; sent 80 PCR-positive specimens to 
the WHO collaborating center as part of WHO’s global influenza surveillance. 
•	 Hired an additional laboratory expert for the NIC to strengthen the capacity of the 
laboratory to support the national influenza surveillance activities. 
•	 The NIC participated in the WHO influenza External Quality Assessment Program 
(EQA) and provided supportive supervision to all influenza sentinel surveillance sites. 
Preparedness 
•	 Tanzania continued to work with U.S. CDC, the United Nations, and other 
stakeholders to implement a preparedness and response plan for avian and pandemic 
influenza. 
•	 Conducted 5 sessions of public awareness seminars in high-risk areas. 
•	 Developed and distributed 4,000 avian and pandemic influenza leaflets to the public. 
•	 Developed and distributed IEC influenza materials to poultry traders and disaster 
management committees. 
•	 Trained 80 of 132 district rapid response teams. 
•	 Participated in the first tabletop simulation exercise that tested the effectiveness of 





•	 The NIC conducted training on specimen collection, storage, and transportation to all 
laboratories in the influenza surveillance network. 
•	 Eighty-five health care workers received on-site training on influenza surveillance. 
•	 One laboratory expert at the NIC received training on the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA)-accredited course on packaging and shipping dangerous goods. 
•	 The NIC received training in 2009 H1N1 influenza testing using real-time PCR and 
influenza culture techniques at the CDC-KEMRI laboratory in Nairobi, Kenya. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Tanzania developed and distributed national guidelines and procedures for surveillance 
and management of suspected and confirmed cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Set up screening of travelers at international airports and provided health care staff with 
training, supplies, and communication equipment. 
•	 Provided training to NIC laboratory staff on 2009 H1N1 influenza testing by using 
real-time RT-PCR. 
•	 Provided training to regional rapid response teams and hospital teams on 2009 H1N1 
influenza surveillance and sample collection, storage, and transportation. 
•	 Enhanced the surveillance of ILI and SARI in all public and private health facilities. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 The established influenza screening program identified the first 2009 H1N1 influenza 
suspect case at the port of entry and confirmed the case within 24 hours. 
•	 Tanzania had adequate drugs (i.e., Tamiflu) to treat all laboratory-confirmed 2009 
H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Established capacity to test influenza samples by using real-time RT-PCR at the NIC. 
•	 Contributed positive samples to WHO’s GISN. 
•	 Provided national influenza surveillance data showing influenza trends and circulating 
virus types. 
Special Influenza Projects 
•	 Involved Tanzania Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (T-FELTP) in 
the surveillance and response to avian and pandemic influenza. 
•	 Participated in the East African countries (i.e., Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda) cross-border 
avian influenza simulation exercise. 
•	 Enhanced communication and sharing of data with laboratories in the network and 
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•	 Capital: Kampala •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 65.99 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 236,040 sq km live births; male: 69.65 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 62.21 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 33,398,682 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 66.8%; male:  0–14 years: 50% (male 7,903,935/ •	
76.8%; female: 57.7% (2002 census) female 7,789,792); 15–64 years: 47.8% (male 
7,528,073/female 7,469,938); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $34.23 billion (2008 est.) 
2.2% (male 284,122/female 392,112) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,100 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 52.34 
years; male: 51.31 years; female: 53.4 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began August 2007. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the agreement. 
Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) was designated a NIC in the 1980s. However, NIC 
activities had slowed considerably until recently, when proposals to carry out surveillance for 
seasonal influenza were reinitiated. The advent of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) 
contributed to the reestablishment of the UVRI NIC. 
In response to the risk of HPAI worldwide, in October 2005, the government of Uganda 
established a multisectoral National Task Force (NTF) for influenza to undertake a risk 
assessment and to prepare and implement an Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Plan. Under the preparedness plan, the MOH is responsible for establishing and 
implementing systems for the prevention and containment of human influenza. UVRI was 
redesignated as the NIC. 
In August 2006, supplemental funding was obtained through the U.S. CDC Global AIDS 
Program to support the NIC; this funding provides in-country reference laboratory facilities 
and surveillance for seasonal influenza and a rapid response to pandemic or avian influenza 
outbreaks, filling in some gaps in the national plan. 
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In 2007, a proposal was written that requested funds to support the NIC. The purpose was 
to help support the national avian influenza preparedness plan and to establish a sustainable 
influenza surveillance network in Uganda. This was to be achieved by 
•	 Supporting the NTF in awareness and training activities. 
•	 Supporting the NIC at UVRI by carrying out both PCR detection and virus isolation 
for influenza and other respiratory viruses. 
•	 Supporting the NIC in carrying out influenza surveillance in areas of Uganda that are 
not covered. 
•	 Supporting epidemiologic surveillance and establishing early warning systems. 
•	 Establishing rapid response and training teams. 
•	 Coordinating in-country influenza efforts. 
A 4-year U.S. CDC cooperative agreement funds award was given to the institute for these 
activities. FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the agreement. 
Surveillance 
In 2007, surveillance activities were initiated at sentinel sites in the central region of Kampala 
and Entebbe, and this was later extended to northwestern Uganda, in the West Nile region of 
Arua and Koboko districts. There were 3 sentinel sites in Kampala and a site in Entebbe, plus a 
sentinel site each in the Arua and Koboko districts. 
In 2008, surveillance was extended to another site in Kampala, and 1 was closed. With the 
advent of 2009 H1N1 influenza, more sentinel sites opened in Kampala. The new sites were 
targeted to collect samples from the local communities (e.g., Kitebi Health Center IV) and from 
expatriate staff and affluent societies (e.g., UN Clinic and the Surgery Clinic), who were more 
likely to travel out of the country and bring back different types of influenza. A satellite sentinel 
site (Labole) opened in Koboko; it works closely with the main site in Koboko Town. 
Surveillance was started in May 2009 in southwestern Uganda’s Mbarara district at the Mbarara 
Regional Referral Hospital. Ten sites are active. Plans are underway to start surveillance in 
Western (Kabalore district) and Eastern Uganda (Tororo district). The MOH and WHO 
country offices have requested that the NIC open more sites to cover the country. The NIC 
works with the Makerere University Walter Reed Program (MUWRP), which also has sentinel 
sites in Jinja, Bugiri, and Kayunga districts in Central and Eastern Uganda and a sentinel site at 
Mulago Hospital, the National Referral Hospital in Kampala. MUWRP is also going to expand 
its sentinel sites to Western and Northern Uganda. 
Laboratory 
The NIC at UVRI is the only laboratory capable of influenza diagnostic testing in the country. 
The laboratory can use hemagglutination (HA) and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) and 
RT-PCR testing to confirm diagnoses. The laboratory has also been evaluating sensitivity and 
specificity to viruses circulating in Uganda by using commercially available rapid diagnosis kits 
for seasonal influenza. The laboratories have been newly renovated, and more space is due for 




The NIC has worked closely with U.S. CDC to establish a state-of-the-art laboratory, and 
technologists have trained extensively with CDC-Atlanta scientists, KEMRI, and scientists at 
the National Institutes of Communicable Diseases, South Africa, on typing, subtyping, and 
real-time PCR. 
The NIC laboratory participates in the WHO EQA for influenza A viruses. All viruses were 
successfully identified in the last 6 panels in which the laboratory participated. Isolates and 
aliquots of some of influenza virus strains that could not be typed were periodically sent to the 
WHO collaborating center in Atlanta. 
Preparedness 
The NIC participated in the preparation and implementation of the Uganda preparedness plan 
and was part of the national task force for influenza. Staff from the NIC participated in national 
and regional tabletop exercises to test implementation of the preparedness plan. The NIC also 
provided funding for some of the activities of the tabletop exercises. 
Training 
The NIC was involved in training health, veterinary, and agriculture personnel in each district, 
and staff at WHO, USAID, the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industries and Fisheries, and 
the MOH. 
•	 The NIC trained health personnel in Kampala district, a densely populated area where 
2009 H1N1 influenza has circulated in the population. 
•	 Training of health personnel was carried out in Bushenyi district, where clustered 
episodes of 2009 H1N1 influenza occurred in schools. 
•	 A refresher training was given by the NIC for staff of all sentinel surveillance sites. 
•	 The laboratory conducted training for technologists from the MUWRP before they 
started working in the NIC. 
•	 The MUWRP held an African regional influenza diagnostics training in which 
participants had hands-on experience at the NIC, and NIC staff members were part of 
the training team. 
•	 NIC laboratory scientists and the technologist staff attended training at Kenya Medical 
Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 




•	 Aliquots and isolates from the outbreak have been sent to the Atlanta WHO for further 
characterization and testing for resistance to influenza antiviral drugs. 
•	 NIC staff have been performing control activities to limit the spread of pandemic 
influenza. 
•	 NIC staff have participated in television and radio talk shows on pandemic influenza. 
67
 
•	 The NIC has provided specimen collection supplies to several districts to assist in the 
collection of samples for testing. 
•	 The Uganda NIC provided diagnostic capacity for Burundi when samples were sent for 
testing. We confirmed pandemic influenza from some of the samples sent. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 A wing for influenza laboratories and NIC offices was refurbished and opened. 
•	 The World Bank approved a loan to Uganda to implement the preparedness plan, with 
active involvement from the NIC in the preparation and negotiations. 
Special Influenza Projects 
A student pursuing a Master of Science degree performed research in the NIC by using samples 
collected from 2 of the sentinel sites. The study, “Identification of Respiratory Viruses and 
Epidemiological Factors Associated with Acute Respiratory Illness (ARI) in Kampala and 
Entebbe, Uganda, 2008,” aimed to identify and describe the epidemiology of respiratory viruses 
associated with ARI at Kiswa, Kampala, and Entebbe hospitals, specifically the respiratory 
viruses circulating among ARI patients at Kiswa and Entebbe hospitals to determine the 
epidemiologic factors associated with respiratory virus infections. It was a cross-sectional study. 
Samples were collected from a subset of clinically diagnosed ARI patients of all ages. A 2-test 
multiplex PCR for 12 viruses was performed on the samples. The viruses that were studied 
included the following: influenza A; influenza B; coronavirus 229E; coronavirus OC43; 
parainfluenzas 1, 2, and 3; rhinovirus A; respiratory syncytial virus A; respiratory syncytial virus 
B; adenoviruses; and metapneumovirus. 
Study results showed that the main viral causes of ARI in the study area were influenza A 
(19.2%), adenoviruses (8.7%), and rhinoviruses A (7.9%). Risk factors associated with ARI 
infection included an age of less than 10 years, overcrowding, use of some cooking fuels (e.g., 
charcoal), and contact with certain birds (e.g., ducks). In response to these findings, further 
studies need to be carried out, such as prospective studies to determine the public health 
importance of each viral pathogen and to identify the causative agents for the remaining 
undetermined pathogens (53.4%). 
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•	 Capital: Lusaka •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 99.92 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 752,618 sq km live births; male: 104.67 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 95.04 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.) 12,056,923 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 80.6%; male:  0–14 years: 44.8% (male 2,710,947/ 
86.8%; female: 74.8% (2003 est.) female 2,685,181); 15–64 years: 52.9% (male 
3,199,685/female 3,180,292); 65 years or older: 2.3% •	 GDP: $18.5 billion (2009 est.) 
(male 113,299/female 167,519) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,500 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 38.86 
years; male: 38.77 years; female: 38.95 years (2010 est.) 
The MOH of the Republic of Zambia is working to support the execution of the existing 
National Response Plan (NRP) for Avian Influenza and to complement ongoing and planned 
AI activities funded by other donors and technical agencies. 
The influenza surveillance cooperative agreement with the Influenza Division will complement 
ongoing initiatives by strengthening public health laboratory and surveillance capacity for ILI 
and SARI in the country. Moreover, the project will contribute to strengthen rapid response and 
infection control capacity of the country through potential outbreaks of AI and other emerging 
and reemerging infectious diseases. The project will be implemented by the University Teaching 
Hospital (UTH) and the Lusaka District Health Office (LDHO) on behalf of the MOH 
and in close collaboration with CDC-Zambia, CDC-South Africa, the National Institute for 
Communicable Diseases (NICD-South Africa), and the WHO. 
The project under the cooperative agreement aims to support national efforts to address a 
possible pandemic of AI from a disease prevention and control standpoint. In addition, the 
project intends to address preparedness for possible other emerging SARI to 
•	 Monitor the emergence of pandemic viruses, including AI in humans. 
•	 Reduce morbidity and mortality from possible emerging respiratory infectious diseases 
by rapid detection and containment. 













•	 Surveillance and Detection Goal 
ˏ	 To substantially increase the capacity of the MOH for surveillance and diagnosis 
of ILI and SARI cases, including seasonal influenza and HPAI in humans. 
•	 Objectives 
ˏ	 UTH Virology Laboratory will meet requirements to perform molecular biology 
diagnosis and viral isolation of influenza samples and obtain WHO accreditation 
as a NIC. 
ˏ	 Pediatric and adult medicine admission wards at the central referral hospital 
(UTH) and one outpatient public clinic in Lusaka will effectively implement SARI 
and ILI surveillance, respectively. 
•	 Response and Containment Goal 
ˏ	 To substantially increase the capacity of the MOH to adequately respond to 
potential AI and emerging or epidemic prone diseases. 
•	 Objectives 
ˏ	 Review all recent influenza outbreaks for lessons learned and outbreak response 
plans. 
ˏ	 Update pandemic influenza preparedness plans consistent with NRP and national 
disaster plans. 
ˏ	 Train 3 districts in 4 provinces in AI RRT as part of refresher training on emerging 
and reemerging infectious diseases. 
ˏ	 Provide infection control training, and provide written standard operating 
procedures to UTH. 
ˏ	 Staff pediatric and adult internal medicine admission ward support and designate 
staff for the selected isolation unit. 
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Human Influenza Surveillance: EMRO 2010 
Sustainability Cooperative Agreement 
U.S. CDC Direct Regional Support 
Strengthening Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Region Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began October 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
The cooperative agreement between EMRO and the U.S. CDC began in October 2006 and 
is a 5-year project designed to improve influenza surveillance and response in EMRO. The 
overarching goal is to strengthen the public health capacity of member states in the region to 
rapidly detect, assess, respond to, and contain public health risks that result from the threats 
of HPAI and human pandemic influenza. The project is built on the existing partnerships and 
collaborative arrangements in EMRO between WHO, FAO, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP) on regional preparedness and response 
for human pandemic influenza. 
This crosscutting project involves multiple focal points in EMRO. A regional task force 
representing 12 different technical units in the regional office is supporting the Communicable 
Diseases Surveillance, Forecasting, and Response Unit to implement this 5-year project. 
The overall objectives of the project are to strengthen the emergency preparedness and risk 
communication capacity of EMRO member states to respond to HPAI and pandemic human 
influenza. 
•	 Enhance the surveillance capacity of member states to detect HPAI, as well as seasonal 
human influenza and ILI. 
•	 Accelerate member states’ ability to response rapidly and contain HPAI outbreaks in 
EMRO areas. 
Since October 2006, the operational plans for year 1 (2007), year 2 (2008), and year 3 (2009) 
have been implemented in collaboration with U.S. CDC, other United Nations (UN) agencies, 
and the NAMRU-3, a WHO collaborating center for emerging diseases. As part of this ongoing 
project, EMRO developed a regional strategic plan for implementing a global strategy for avian 
influenza and human pandemic influenza to complement national efforts and enhance the 
capacity of the member states to respond rapidly and effectively to pandemic influenza. The 
regional plan encourages member states to 
•	 Ensure adequate stockpiling of antiviral drugs. 
•	 Promote the use of appropriate nonpharmaceutical interventions (e.g., avoidance of 
crowding, promotion of personal hygiene). 
•	 Promote and support activities in operational and epidemiologic research to improve 
knowledge of risk factors for spread of influenza. 
•	 Examine the ethical dimensions of enforced quarantine or compliance with other 
recommended measures. 
The specific objectives of this project and grant are as follows: 
•	 Support development of intersectoral collaboration and cooperation among 
organizations (e.g., FAO and the World Organization for Animal Health [OIE], 
UNICEF, WFP, and other UN agencies) and other partners, such as NAMRU-3, and 
maintain a standing committee to deal with zoonotic diseases, in general, and avian 
influenza, in particular, and strengthen the regional office capacity in veterinary health. 
•	 Increase the level of awareness and commitment of policy and decision makers and 
identify clear national lines of leadership with clear terms of reference (TOR) for 
implementation of national pandemic preparedness plans. 
•	 Ensure that public health authorities work closely with animal health and other related 
sectors, both private and public. 
•	 Promote intersectoral and intrasectoral planning activities between different ministries 
and related stakeholders to develop and implement national preparedness plans for avian 
influenza and human pandemic influenza. 
•	 Ensure full transparency and timely exchange of information related to confirmed cases 
of avian influenza and human pandemic influenza. 
•	 Support countries in revising, updating, and activating their national pandemic 







•	 Support countries to build their public health capacities to conduct epidemic or 
pandemic risk assessments for any novel influenza virus on the basis of epidemiologic, 
virologic, and clinical evidence. 
•	 Help countries build their epidemiologic and laboratory surveillance capacities for early 
detection, rapid response, and containment of any cases or cluster of cases resulting from 
HPAI virus or any novel strain of influenza virus having pandemic potential. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
Surveillance 
•	 Technical assistance was provided to 8 member states to set up sentinel surveillance 
system for ILI and SARI. 
•	 An IATA licensing workshop on the shipment of infectious substances, including 
influenza specimens and virus isolates, was organized to support all member states to 
improve biosafety and biosecurity practices for the shipment of infectious substances 
and dangerous pathogens by using standardized IATA guidelines and other international 
procedures. 
•	 A weekly epidemiologic report for influenza surveillance was published regularly to 
inform all member states of the current and ongoing infectious disease outbreaks in the 
region, particularly those caused by HPAI and novel influenza virus. 
•	 Logistic support was provided to all member states for proper collection, transport, and 
shipment of biologic specimens, including influenza virus isolates and patient specimens 
of suspected H5N1 virus. 
•	 Technical missions were conducted in 8 member states to assess and review the ongoing 
seasonal influenza surveillance programs in these countries. 
•	 Technical assistance was provided to 4 member states to set NICs. 
Preparedness 
•	 A guidance document for developing tabletop simulation exercise on pandemic 
influenza was developed for the member states by EMRO through a consultative 
process. Technical support also was provided to 8 member states to conduct tabletop 
simulation exercise on pandemic influenza. 
•	 Technical missions were conducted in 6 member states to assess national pandemic 
preparedness plans. 
•	 An intercountry workshop on risk communication for pandemic influenza was 
organized to help all member states develop their own pandemic risk communication 
strategies for influenza. 
•	 Multilingual (i.e., Arabic, French, English) illustrative posters, video clips, and radio 
messages were developed for infection control in public places, community mitigation 
measures in academic settings, and patient care in health care settings. 
•	 A consultative meeting was organized on health systems preparedness for pandemic 








•	 A national training course on avian influenza outbreak and containment of human 
pandemic influenza was organized in 4 member states. 
•	 Two subregional training workshops were organized on infection control practices in 
health care settings for epidemic and acute respiratory infections with pandemic potential. 
•	 An intercountry training workshop on the use of PCR techniques for the diagnosis of 
H5N1 influenza virus was organized. The workshop supported all member states to 
build and strengthen their capacity to use PCR techniques to detect subtype influenza 
A viruses, including influenza A (H5N1), and to promote good laboratory practices and 
laboratory safety. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 An intercountry training workshop on management of public health risk following 
disasters and public health emergencies, including pandemic influenza, was organized 
for all 22 member states. 
•	 An interim guidance on clinical management of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza 
infection was developed for EMRO through a consultative process. 
•	 An intercountry training workshop on the use of PCR techniques to diagnose and 
detect 2009 H1N1 influenza was organized to support all member states to build their 
capacity to diagnose 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Orientation sessions were organized for the media on the dynamics and transmission of 
pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus infection. 
•	 An interim guidance on community mitigation measures for schools and other academic 
settings for pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus infection was developed for EMRO 
through a consultative process. 
•	 A consultative meeting was organized on health systems preparedness for pandemic 
influenza to support all member states to improve the surge capacity of health systems 
for pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus infection. 
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Afghanistan 
•	 Capital: Kabul •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 154.67 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 647,500 sq km live births; male: 158.88 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 150.24 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 29,121,286 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:   0–14 years: 44.6% (male 7,474,394/ •	 Total population: 28.1%; male:
43.1%; female: 12.6% (2000 est.) female 7,121,145); 15–64 years: 53% (male 8,901,880/ 
female 8,447,983); 65 years or older: 2.4% (male •	 GDP: $26.29 billion (2008 est.) 
383,830/female 409,144) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $800 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 44.21 
years; male: 44.04 years; female: 44.39 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a nation recovering from decades of conflict and an 
economic collapse that has left the country extremely poor and lacking essential systems and 
infrastructure. The Afghan Public Health Institute (APHI) of the Afghanistan MOH was 
dormant during the years of conflict. Funding from this cooperative agreement supports 
APHI to plan and conduct pandemic preparedness and response, ILI surveillance, and health 
education and training activities, as well as to build laboratory capacity. 
Surveillance 
•	 The Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) collects information on 15 reportable 
diseases, including ILI. 
•	 DEWS includes 154 sentinel surveillance sites covering all 34 provinces in the country. 
•	 There is a daily reporting system for all provincial and regional hospitals. 




•	 During the first 6 months of 2009, DEWS detected 6 suspected outbreaks of avian 
influenza; all outbreaks were investigated, and none were found to be H5N1. 
•	 There were 12 suspected human cases of H5N1; however, upon further testing, none 
were found to be positive. 
•	 The influenza and polio surveillance systems in each country were functionally 

integrated to detect and respond to clusters.
 
Laboratory 
The virology laboratory at the Central Public Health Laboratory was recognized by WHO as 
the NIC in April 2009. 
•	 A total of 559 specimens of influenza (ILI, avian influenza [AI], and pandemic 2009 
H1N1 influenza) were collected from different parts of the country for testing, with 
isolation of virus from 2 specimens. 
Preparedness 
•	 New guidelines for H1N1 surveillance and case management were developed, and these 
guidelines were translated, printed, and distributed to health care workers. 
•	 Five thousand capsules of oseltamivir were distributed to each region, enough for 
treatment of 500 severe cases of influenza. 
•	 Five hundred PPE kits were distributed in each region. These kits include a surgical 
mask and gown, gloves, boot covers, and a head cover. 
•	 Preparedness workshops were conducted for religious leaders, teachers, the media, and 
800 health care workers. 
•	 A command and control center was established, and 3 hotline numbers are available to 
the public. 
Training 
•	 Refresher training was conducted for rapid response teams from 13 provinces. 
•	 In the first 6 months of 2009, 13 workshops and training programs were conducted on 
AI, pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza, epidemiology, surveillance, pandemic planning, 
advocacy for pandemic response, and data management. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Laboratory capacity for the diagnosis of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza was strength­
ened through monitoring and additional training. 
•	 The first case of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza was detected in the NIC by using the 
H1N1 miniature RNA kit provided by U.S. CDC. 
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Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 A pandemic action plan for the health sector was developed and prepared with the coop
eration of all health sector stakeholders; the plan was finalized in February 2009 and 
endorsed by the MOH. 
•	 The Afghan Central Public Health Laboratory received WHO recognition as a NIC in 
April 2009. 
•	 New guidelines for H1N1 surveillance and case management have been developed and 
the guidelines were translated, printed, and distributed to health care workers. 
Principal Collaborators 
Project Investigators 
Jawad Mofleh, MD, MBA 
Ultrasonologist, Avian Influenza Coordinator, DEWS Director 
Ministry of Public Health, APHI 
G. Massoud Square, Wazir Akbar khan Mena 
Main Building, 3rd floor 
Kabul, Afghanistan 
E-mail: jmofleh@yahoo.com or jmofleh@moph.gov.af 
Bashir Noormal, MD 
Associate Professor 
Director General 
Ministry of Public Health, APHI 
G. Massoud Square, Wazir Akbar khan Mena 
Main Building, 3rd floor 
Kabul, Afghanistan 
E-mail: noormalb@yahoo.com or noormalb@moph.gov.af 
Faizullah Kakar, MD, PhD 
Deputy Minister for Technical Affairs 
Ministry of Public Health, APHI 
G. Massoud Square, Wazir Akbar khan Mena 
Main Building, 3rd floor 
Kabul, Afghanistan 
E-mail: moph_aphi@yahoo.com 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Charlene Sanders, MPH, RD 
Project Officer 
Influenza Division 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A20 
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Arab Republic of Egypt 
•	 Capital: Cairo •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 26.2 deaths/1,000 live 
•	 Area: Total: 1,001,450 sq km births; male: 27.84 deaths/1,000 live births; female: 
•	 Population: 24.48 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  80,471,869 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 71.4%; male: 83%;  0–14 years: 32.8% (male 
female: 59.4% (2005 est.) 13,495,577/female 12,890,378); 15–64 years: 
62.8% (male 25,689,588/female 24,871,255); •	 GDP: $471.2 billion (2009 est.) 
65 years or older: 4.4% (male 1,602,219/female •	 GDP per Capita: $6,000 (2009 est.) 
1,922,852) (2010 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 72.4 
years; male: 69.82 years; female: 75.1 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began August 2009. 
In Egypt’s MOH, officials in the Preventive Sector have outlined the following 3 goals to guide 
efforts to build capacity to detect, prepare, and respond to a potential influenza pandemic: 
•	 Prevent the emergence and spread of a pandemic influenza virus. 
•	 Reduce morbidity and mortality caused by a pandemic influenza virus. 
•	 Improve the state of preparedness and the quality of response to an influenza pandemic. 
The MOH proposes the following activities under each of the major components: 
Surveillance 
•	 Improve laboratory capacity and infrastructure for influenza surveillance. 
•	 Enhance epidemiology capacity and infrastructure for disease surveillance. 
•	 Develop or enhance the integrated epidemiologic surveillance network for influenza. 
•	 Develop or expand comprehensive, territory-wide surveillance for cases and clusters of 





•	 Develop or expand sentinel, laboratory-based surveillance for SARI. 
•	 Develop or enhance the integrated laboratory surveillance network for influenza. 
Preparedness 
•	 Update national public health preparedness plans. 
•	 Develop communication plans, risk messages, and products. 
Training 
•	 Develop and implement pandemic preparedness training courses as a pilot in 
2 governates. 
•	 Train rapid response teams at the governate and district levels. 
•	 Train hospital workers on infection control practices. 
Principal Collaborators 
Amr Kandeel 
Undersecretary of Preventive Affairs 
Egypt Ministry of Health 




Director of Epidemiology and Surveillance Unit 
Egypt Ministry of Health 
3, Magles El Shaab Street 
Cairo, Egypt 
Shermine Samir 
Officer of Influenza Surveillance 
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GDD-Egypt 
Established in 2006, the Global Disease Detection Regional Center in Egypt (GDD-Egypt) 
began as an extension of an established agreement between the U.S. CDC, WHO-EMRO, and 
NAMRU-3 to develop national and regional resources to control and combat infectious diseases 
that are the leading causes of death, disability, and illness in the region. The center is located on 
the NAMRU-3 campus. 
Coverage 
GDD-Egypt has provided support to more than 20 countries in AFRO, EMRO and EURO 
from its base at NAMRU-3. It is also the platform for much of U.S. CDC’s public health 
support to Iraq and Afghanistan. GDD-Egypt benefits from access to state-of-the-art 
laboratory facilities, including BSL-3 space from NAMRU-3. Egypt and the United States also 
work together to conduct joint surveillance activities, such as performing timely laboratory 
confirmation and pathogen discovery and training public health leaders in field epidemiology. 
Activities 
•	 Outbreak response. 





In 2009, GDD-Egypt responded to and provided laboratory support for 17 outbreaks. GDD-
Egypt officials also discovered a pathogen new to the region and increased their laboratory 
testing capacity fourfold. In addition, the center expanded the skills of more than 800 
participants through short-term regional and national training courses. 
In-Country Field Staff 
Erica Dueger, PhD, DVM 
GDD-Egypt Coordinator and Acting Influenza Lead 
Principal U.S. CDC Program Collaborations In-Country 
•	 Influenza Preparedness, Detection, and Response Program. 
•	 IEIP. 
•	 FETP. 





             




•	 Capital: Rabat •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 38.22 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 446,550 sq km live births; male: 41.74 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 34.53 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 31,627,428 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 52.3%; male:  0–14 years: 30.5% (male 5,337,322/ 
65.7%; female: 39.6% (2004 census) female 5,136,156); 15–64 years: 64.3% (male 
11,015,409/female 11,069,038); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $137.4 billion (2008 est.) 
5.2% (male 765,882/female 1,019,412) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $4,000 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 71.52 
years; male: 69.16 years; female: 74 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Strengthening Influenza Surveillance Networks in Morocco Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
The Kingdom of Morocco’s National Institute of Hygiene (NIH) is the NIC and the recipient 
of the U.S. CDC’s cooperative agreement for influenza surveillance. U.S. CDC provides the 
only foreign funds for influenza surveillance in Morocco. 
Surveillance 
•	 SARI surveillance is functional in 15 regions around the country. 
•	 ILI surveillance is functional in 15 regional health units and includes 110 private physicians. 
•	 SARI surveillance is conducted in 15 regional hospitals. 
•	 The NIC received samples from 1,299 SARI and ILI cases in 2009. Thirty-two specimens 
were sent to the reference laboratory in London. 
•	 An evaluation of the surveillance system has been conducted and corrective actions are 
ongoing. 
•	 Fax machines were purchased for private physicians to facilitate the data transmission. 
87
 
           
 
           
•	 A Web-based database is operational for data entry, analysis, retrieval, and communication 
between partners. 
•	 Supervisory visits were made by representatives from the NIC and Epidemiology Surveillance
Unit to identity regions that needed assistance to improve surveillance activities. 
Laboratory 
•	 Six real-time PCR machines for regional laboratories, an extraction machine, and a 

sequencing machine were purchased.
 
•	 The project regularly orders laboratory consumables for the NIC and regional laboratories. 
•	 The project coordinator attended a U.S. CDC-sponsored serology course and a WHO-
sponsored NIC meeting. 
Preparedness 
The National Public Health Preparedness Plan was updated. 
Training 
•	 Laboratory and health professionals have attended data analysis training. 
•	 A 2-day evaluation workshop was held for laboratory directors, regional hospital 

directors, and representatives from regional health observatories.
 
•	 Laboratory professionals received training in microneutralization. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 A major evaluation of the country’s influenza surveillance system was undertaken, and 
recommendations for corrective actions were made. 
•	 The national preparedness plan was updated and distributed. 
Principal Collaborators 
Rajae El Aouad, MD 
Professor of Medicine 
Director 
National Institute of Hygiene 
27, Av Ibn Battouta, BP 769 
Rabat, Morocco 
E-mail: relaouad@sante.gov.ma or rajaeelaouad@yahoo.fr 
Amal Barakat, PhD 
Virologist 
National Institute of Hygiene, Virology Laboratory 
27, Av Ibn Battouta, BP 769 
Rabat, Morocco 
E-mail: amal.barakat@yahoo.fr 
Mohammed Youbi, MD 
Epidemiologist 
National Institute of Hygiene 
27, Av Ibn Battouta, BP 769 









•	 Capital: Islamabad •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 66.94 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 803,940 sq km live births; male: 67.04 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 66.84 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 177,276,594 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure: •	  Total population: 49.9%; male: 63%; 0–14 years: 37.8% (male 
female: 36% (2005 est.) 33,617,953/female 31,741,258); 15–64 years: 58% 
(male 51,292,535/female 48,921,023); 65 years or •	 GDP: $454.2 billion (2008 est.) 
older: 4.2% (male 3,408,749/female 3,818,533) •	 GDP per Capita: $2,600 (2008 est.) 
(2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 64.13 
years; male: 63.07 years; female: 65.25 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Development of Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2004. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 5th year of the cooperative agreement. 
This cooperative agreement supports the development and maintenance of laboratory capacities 
at various sentinel sites in Pakistan to provide means for rapid confirmation of cases of human 
and pandemic influenza. The funding also supports pandemic influenza preparedness through 
the improvement of the national influenza surveillance program, planning for prevention and 
control programs, and developmental of a national vaccine policy. 
Pakistan’s MOH and NIH have implemented a 5-year, laboratory-based influenza surveillance 
program with technical assistance from the U.S. CDC. The capacity of the NIH central 
laboratory has been enhanced, and 1 regional laboratory in each province is being provided the 
requisite equipment and supplies to process specimens from suspected 2009 H1N1 influenza 
cases. Despite a delayed start and the country’s current sociopolitical situation, significant 






Designated the following 5 sentinel sites at the outpatient departments of major tertiary care 
hospitals in Pakistan’s 4 provinces and the federal capital: 
•	 King Edward Medical University (KEMU), Lahore in Punjab Province. 
•	 Civil Hospital, Karachi in Sindh Province. 
•	 Hayatabad Medical Complex (HMC), Peshawar in the North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP). 
•	 Bolan Medical Complex (BMC), Quetta in Balochistan. 
•	 Federal Government Services Hospital (FGSH), Islamabad Capital Territory. 
These sites were chosen in order to ensure data from all geographic areas of the country. They 
also represent areas of high population density and facilities with high patient turnover. These 
sites collected more than 1,018 ILI and 31 SARI samples during FY 2009. 
Other surveillance activities included the following: 
•	 Joint MOH-WHO rapid response teams were dispatched to affected areas and districts. 
•	 The country’s existing surveillance system was activated to perform case finding, collect 
samples, and send information to the virology laboratory at the NIH. 
•	 Provincial and regional health departments were asked to strengthen surveillance 
systems and designate district surveillance officers. 
Laboratory 
Five BSL-2 laboratories will be set up to conduct influenza surveillance, diagnostic activities, 
viral isolation, and information-sharing with stakeholders. The NIH laboratory conducts PCR 
testing, tissue cultures, and HA/HI. The 4 labs in Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta 
perform real-time PCR. 
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Viral transport media and swabs were supplied to provincial health departments and all 
international airports for the collection and transportation of samples from any suspected patients. 
The laboratory facilities in Lahore and Peshawar are undergoing biosafety enhancements to ensure 
that they follow the required standards for molecular testing for influenza. The laboratories also 
have received the equipment and supplies needed to conduct real-time PCR. 
Since its establishment, the biosafety-enhanced (BSL-2 plus) influenza laboratory at NIH 
has developed, standardized, and implemented standard operating procedures (according to 
U.S. CDC protocols) for several laboratory techniques. As the country’s national influenza 
center, the NIH laboratory participates in internal and external quality assurance surveys 
conducted by WHO. The laboratory’s Public Health Laboratory Division offers a fully 
functional, standardized facility that can perform tissue cultures, real-time PCR testing, and 
immunofluorescent assays. 
Preparedness 
Officials in Pakistan’s MOH have taken several steps to prevent and control pandemic influenza 
in the country, including creation of the National Preparedness Plan for Prevention and Control 
of Avian and Pandemic Influenza. This plan was developed by the multisectoral National 
Expert Committee in 2005 and led to implementation of a National Program for Prevention 
and Control of Avian and Pandemic Influenza. Components of this plan include emergency 
response, clinical health services, antiviral medicines, vaccine, containment and quarantine, 
communication, and staffing issues. 
Through its laboratory surveillance activities, officials in Pakistan’s NIH monitor the global 
influenza pandemic situation daily. The NIH also is receiving technical support from WHO, 
NAMRU-3, and the U.S. CDC. 
Specific steps taken for surveillance of human cases were 
•	 Immediate dispatching of joint MOH-WHO rapid response teams to affected areas and 
districts. 
•	 Strengthening of NIH laboratory capacity to conduct viral culture, subtyping, and 
molecular (PCR) testing. 
•	 Activating the country’s existing surveillance system for case finding, sample collection, 
and transportation to the virology laboratory at the NIH. 
•	 Activating district-level 

monitoring and response 

committees overseen by 





•	 Distributing viral transport 

media to provincial health 

departments and all 

international airports for the 

collection and transportation 







          
          
            
General steps taken for surveillance of human cases were as follows: 
•	 Joint steering committees were established at the federal level, with the federal ministers 
for health and food, agriculture, and livestock serving as cochairmen. 
•	 Joint committees were established at district levels under the epidemiology district 
officer, the medical superintendent at District Headquarters Hospital, the agriculture and 
livestock district officers, an officer from the wildlife department, the deputy director of 
the information department, and a representative from the district finance department. 
•	 The national reference BSL-3 laboratory at NIH is in its final phases of construction. 
•	 The MOH has registered the antiviral medicines that are known to be effective against 
influenza, and 13 local pharmaceutical companies have shown interest in manufacturing 
generic versions of oseltamivir (Tamiflu). 
•	 Public health specialists from provincial health departments have been added to the 
rapid response teams of the ministries of food, agriculture, and livestock. 
•	 National and international collaborative links have been established among the MOH 
and international stakeholders such as WHO and the U.S. CDC. 
•	 Standard operating procedures for surveillance and rapid response for cases of pandemic 
influenza have been circulated to the provincial health departments of Punjab, Sindh, 
NWFP, and Balochistan and to the regional health departments of the Azad State of 
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). 
•	 Standard operating procedures for collection, storage, and transportation of specimen 
from suspected cases of influenza have been developed. 
•	 The national influenza project sent information about PPE standards to the provincial 
health departments, Islamabad Capital Territory, AJK, Federally Administered Northern 
Areas, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 
•	 Antiviral medicines such as oseltamivir (Tamiflu) were sent from the national level to 
high-risk districts throughout Pakistan. Oseltamivir (Tamiflu), other antiviral medicines, 
and seasonal influenza vaccine were procured for staff engaged in seasonal, swine, and 




Several physicians, public health professionals, and laboratory personnel were trained through 
a program designed specifically for this project. Activities focused on providing rapid response 
training for officials involved in outbreak response activities. In 2009, 
•	 Five exercises were conducted, with 46 people trained. 
•	 Five trainings for sentinel site physicians were conducted, with 42 participants. 
•	 Ten laboratory staff from all sites and provinces attended PCR training. 
•	 A national seminar on influenza and a workshop on quality control are planned for the 
next quarter. 
•	 Public health and health care professionals were trained how to conduct surveillance of 
human cases and how to use PPE through the FELTP in Pakistan. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Health education materials and forms were produced. 
•	 The biosafety enhanced laboratory at NIH is fully functional to pick up pandemic 2009 
H1N1 influenza cases. The federal monitoring cell at NIH is monitoring the situation 
constantly. 
•	 Consistent information-sharing with GISN and 100% evaluation results or scores in 
(EQAP) from WHO for seasonal, avian, and swine influenza. 
•	 Press and media communication on regular basis. 
•	 All sentinel sites at FGSH, KEMU, HMC, BMC and CHK are operational after basic 
orientation training of physicians and medical personnel for collection of epidemiologic 
data and samples from ILI and SARI cases. 
•	 Sentinel site virologic specimens and epidemiologic data are shipped to NIH by courier. 
•	 Rapid response teams have been reorganized and activated for timely response. 
Principal Collaborators 
Project Investigators 
Birjees Mazher Kazi, MBBS, DCP, MPhil 
Executive Director NIH, Project Director NILSP 
Park Road, Chak Shahzad, Islamabad-54000, Pakistan 
E-mail: bmkazi@gmail.com 
Syed Sohail Zahoor Zaidi, MPhil, MPhil 
Head Virology, Technical Officer NILSP 
Virology Department, PHLD 
Park Road, Chak Shahzad, Islamabad-54000, Pakistan 











European Regional Office (EURO)
 
Human Influenza Surveillance: EURO 2010
 
U.S. CDC  Assignees 
WHO Regional Laboratory 
WHO National Influenza Center 
GDD Site 
WHO EURO Head quarters 
WHO Head quarters 
ECDC Headquarters 
European  Union Member States 
WHO EURO 
CDC Indirect  Funding 
Influenza Cooperative Agreement 0 337 .5 675 1,350 2 ,0 25 
Miles 
U.S. CDC Direct Regional Support 






•	 Romania (through WHO-EURO). 
•	 Ukraine (through Program Appropriate Technology in Health [PATH]). 
WHO-EURO works in coordination with the European Centers for Disease Control (ECDC) 
to support the implementation of public health programs in the region’s 53 member states. 
These member states are located in Eastern and Western Europe, the Caucasus region, and 
Central Asia. 
The U.S. CDC currently has an influenza advisor assigned to the ECDC, which is located in 
Stockholm, Sweden. During 2009, U.S. CDC placed an epidemiologist in WHO-EURO in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. Placement of the epidemiologist in the region will provide critical 
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support to the WHO-CDC mission to support influenza surveillance and response activities in 
the region. 
WHO-EURO and U.S. CDC are collaborating on the implementation of a coordinated 
plan to improve laboratory capacity in member state NICs. This capacity is needed to detect 
and respond to outbreaks of novel influenza and other pathogens with pandemic potential in 
humans and to support pandemic planning and containment efforts in the region. WHO­
EURO and U.S. CDC coordinate closely to implement influenza surveillance and pandemic 
activities in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. 
Surveillance 
•	 Peer-reviewed seasonal influenza surveillance guidelines were developed and published 
jointly by WHO-EURO and U.S. CDC. (See www.euro.who.int/document/e92738.pdf.) 
•	 Thirteen countries received technical assistance and support to submit epidemiologic 
and virologic data into the WHO-EURO regional surveillance platform. 
•	 A regional platform for influenza surveillance that includes databases with information 
on the capacities of EU countries was established and expanded from 29 to 53 
countries. 
•	 A LabNet meeting for NICs in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and South 
Eastern Europe (SEE) countries was conducted jointly with epidemiologists responsible 
for influenza at the national level. 
•	 The restructuring of the WHO-EURO Communicable Disease Section’s influenza 
Web site was completed and expanded to include a section on pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza. 
Laboratory 
An intercountry workshop on strategies for improving laboratory quality as part of the 
implementation of IHR core capacities was conducted. 
Preparedness 
•	 Two pandemic preparedness workshops were conducted; 12 CIS countries attended 1 
workshop, and 9 SEE countries attended the other. 
•	 Pandemic working groups were established for CIS and SEE countries. 
•	 Three field missions were deployed for outbreak containment. 
Training 
•	 Hands-on training in biosafety was conducted for senior laboratory staff from national 
influenza laboratories in 12 CIS countries. 
•	 IHR-related laboratory management training was conducted for 3 countries. 
•	 Two subregional alert and response training sessions were conducted for the Baltic States 
and SEE countries. 
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 H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 A regional meeting was held in August 2009 to discuss current knowledge of 2009 
H1N1 influenza and review and reinforce strategies for surveillance. 
•	 WHO-EURO coordinated pandemic communications with WHO country offices, the 
European Commission, the ECDC, and other EU agencies and partners. 
•	 Nonpharmaceutical social distancing control measures were reviewed. 
•	 2009 H1N1 influenza kits and other reagents and supplies developed by U.S. CDC 
were distributed to countries in support of pandemic response efforts. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Launch of the influenza surveillance platform for all 53 WHO member states. 
•	 Publication of WHO-EURO guidance for influenza surveillance in humans. 
•	 Distribution of laboratory kits to member states after emergence of the pandemic 2009 
H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Regional meeting for 25 member states on the response to the pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza in Copenhagen. 
Principal Collaborators 
Caroline S. Brown, PhD 
Technical Officer 
Communicable Diseases Unit 
WHO Regional Office for Europe 
8, Scherfigsvej 8 
2100 Copenhagen, Denmark 
E-mail: cbr@euro.who.int 
Joshua Mott, MA, EMT-P, PhD 
Epidemiologist 
Communicable Diseases Unit 
WHO Regional Office for Europe 
8, Scherfigsvej 8 
2100 Copenhagen, Denmark 
E-mail: jmo@euro.who.int 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Charlene Sanders, MPH, RD 
Project Officer 
Influenza Division 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A20 








•	 Capital: Yerevan •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 20.94 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 29,743 sq km live births; male: 25.82 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 15.33 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 2,966,802 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 99.4%; male: 0–14 years: 18.7% (male 296,401/ 
99.7%; female: 99.2% (2001 census) female 259,594); 15–64 years: 70.3% (male 
975,438/female 1,111,989); 65 years or older: 11% •	 GDP: $19.6 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 128,398/female 196,766) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $6,600 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 72.4 
years; male: 68.79 years; female: 76.55 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza by National Health Authorities 
Outside the U.S. Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Since 2006, Armenia has been funded to enhance influenza surveillance and laboratory 
capacity to improve capabilities to respond to avian and pandemic influenza outbreaks. The 
State Hygiene and Anti-Epidemic Inspectorate (SHAEI) of the MOH in Armenia has project 
goals that focus on developing appropriate laboratory and diagnostic capacity to rapidly detect 
suspect cases of avian, seasonal, and pandemic influenza. In addition, project goals include 
strengthening epidemiologic surveillance capacity at all levels of government, including local 
and border sanitary quarantine posts. 
Surveillance 
During 2008–2009, the following activities were implemented under the epidemiology capacity 
and infrastructure component of the surveillance and response to avian and pandemic influenza 
grant project: 
•	 With the support of local experts (i.e., epidemiologists, infectious disease specialists, and 
virologists), guidance on influenza laboratory diagnostic testing was developed. 
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•	 Roles and responsibilities were defined for notification, recording, and reporting of 
influenza laboratory test results, as well as for the regimen and scheme required for 
packaging, shipping, and transporting influenza specimens from sentinel sites from the 
PCR laboratory in Lori Marz (i.e., the Northern region of Armenia) to the AI reference 
laboratory at the CDC MOH (Yerevan). 
•	 Roles and responsibilities of medical doctors, epidemiologists, and nurses working at 
sentinel sites were defined according to the influenza epidemiologic surveillance scheme 
and surveillance standard, including those related to notification, recording, reporting, 
and sampling. These standards are based on the surveillance standard and protocol for 
investigating cases and clusters. 
•	 Medical doctors, epidemiologists, and nurses were identified and enrolled at sentinel 
sites in Lori Marz and Yerevan. 
•	 All sentinel medical doctors, epidemiologists, and nurses from Lori Marz and Yerevan 
were trained on influenza epidemiologic surveillance scheme and surveillance standards, 
including case definitions, roles and responsibilities, notification, recording, reporting, 
and sampling. Sentinel surveillance is being piloted at 2 sites. 
•	 Guidance on how to conduct a sentinel surveillance system was adopted by the Republic 
of Armenia’s MOH. 
•	 Regulations on the exchange of information about cases of animal and human diseases 
among the MOH, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Ecology (including 
reporting forms) was adopted by the Armenian government. 
•	 A small library of scientific periodicals was established, with approximately 100 volumes 
on public health, epidemiology, and virology in English and Russian. 
Laboratory 
The sentinel surveillance network consists of the following 3 laboratories: 
•	 CDC-MOH (Yerevan). 
•	 Expert center of the State Hygiene and Anti-Epidemic Inspectorate (SHAEI) of Lori 
Marz (Vanadzor, Armenia), which was renovated and equipped under this project. 
•	 Expert center of the SHAEI of Syunik Marz (Kapan, Armenia), which is not fully 
equipped yet. It is being equipped through donations from Austria and should be 
operational in 2010. 
The PCR Laboratory of Nork Infection Hospital of the MOH (Yerevan, Armenia) has no 
real-time PCR equipment, only an open system, and it is not yet part of the influenza sentinel 
network. 
During FY 2008–2009, the following activity was implemented under the laboratory capacity 
and infrastructure component of the Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza Grant Project: 
•	 The PCR open system of the Lori Marz SHAEI laboratory was reequipped with a 






The preparedness plan for pandemic influenza was adopted by the Armenian government. 
Training 
•	 Training on how to conduct influenza PCR diagnosis with the LightCycler 480 
Instrument II (Roche Diagnostics) was provided for 2 virologists from Lori Marz 
in August 2009. This training was performed at the PCR Laboratory of the expert 
center of the SHAEI of Lori Marz and consisted of theoretical and practical 
applications. 
•	 Training on PCR diagnosis of avian and seasonal influenza and other viral diseases 
was conducted for 8 PCR laboratory specialists from CDC MOH (Yerevan), 
Lori Marz, Syunik Marz, and Nork Infectious Clinical Hospital PCR laboratories 
(each facility sent 2 people). This training consisted of theoretical and practical 
applications and was performed at the CDC-MOH (Yerevan). 
•	 Four days of training on the introduction of an influenza sentinel pilot system in 
Yerevan, Vanadzor, and Lori Marz was conducted for 47 doctors from 6 hospitals (4 
hospitals from Yerevan, 1 hospital from Vanadzor, and 1 hospital from Lori Marz). 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Since August 2009, project team members have participated in regular weekly meetings 
of the multilateral task force on 2009 H1N1 influenza at the MOH. 
•	 Sanitary quarantine control was strengthened on the frontier, particularly in the 
following locations: Zvartnots International Airport (Yerevan), Shirak Airport (Gyumri, 
Shirak Marz), Bavra (Shirak Marz, border with Georgia), Gogavan-Privolnoe (Lori 
Marz, border with Georgia), Ajrum-Jiliza (Tavush Marz, border with Georgia), 
Bagratashen (Tavush Marz, border with Georgia), and Meghri (Syunik Marz, border 
with Islamic Republic of Iran). 
•	 Staff of the Sanitary Quarantine Post (SQP) in Zvartnots International Airport 
(Yerevan) implemented the thermoscreening of all passengers arriving from other 
countries. All passengers filled out the Public Health Passenger Locator Card and 
provided it to the SQP staff. 
•	 Public awareness activities were undertaken, including distribution of practical guidance 










Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 The PCR laboratories at CDC-MOH (Yerevan) and Lori Marz are operational. 
•	 The sentinel surveillance scheme was adopted, staff were trained, and pilot programs 
were launched at 2 sentinel sites. 
•	 Regulations on the exchange of information about cases of animal and human diseases 
among the MOH, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Ecology (including 
reporting forms) was adopted by the Armenian government. 
Special Influenza Project 
World Bank Avian Influenza Preparedness 
•	 Procured 16,000 doses of vaccine against seasonal influenza for the 2008–09 influenza 
season. 
•	 Implemented vaccination protocol among populations at high risk, such as members 
of rapid response teams, physicians, pediatricians, family doctors, nurses, workers 
implementing border control, workers on battery farms, zoo workers, ornithologists, 
and children aged 6–7 years living in a territory where wild birds settle. 
•	 Constructed, renovated, and equipped the following sanitary quarantine border posts on 
northern and southern parts of the frontier of Armenia (AIP Project by World Bank): 
ˏ Zvartnots International Airport (Yerevan). 
ˏ Shirak Airport (Gyumri, Shirak Marz). 
ˏ Bavra (Shirak Marz). 
ˏ Gogavan-Privolnoe (Lori Marz). 
ˏ Ajrum-Jiliza (Tavush Marz). 
ˏ Bagratashen (Tavush Marz).
 














•	 Provided Internet connections to the following SHAEI centers to allow these sites to 
interact with the influenza surveillance network: 
ˏ	 Central office of the SHAEI of the MOH. 
ˏ	 Regional center of the SHAEI of Aragtsotn Marz (Ashtarak). 
ˏ	 Regional center of the SHAEI of Armavir Marz (Armavir). 
ˏ	 Regional center of the SHAEI of Ararat Marz (Artashat). 
ˏ	 Regional and intraregional centers of the SHAEI of Syunik Marz (Megri, Goris, 
Kapan). 
ˏ	 Regional and intraregional centers of the SHAEI of Kotayk Marz (Abovyan, 
Hrazdan). 
ˏ	 Intraregional centers of the SHAEI of Gegharkunik Marz (Chambarak, Vardenis). 
ˏ	 Regional center of the SHAEI of Shirak Marz (Gjumri). 
ˏ	 Regional center of the SHAEI of Vajots Dzor (Vayq). 
ˏ	 Regional center of the SHAEI of Lori Marz (Vanadzor, Tashir, Alaverdi). Nork 
Infection Hospital. 
Principal Collaborators for the Armenia NIC 
Project Investigators 
Sergey Khachatryan 
17 Shirvanzade Street 
Yerevan 0014, Armenia 
E-mail: hpiu@arminco.com or srg@arminco.com 
Artavazd Vanyan 
10 G. Hovsepyan Street 




17 Shirvanzade Street 
Yerevan 0014, Armenia 
E-mail: hpiu@arminco.com or hayrarmen@armenia.com 
Nune Bakunts 
Project Team Leader 
10 G. Hovsepyan Street 
Yerevan 0047, Armenia 









•	 Capital: Tbilisi •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 16.78 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 69,700 sq km live births; male: 18.81 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 14.48 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 4,600,825 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure: •	  Total population: 100%; male: 0–14 years: 16.3% (male 402,961/ 
100%; female: 100% (2004 est.) female 352,735; 15–64 years: 67.1% (male 
1,496,802/female 1,610,725); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $22.93 billion (2008 est.) 
16.6% (male 307,795/female 459,823) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $5,000 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 76.51 
years; male: 73.21 years; female: 80.26 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza by National Health Authorities 
Outside the United States Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
Surveillance 
•	 A total of 1,382 samples were received at the National Influenza Laboratory (NIL) from 
1,371 cases of ILI. Of these samples, 688 were tested by rapid-test, 78 were positive for 
influenza A, and 74 were positive for influenza B. 
•	 A total of 1,190 samples were tested by real-time RT-PCR. Of these samples, 28 were 
positive for pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza, 5 were positive for seasonal A/H1 
influenza, 34 were positive for A/H3 influenza, and 31 were positive for influenza B. 
•	 Twenty-five influenza isolates cultivated on Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells 
were tested by HI/HA. One was seasonal A/H1 influenza, 8 were A/H3 influenza, and 
16 were influenza B. 
In May 2009, officials in the Republic of Georgia conducted the first round of monitoring of 
the influenza surveillance system. One objective of this monitoring was to evaluate awareness 
about influenza and pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza among health care providers. The data 





relevant to these issues. A second round of monitoring was conducted in September 2009 and 
showed that health care providers had satisfactory knowledge about 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
During the 2 rounds of monitoring, 50 health care facilities were visited. The quality of 
registration and notification has increased significantly since 2007, when monitoring was first 
established to maintain the national surveillance network. 
Data received from an evaluation survey of issues related to the diagnostic, registration, and 
reporting system for influenza and acute infections of the upper respiratory tract in Georgia 
were analyzed in FY 2009. As a result of this analysis, negotiations about what changes should 
be made to the country’s influenza surveillance system are ongoing. The data also were used to 
develop recommendations and guidelines to address existing gaps in the system. New 
recommendations and guidelines will be published in FY 2010. 
Other surveillance activities during FY 2009 included the following: 
•	 The rapid response team in Georgia conducted several case investigations involving 
SARI. 
•	 Necessary equipment and supplies were purchased and distributed to 8 sentinel sites. 
•	 Since May 2009, an additional sentinel site was established at a large outpatient clinic in 
Tbilisi. NIL receives about 60 samples weekly from this site. 
Laboratory 
•	 By April 2009, the NRL at Georgia’s National Center for Disease Control and Public 
Health (NCDC) was provided with all necessary reagents and supplies for laboratory 
functions during routine surveillance and pandemic circumstances. 




•	 Additional primers for other respiratory infections were acquired, and the NCDC’s NIL 
can now conduct differential diagnostics for other respiratory infections. 
•	 During 2009, the NRL sent 2 additional laboratory technicians for international 
training on influenza testing techniques. The technicians are working under contract for 
the project, and their contracts were extended to the 3rd budget year. 
•	 Because of military operations in Georgia in August 2008, the Project Management 
Unit (PMU) could not take part in a meeting in Cairo. Instead, staff members from 
the PMU visited the U.S. CDC to familiarize themselves with materials from the Cairo 
meeting and to consider project plans. 
•	 In addition, PMU staff members were able to learn about U.S. CDC’s organization 
and structure, discuss existing problems with Georgia’s surveillance system, learn more 
about the U.S. surveillance system, visit U.S. CDC’s influenza laboratory, and receive 
recommendations about laboratory equipment. 
•	 Diagnostics were conducted in BSL-2 laboratories equipped by the Threat Agent 
Detection and Response Project, with virology and PCR diagnostics performed only for 
special cases. The number of samples tested by PCR was increased because the efficacy 
of virology testing is significantly low and time-consuming. 
•	 Because the PCR machine at the NRL is in use almost continuously, officials found 
space to accommodate a second machine. Other necessary equipment also was pur­
chased as part of the U.S. CDC project. 
•	 Because of the occurrence of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza, funds were redirected to 
pay for developing and printing training materials about the emergency of the new pan­
demic. Materials were developed to increase awareness of health care providers through­
out the country. 
•	 Trainings on how to control pandemic influenza and use PPE were conducted for 1,000 
health care providers in all 63 districts of Georgia. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
Officials conducted a case investigation of the first cluster outbreak of pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza, with the following results: 
•	 On July 30, 2009, a member of a Georgian dance group returning from Western Europe 
was confirmed to have 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
•	 Project staff investigated transmission of influenza within the dance group and with 
their close contacts upon return to Georgia. A standardized questionnaire was used to 
collect information on age, symptoms, and health practices. 
•	 Five cases were confirmed, and 8 probable case-patients were suspected to have 2009 
H1N1 influenza virus (13 of 35 group members, attack rate (AR) = 37%; 1 of 37 
in-country contacts, AR = 3%). The first probable case-patient developed symptoms 
on July 20, 2009, during the tour. The age distribution of the case-patients was 10–18 
years; none of 30 adults (4 group members and 26 in-country contacts) was affected. 
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•	 Common symptoms of case-patients were fever more than 38 °C (70%), cough (35%), 
sore throat (35%), runny nose (35%), and headache (29%). 
•	 Surveillance also revealed that 93% of all case-patients had practiced limited 
handwashing during the tour, and all had been in close contact with each other for 
5 days while traveling by ferry and bus. No group members or contacts were ever 
vaccinated against seasonal influenza. 
•	 No one received antiviral treatment. No complications or deaths have occurred. 
•	 Before this cluster was identified, only 7 sporadic imported cases of pandemic 2009 
H1N1 influenza had been confirmed. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 One additional sentinel surveillance site was established at a large outpatient clinic in 
Tbilisi in May 2009 bringing the total of sentinel sites in Georgia to 9. The NIL receives 
approximately 60 samples weekly from this new site. 
•	 Space within the NRL was upgraded to accommodate an additional PCR machine and 
other equipment to meet the growing needs of the project. 
Project Investigators 
Khatuna Zakhashvili, MD 
Project Coordinator 
Head of Surveillance Department 
National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC) 
0177, 9 M. Asatiani Street 
Tbilisi, Georgia 
E-mail: episurv@ncdc.ge 
Olga Tarkhan-Mouravi, MD 
Project Assistant 
Head of Vaccine Preventable Disease Unit, NCDC 





Head of Influenza Laboratory, NCDC 
0177, 9 M. Asatiani Street 
Tbilisi, Georgia 
E-mail: lrc@ncdc.ge 
Paata Imnadze, MD, DPH 
Main Expert 
Director General of NCDC 









•	 Capital: Astana •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 26.56 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 2,717,300 sq km live births; male: 31.03 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 21.83 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  15,460,484 (July 2010 est.) 
otal population: 99.5%; male: ears: 22.1% (male 1,734,622/ •	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  T 0–14 y
99.8%; female: 99.3% (1999 est.) female 1,659,723); 15–64 years: 69.6% (male 
5,219,983/female 5,463,468); 65 years or older: 8.2% •	 GDP: $184.3 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 443,483/female 819,254) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $12,000 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 67.55 
years; male: 62.24 years; female: 73.16 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Development of Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2005. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 5th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Funding through the cooperative agreement has been combined with other support from the 
U.S. CDC and contributions from USAID and NAMRU-3 to establish an influenza sentinel 
surveillance network of 7 sites that provide influenza-positive specimens to the GISN through 
the Kazakhstan NIC. 
Surveillance 
Surveillance activities in Kazakhstan include the following: 
•	 Fourteen oblast Sanitary Epidemiological Service (SES) laboratories and 2 city SES 
offices report all cases of acute viral respiratory disease and influenza to the Republican 
Sanitary Epidemiological Service (RSES). 
•	 The U.S. CDC helped the Kazakhstan MOH establish 3 geographically dispersed 
sentinel sites to collect information on acute respiratory disease. 
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•	 At each site, trained epidemiologists and clinicians collected epidemiologic and clinical 
information, as well as upper respiratory tract specimens, from a sample of persons who 
met the WHO ILI or SARI case definitions. 
Laboratory 
•	 Fourteen oblast SES laboratories, 2 city SES laboratories, and the NIC can detect influ­
enza virus by culture and immunofluorescence microscopy. 
•	 The 14 oblast SES laboratories can diagnose influenza by testing acute and convalescent 
serum specimens. 
•	 Each site obtains 2 nasal and 1 pharyngeal swabs from a sample of persons who meet 
the WHO ILI or SARI case definitions and who have symptoms for more than 72 
hours. The swabs are placed in viral transport medium, which is divided into 2 aliquots 
and frozen at less than 70°C. 
During the 2008–09 influenza season, sentinel sites submitted 669 specimens from patients. Of 
these, 270 (40%) were positive by PCR for influenza virus. Of these 270 specimens, 97 (36%) 
were influenza B and 173 (64%) were influenza A. Among the influenza A viruses, 79% were 
2009 H1N1 influenza and 21% were seasonal H3N2 influenza. 
The following are laboratory milestones: 
•	 In 2009, Kazakhstan gained the capability to reliably diagnose influenza virus infections. 
•	 In 2009, the RSES virology laboratory became a fully functioning NIC and was offi­
cially recognized by WHO. 
•	 During the 2008–09 influenza season, more than 100 influenza viruses were typed and 
subtyped in Kazakhstan for the first time in a decade. 
•	 During summer 2009, as a direct result of U.S. CDC-led effort to establish real-time 
PCR capability in the RSES laboratory, the Kazakhstan MOH diagnosed 17 imported 
cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza and ruled out other viruses. These findings lessened a 
public health challenge presented by the initial introduction of 2009 H1N1 influenza in 
Kazakhstan and allowed the MOH to make prudent responses. 
•	 The sentinel surveillance network in Kazakhstan will expand to 7 sites, covering the 
entire country during the 2009–10 influenza season. 
•	 Influenza virus identification and typing by real-time PCR that uses Amplisense prim­
ers will be performed at the oblast level for all positives and a sample of negatives and 
forwarded to the NIC for confirmation with U.S. CDC primers. 
Preparedness 
Preparedness activities for FY 2009 included the following: 
•	 U.S. CDC staff drafted a National Pandemic Preparedness Plan and submitted it to the 
MOH. 
•	 U.S. CDC supported and led the MOH work group created to refine the plan. 
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•	 U.S. CDC sponsored two 1-day interministerial meetings to discuss and publicize the 
plan and two 2-day tabletop simulation exercises with representatives of all relevant 
ministries and NGOs to further refine the plan. 
•	 The plan was approved by the prime minister of Kazakhstan in August 2009. 
•	 Implementation guidelines were approved by the chief state sanitary doctor in October 
2009. 
Training 
Training activities in Kazakhstan included the following: 
•	 A week-long course on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity for laboratory directors and 
workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
•	 Five- and 2-day sentinel surveillance trainings (i.e., clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory) 
were conducted twice in Uralsk, Petropavlovsk, and Taldykorgan and once in Aktau, 
Astana, Taraz, and Ust-Kamenogorsk. 
•	 Two-day tabletop exercises on pandemic influenza were held near Astana. One was for 
national-level officials representing all relevant ministries and NGOs, and the other was 
for oblast-level representatives of the same organizations. 
•	 A week-long workshop on the cleaning and analysis of influenza sentinel surveillance 
data was held for sentinel site and RSES epidemiologists in Almaty. 
•	 A 2-day regional training on how to use real-time PCR to detect 2009 H1N1 influenza 
was held in Almaty. 
•	 A half-day training on the proper use of biosafety cabinets was provided to 400 users of 
biosafety cabinets in the RSES laboratories. 
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 H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Acquired 2009 H1N1 influenza test kits from U.S. CDC. 
•	 Provided regional training on the use of the 2009 H1N1 influenza test kits with help 
from NAMRU-3. 
•	 Provided consultative services to the MOH during summer 2009 when 17 H1N1 cases 
were confirmed and again in October when additional cases were suspected. 
•	 Supported an urgent 1-day convocation of senior health officials from throughout the 
nation to ensure discussion of 2009 H1N1 influenza and the national pandemic plan. 
Special Influenza Projects 
An assessment of the sensitivity and specificity of influenza A and B typing test kits from 
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Established in 2008, the Global Disease Detection Regional Center, Kazakhstan (GDD-
Kazakhstan) began as an extension of the U.S. CDC’s presence and success from its FETP, 
which began in 2003. In addition, integrated efforts with field staff from U.S. CDC’s Influenza 
Division in 2007 helped form the foundation of the center’s activities. 
Coverage 
GDD-Kazakhstan covers 5 countries in Central Asia and has relied heavily on the expertise of 
the U.S. CDC’s Influenza Division to link surveillance and laboratory confirmation of new and 
emerging pathogens. Two outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) have been 
reported in Central Asia: an outbreak among poultry in northern Kazakhstan in 2005 and an 
outbreak among wild swans in western Kazakhstan in 2006. 
Activities 
•	 Outbreak response. 





In 2009, GDD-Kazakhstan responded to 14 outbreaks, 93% of which resulted in a confirmed 
cause through laboratory analysis. In addition, they detected 1 pathogen new to the region and 
developed new laboratory testing capacity for influenza A and B. GDD-Kazakhstan trained 
6 FETP graduates and more than 200 participants through short-term regional and national 
trainings. 
Staff 
In-Country Field Staff 
John Moran, MD, MPH 
GDD-Kazakhstan Coordinator and Influenza Lead 
Principal U.S. CDC Program Collaborations In-Country 
•	 Influenza Preparedness, Detection, and Response Program. 
•	 IEIP. 
•	 FETP. 










•	 Capital: Bishkek •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 30.25 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 199,951 sq km live births; male: 35.09 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 25.15 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  5,508,626 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:    0–14 years: 29.4% (male 827,346/ •	 Total population: 98.7%; male:
99.3%; female: 98.1% (1999 census) female 794,746); 15–64 years: 65% (male 
1,754,681/female 1,827,553); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $11.66 billion (2009 est.) 
5.5% (male 118,215/female 186,085) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $2,100 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 69.74 
years; male: 65.74 years; female: 73.94 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Although there is no cooperative agreement in the Kyrgyz Republic (i.e., Kyrgyzstan), the U.S. 
CDC has received World Bank funding through the U.S. CDC Foundation. These funds were 
used to supplement support from the USAID, U.S. CDC’s Influenza Division, and the GDD. 
Surveillance 
•	 There is universal reporting of acute viral respiratory disease and influenza to the RSES. 
•	 During the 2007–08 influenza season, U.S. CDC helped the MOH in Kyrgyzstan 
establish 2 geographically dispersed sentinel sites to collect information on acute 
respiratory disease. At each site, trained epidemiologists and clinicians collect 
epidemiologic and clinical information, as well as upper respiratory tract specimens, 
from a sample of persons who meet the WHO SARI case definition. 
•	 During the 2009–10 influenza season, the sentinel sites will attempt to obtain 

specimens from ILI and SARI patients.
 
Laboratory 
•	 Government laboratories in Kyrgyzstan generally lack trained staff and supplies. U.S. CDC 
works mainly with the RSES virology laboratory in Bishkek and the laboratory in Osh. 
•	 During March 2006–February 2008, the RSES virology laboratory submitted 12 
influenza virus isolates to the GISN through NAMRU-3. Ten of the 12 tested positive 




             
              
 
             
              
               
 
•	 Improving the sensitivity of viral culture in the NIC in Kyrgyzstan continues to be a
project goal, and U.S. CDC has supported viral isolation in the RSES virology laboratory 
with equipment, supplies, and training. At the same time, U.S. CDC and its partners also 
have established real-time PCR capability in the RSES laboratory and 2 geographically
dispersed surveillance sites for acute respiratory disease. At each site, 2 nasal and 1 
pharyngeal swabs are obtained from a sample of persons who meet the WHO SARI case 
definitions and who have had symptoms for less than 72 hours. The swabs are placed in 
viral transport medium, which is divided into 2 aliquots and frozen at less than 70°C. 
•	 During the 2008–09 influenza season, the sites submitted 390 specimens from patients 
who met the SARI case definition. Of these, 33% were positive by PCR for influenza 
virus. Of this subgroup, 5% were influenza B and 95% were influenza A. Among the 
influenza A viruses, 21% were 2009 H1N1 influenza and 79% were seasonal H3N2 
influenza. 
Preparedness 
•	 U.S. CDC staff helped write a National Pandemic Preparedness Plan, which was 
submitted to the MOH. U.S. CDC supported the MOH work group created to refine 
the plan. As part of this work, U.S. CDC sponsored two 1-day interministerial meetings 
to discuss and publicize the plan and two 2-day tabletop simulation exercises with 
representatives of all relevant ministries and NGOs to further refine the plan. 
Training 
•	 Two-day sentinel surveillance training (i.e., clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory) was 
conducted in Bishkek and Osh. 
•	 Two-day tabletop exercises on pandemic influenza were held at Issky-Kul. One was for 
national-level officials representing all relevant ministries and NGOs, and the other was 
for oblast-level representatives of the same organizations. 
•	 A week-long workshop on the cleaning and analysis of influenza sentinel surveillance 
data was held for sentinel site and RSES epidemiologists in Bishkek. 
•	 A 2-day regional training on how to use real-time PCR to detect 2009 H1N1 influenza 
was held in Almaty. U.S. CDC sponsored 2 laboratory workers from Bishkek to attend. 
•	 A half-day training in the proper use of biosafety cabinets was provided to 125 users of 
biosafety cabinets in the RSES laboratories. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Acquired 2009 H1N1 influenza test kits from U.S. CDC. 
•	 Provided regional training on the use of the 2009 H1N1 influenza test kits with help 
from NAMRU-3. 
•	 Provided consultative services to the MOH during summer 2009 when 4 H1N1 cases 
were confirmed and again in October when additional cases were suspected. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 In 2009, Kyrgyzstan gained the capability to reliably diagnose influenza virus infection. 
•	 In 2009, the RSES virology laboratory became a fully functioning NIC and was 





•	 During the 2008–09 influenza season, more than 100 influenza viruses were typed and 
subtyped in Kyrgyzstan for the first time in a decade. 
•	 In summer 2009, solely as a result of the U.S. CDC-led effort to establish real-time 
PCR capability in the RSES laboratory, the Kyrgyzstan MOH was able to diagnose 4 
cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza and rule out others. These findings lessened the public 
health challenge presented by the initial introduction of 2009 H1N1 influenza to 
Kyrgyzstan and allowed the MOH to make prudent responses. 
Principal Collaborators 
Project Investigators 
Zuridin Nurmatov, MD 
Chief Epidemiologist, RSES 
535 Frunze Street 
Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, 720033 
E-mail: zuridin@mail.ru 
Kaliya Kasimbekova, MD 
Chief of Virology Laboratory, RSES 
535 Frunze Street 








•	 Capital: Chisinau (Kishinev) •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 12.77 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 33,851 sq km live births; male: 14.2 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 11.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  4,317,483 (July 2010 est.) 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 99.1%; male:  0–14 years: 15.7% (male 347,808/ •	
99.7%; female: 98.6% (2005 est.) female 329,331); 15–64 years: 73.7% (male 
1,544,640/female 1,637,707); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $9.986 billion (2009 est.) 
10.6% (male 167,917/female 290,080) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $2,300 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 71.09 
years; male: 67.39 years; female: 75 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness and Response Capacity in the Republic of Moldova 
Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began August 2009. 
The Republic of Moldova’s MOH is newly funded to support the development of 
epidemiologic, laboratory, and related capacity to detect, respond, and monitor shifts in 
influenza viruses. The main objectives of the project are to 
•	 Strengthen pandemic influenza preparedness capacity to reduce the economic and social 
impact of a pandemic. 
•	 Improve detection and response capacities by enhancing the surveillance system and 
laboratory network. 
•	 Strengthen response and containment capacity through rapid response and infection 
control. 
Activities will be implemented in close collaboration with WHO regional and country offices 




The MOH proposes to enhance detection and response capacity to 
•	 Improve information and data management capacity through integration of the 
technology system for the surveillance of infectious diseases. 
•	 Improve the process of specimen collection at facilities in the sentinel system. 
•	 Improve the process of information collection for SARI at each site in the sentinel 
system by using standard case definitions. 
•	 Strengthen early warning systems for reporting human cases of influenza. 
•	 Strengthen infection control capacity. 
Laboratory 
The MOH proposes to strengthen the current sentinel laboratory network, which consists of 
the National Viral Respiratory Laboratory (NVRL) and 9 additional laboratories around the 
country, to support surveillance and detection of influenza through the following activities: 
•	 Strengthening and improving the 

laboratory capacity of the NVRL 

for performing the isolation and 





•	 Maintaining the diagnostic 

capacities needed to carry out the 

functions of the NVRL and the 

sentinel-based laboratory network 

through the procurement of 





•	 Maintaining and ensuring the biosafety and biosecurity of targeted laboratories 
according to national and international standards through the use of guidelines, 
standard operating procedures, and training. 
Preparedness 
The government of the Republic of Moldova approved the National Preparedness Pandemic 
Plan for Human Pandemic Influenza in 2005. During the course of the current cooperative 
agreement, project staff proposed to 
•	 Upgrade the National Pandemic Plan. 
•	 Establish an interdepartmental working task force with multisectoral involvement from 
governmental ministries. 




•	 Improve the coordination capacity between human and animal sectors, government 






•	 Establish a communication component to the pandemic preparedness plan. 
•	 Develop and adopt rapid response and containment protocols to strengthen local rapid 
response capacity. 
Training 
The MOH proposes to train 
•	 Epidemiologists to increase their knowledge and skills to support surveillance, outbreak 
investigation and response, and disease control activities. 
•	 Rapid response and containment teams. 
•	 Laboratory scientists and technicians in the sentinel network in sample collection, and 
the proper laboratory techniques for detection, typing, and subtyping of the influenza 
virus. 
Special Influenza Projects 
The World Bank initiated the Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response (AIHP) project in Moldova in 2006. The project is a part of the Global Program for 
Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response (GPAI). Moldova 
met the eligibility criteria set in the GPAI document for a country at risk. The overall objective 
of the project is to minimize the threat posed to humans by HPAI and enhance national 
pandemic preparedness. The human health component of the project is designed to 
•	 Enhance the national response capacity through review of the regulatory system. 
•	 Improve the informational technology system for surveillance of infectious 

diseases and train personnel.
 
•	 Strengthen the national laboratory 
capacity to detect avian influenza virus by building a new module for influenza A 
(H5N1) diagnosis and renovation of the NVRL. 
•	 Strengthen the health system response capacity through renovation of the intensive care 
unit of the country’s referral hospital for suspected cases of avian influenza. 
Principle Collaborators 
Radu Cojocaru, MD, PhD 
Executive Coordinator 
Director of the Laboratory 
67A Gheorghe Asachi Street 
Chisinau, 2068, NCPM 
Republic of Moldova 
E-mail: radu_cojocaru@hotmail.com or rcojocaru@sanepid.md 
123
 
Angelina Ursu, MD 
Program Manager 
Human Health Component Coordinator 
Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response 
67A Gheorghe Asachi Street 
Chisinau, 2068, NCPM 




67A Gheorghe Asachi Street 
Chisinau, 2068, NCPM 










•	 Capital: Bucharest •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 22.09 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 238,391 sq km live births; male: 25.1 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 18.9 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  22,181,287 (July 2010 est.) 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 97.3%; male:  0–14 years: 15.5% (male 1,768,207/ •	
98.4%; female: 96.3% (2002 census) female 1,677,503); 15–64 years: 69.8% (male 
7,701,149/female 7,774,159); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $255.4 billion (2009 est.) 
14.7% (male 1,326,163/female 1,934,106) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $11,500 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 72.71 
years; male: 69.22 years; female: 76.43 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Romania is supported in its efforts to enhance laboratory and surveillance capacity to detect and 
respond to avian, seasonal, and pandemic influenza through a U.S. CDC cooperative 
agreement with WHO-EURO. A Romanian-based National Professional Officer has been 
recruited to facilitate the implementation of activities in the areas of pandemic preparedness, 
surveillance, and response to avian influenza outbreaks, laboratory capacity, and desktop 
simulation activities. The NIC is located in the Cantacuzino Institute in Bucharest. 
Surveillance 
Surveillance activities for Romania include the following: 
•	 An assessment of the Romanian surveillance network was completed. 
•	 Sentinel surveillance sites for ILI and SARI have been established in 20 counties and 
Bucharest. 
•	 SARI surveillance is being implemented in Iasi, Cluj, Constanta, Timisoara, and 

Bucharest on the basis of recommendations from the surveillance assessment.
 
•	 Guidelines and training materials for SARI surveillance and procedures for quality 





•	 During the 2008–09 influenza season, 1,064 samples were tested by RT-PCR, 
resulting in 384 positive results for influenza A H3, 77 positive results for influenza B, 
and 4 positive results for influenza H1. 
Laboratory 
Laboratory activities in FY 2009 include the following: 
•	 Development of the Cantacuzino Institute as a regional influenza center for laboratory 
diagnostics and as a model for implementation and support of influenza surveillance. 
•	 The Cantacuzino Institute has performed influenza specimen testing and quality control 
for other countries in the region. 
•	 RT-PCR laboratories were upgraded and installed at 4 sentinel sites. 
•	 A laboratory expert from Romania (Alina Baetel) traveled to Macedonia and Albania to 
support local laboratories in testing pandemic samples. 
Training 
Romania conducted the following training activities in FY 2009: 
•	 Laboratory staff members were trained on the SARI surveillance guidelines and use of 
RT-PCR machines. 
•	 Physicians were trained on the SARI surveillance guidelines and standards. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Recruitment and placement of the National Professional Officer for Romania was
successfully completed. 
•	 SARI surveillance is being implemented as part of the sentinel surveillance scheme. 
•	 The Cantacuzino Institute was established as a regional influenza center. 
Principal Collaborator 
Caroline S. Brown, PhD 
Technical Officer 
Communicable Diseases Unit 
WHO Regional Office for Europe 
8, Scherfigsvej 8 




Ministry of Health, Romania 
Intr. Cristian Popisteanu 









•	 Capital: Kyiv (Kiev) •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 9.23 deaths/1,000 live 
•	 Area: 603,700 sq km births; male: 11.48 deaths/1,000 live births; female: 
•	 Population: 6.85 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 45,415,596 (July 2010 est.) 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure: •	  Total population: 99.4%; male: 0–14 years: 13.9% (male 3,277,905/ 
99.7%; female: 99.2% (2001 census) female 3,106,012;); 15–64 years: 70% (male 
15,443,818/female 16,767,931); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $359.9 billion (2008 est.) 
16.1% (male 2,489,235/female 4,909,386) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $7,800 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 68.06 
years; male: 62.24 years; female: 74.24 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Influenza Surveillance and Pandemic Preparedness in Ukraine Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Since October 2006, the U.S. CDC has provided funds to the Program for Appropriate 
Technology in Health (PATH) to help the Ukraine MOH in its efforts to strengthen influenza 
surveillance and pandemic preparedness. Activities have been focused in the following areas: 
•	 Strengthening the NIC in Kiev. 
•	 Establishing sentinel site virologic and epidemiologic surveillance for ILI and SARI 
from influenza. 
•	 Developing national guidelines for health services in Ukraine to plan and organize 
measures to combat pandemic influenza. 
•	 Enhancing the nationwide early warning system and epidemiologic capacity to detect 
and respond to human illness caused by novel influenza A infections or infections from 
other respiratory pathogen with pandemic potential. 
PATH facilitated the Ukraine NIC’s efforts to develop national guidelines for health services in 
Ukraine to plan and organize measures to combat pandemic influenza. In 2009, these guidelines 
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were approved by the academic council of the National Institute of Epidemiology and Infectious 
Diseases and used for pandemic preparedness trainings and to guide the MOH’s 2009 H1N1 
influenza response activities during the October–November surge. 
Surveillance 
PATH has helped establish a fully functioning sentinel influenza surveillance system in Kiev, 
Donetsk, and Odessa and developed a Web site (www.gripnaglyad.com) to support electronic 
reporting, data analysis, presentation, and other aspects of the system. The sentinel surveillance 
network includes 19 hospitals and polyclinics. Data findings suggest that 11% of SARI and 
21% of ILI cases reported to the sentinel sites were caused by influenza. Two cases of pandemic 
2009 H1N1 influenza were captured by the system during summer 2009, demonstrating the 
strength of the system even during the summer period. Information on seasonal influenza is 
routinely submitted to FluNet and the European influenza surveillance scheme. 
Laboratory 
Funding from the partnership between U.S. CDC and PATH and the Ukraine MOH was used 
to purchase RT-PCR equipment, biologic safety instruments, autoclaves, reagents, consumables, 
and other supporting items to strengthen the capabilities of the NIC in Kiev, the Mechnikov 
Anti-Plague Research Institute in Odessa, and 2 regional virologic laboratories in the sentinel 
regions. These laboratories are now able to perform PCR and virus isolation on cell cultures. 
During the 2008–09 influenza season, the NIC received and tested 119 seasonal influenza 
samples from the country laboratories; 95 were type A (primarily H3N2), and 24 were type B. 
U.S. CDC’s Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) review tool was used to conduct 
an NIL capacity assessment in 2009. The review demonstrated that the Ukraine NIC has 
an advanced syndromic and laboratory-based surveillance system and well-trained staff who 
are capable of serving as a potential model for other countries in the region. In addition, the 
assessment revealed that there is capacity to advance into molecular diagnostics for influenza. 
Samples from Ukraine are routinely submitted to the WHO collaborating center for the 
surveillance, epidemiology, and control of influenza at U.S. CDC, and the WHO collaborating 
center for reference and research on influenza at the National Institute for Medical Research in 
London, England. 
Preparedness 
In 2006, the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers approved the general framework of a national plan 
of action to combat influenza and to prepare for a potential pandemic. The Ukraine MOH 
was tasked with developing specific operational details and implementing key provisions of 
the plan. As a result, the partnership on pandemic preparedness between the MOH, PATH, 
U.S. CDC, and WHO has resulted in the development of the National Guidelines for Health 
Services of Ukraine Regarding Planning and Organization of Measures to Combat Pandemic 
Influenza (i.e., the Guidelines). In 2009, the Guidelines were approved by the academic council 
of the Ukrainian Institute of Epidemiology and Infectious Diseases and endorsed by WHO­
EURO. The Guidelines were used to develop pandemic preparedness simulation exercises in 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic to plan national and local preparedness activities 
and to guide MOH pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza response activities during the October– 
November 2009 surge. 
In June 2009, PATH organized and facilitated a pandemic preparedness simulation exercise for 






participation of a WHO Ukraine expert. The meeting highlighted several gaps in preparedness 
and helped identify the most pressing needs and potential solutions. Recommendations for 
international assistance also were discussed. After the meeting, several measures were taken to 
increase preparedness in the city of Kiev, including the following: 
•	 Updating the city plan. 
•	 Refining communication channels. 
•	 Creating a small stockpile of antivirals. 
•	 Increasing the reserve of antibiotics. 
•	 Purchasing additional influenza prevention supplies. 
•	 Updating information for the city influenza hotline. 
•	 Training the city’s physicians. 
•	 Developing a list of specialists responsible for 

communication with the media.
 
•	 Making arrangements with the National Medical University and nursing schools in the 
city for rapid mobilization of students in case of emergency. 
•	 Ensuring additional financing, as necessary, through the city’s fund for epidemiologic 
emergencies. 
•	 Lobbying the MOH officials to update the legal documentation needed to support 
pandemic response activities. 
•	 Conducting similar exercises in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic at the request of 
the U.S. CDC office in Kazakhstan. 
•	 Participating in a joint avian pandemic influenza preparedness exercise for 
representatives of several ministries (including the MOH) that was organized by the 
Ministry of Education and Science and the California National Guard. The aim of 
the exercise was to help the ministries define agency roles in a response to a potential 
pandemic and to improve interagency coordination at various levels. 
Training 
PATH continues to provide technical assistance and training to ensure the functioning of 
the sentinel surveillance system, quality of the surveillance data, prompt data analysis, and 
integration of the pandemic work plan with preparedness activities. 
•	 Eight virologists from the NIC regional SESs were trained on influenza virus isolation 
and identification at the NIC. 
•	 Representatives from the NIC and plague laboratories participated in biosafety, 
biosecurity, and advanced RT-PCR diagnostics international training workshops 
conducted by U.S. CDC experts in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and St. Petersburg, Russia. 
•	 The NIC staff also were trained in real-time PCR diagnostics during U.S. CDC’s APHL 




Personnel of all sentinel influenza stations and regional SESs in Kiev, Odessa, and Donetsk were 
trained by the cooperative agreement project staff in all aspects of sentinel surveillance. Training 
included the following: 
•	 SARI and ILI case definitions. 
•	 Flow of laboratory specimens. 
•	 Epidemiologic data collection and reporting procedure. 
•	 Scope for data analysis. 
•	 Data interpretation guidelines. 
•	 A range of recommended control efforts and monitoring and evaluation indicators to 
assess the quality of the functioning of the system. 
Approximately 2,000 epidemiologists and health care workers (i.e., directors of health 
settings, infectious disease specialists, therapists, family physicians, and ambulance physicians) 
representing several regions of the country were trained by experts from PATH, the Ukraine 
MOH, the NIC, and regional SESs. Key topics included the following: 
•	 Novel influenza and respiratory surveillance (i.e., newly developed technical guidelines) 
focusing on case detection and triggers for reporting, investigation, and immediate 
response from the diagnosing physician in the broader context of international health 
regulations. 
•	 Instructions on investigation of cases and outbreaks, organization of response at the 
rayon level, recommended control response measures (including guidelines for use of 
PPE and antivirals), seasonal influenza 
vaccination recommendations, and 
infection control recommendations for 
health care facilities. 
Representatives of the MOH, the NIC, and 
PATH also participated in U.S. CDC and 
WHO influenza pandemic preparedness 
workshops and meetings in Geneva, 
Copenhagen, St. Petersburg, Ashgabat, and 
Bangkok. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 MOH, NIC, SES, and PATH staff 

were trained through the partnership 





•	 Influenza pandemic preparedness and 

influenza outbreak response guidelines 

developed in partnership with PATH 

and U.S. CDC were used to guide 





•	 Laboratory equipment and consumables purchased through the partnership were used 
to detect pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza cases. 
•	 The sentinel surveillance system currently operating at 2 sites complements routine ARI 
surveillance designed to monitor the 2009 pandemic. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 The sentinel SARI and ILI surveillance system was fully operational at the Kiev and 
Odessa sites. 




•	 The Guidelines were developed and used for pandemic preparedness to guide H1N1 
response activities. 
•	 Tabletop pandemic preparedness simulation exercises were conducted in Kiev and 






•	 Regional SES in sentinel sites, sentinel hospitals, and polyclinics. 
Project Investigators 
Kateryna Gamazina, MD 
Ukraine Country Director, PATH 
25b Shota Rustaveli Street 
Kiev, 01033 Ukraine 
E-mail: kgamazina@path.org 
Alla Mironenko, MD, PhD 
Laboratory Officer 
Head, Influenza Laboratory 
Ukrainian Center of Influenza and Acute Respiratory Infections of the MOH 
5 Mykoly Amosova Street 
Kiev, 03038 Ukraine 
E-mail: miralla@ukr.net 
Galina Romanyuk, MD 
Epidemiology Program Officer, PATH 






Anton Luchitsky, MD 
Epidemiology Program Officer, PATH 
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 800 
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U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) promotes the development of National 
Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plans (NIPPPs) and supports all associated member states in 
this effort. As of 2007, member states were actively engaged in influenza preparedness activities 
and had developed national plans. PAHO supported its member states to enhance internal 
communication, risk communication, and media training and to work with journalists. 
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The Generic Protocol for Influenza Surveillance (GPIS) developed by the U.S. CDC and 
PAHO is designed to standardize influenza surveillance throughout the region and has been a 
model for other WHO regions. Every country in Latin America and the Caribbean has been 
trained to use the GPIS, and implementation is underway. To date, 163 national officials have 
been trained to use the GPIS. In addition, more than 500 professionals have been trained on 
hospital-based acute respiratory event surveillance. 
PAHO has a network of influenza laboratories where more advanced laboratories routinely train 
other laboratories that need to enhance their technical skills. PAHO has facilitated the training 
of laboratories in the region in classical and molecular diagnostic methods. In collaboration 
with U.S. CDC, PAHO convened a PCR work group that worked to standardize laboratory 
protocols for molecular diagnosis of influenza. In addition, PAHO purchased laboratory 
materials, supplies, and equipment to support virologic surveillance in the region. 
Surveillance 
•	 PAHO developed operational guidelines and training packages to help MOHs train 
local personnel in order to support implementation of influenza surveillance. 
•	 PAHO provided IATA training and certification on how to use infectious substances 
sent to every NIC and 16 countries in the English-speaking Caribbean. 
•	 PAHO purchased real-time RT-PCR machines for Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the 
Caribbean to serve all Caribbean English-speaking countries. 
•	 PAHO supported personnel to provide technical collaboration for pandemic 2009 
H1N1 influenza in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, 
and Brazil. 
Laboratory 
•	 Nicaragua has been approved as a NIC, and Guatemala has requested NIC designation. 
•	 PAHO purchased reagents, materials, and equipment for real-time RT-PCR diagnosis of 
influenza. 
•	 PAHO’s laboratory support resulted in every country in Latin America having capability 
to perform real-time RT-PCR for seasonal and pandemic influenza. 
Preparedness 
•	 PAHO supported risk communication workshops in Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile that included simulation exercises to test national-
level communication preparedness plans and plans under development for local-level 
implementation. 
•	 PAHO helped to implement risk and social communication modules at the local level, 






•	 PAHO conducted training on acute respiratory event surveillance (Nationwide 
Enhanced Surveillance) in Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica, and sentinel 
surveillance training in Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
•	 PAHO’s laboratory training network has trained influenza laboratories in Uruguay, 
Paraguay, and in Central America. After the start of the 2009 pandemic, a laboratory 
team was deployed to train member countries in real-time RT-PCR techniques. 
•	 PAHO supported Central American countries and the Dominican Republic in a third 
assessment of their NIPPPs. 
•	 PAHO hosted workshops in Central America to help implement hospital-based 

nationwide enhanced surveillance. 

H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
Response and Containment 
•	 PAHO deployed an outbreak investigation team to Mexico in May 2009 to support that 
country’s response to the pandemic. 
•	 PAHO hired an influenza consultant to help implement the GPIS in the Caribbean. 
The consultant also has been integral in responding to the pandemic. Most recently, 
he provided support to the investigation of the outbreak of pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza on a cruise ship in Aruba. 
Principal Collaborators 
Otavio P. de Oliva, MD, MPH 
Pan American Health Organization 
Communicable Diseases Unit 
525 23rd Street NW 
Washington, DC 20037 
E-mail: olivaota@paho.org 
Key Staff 
Thais Do Santos, MS 
Technical Officer 
Pan American Health Organization 
Communicable Diseases Unit 
525 23rd Street NW 
Washington, DC 20037 
E-mail: dossantt@paho.org 
U.S. CDC Staff 
Tomas Rodriguez, MA 
Project Officer 
Influenza Division 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Rd, MS A20 










•	 Capital: Buenos Aires •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 11.78 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 2,766,890 sq km live births; male: 13.12 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 10.37 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 41,343,201 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure: •	  Total population: 97.2%; male: 0–14 years: 25.8% (male 
97.2%; female: 97.2% (2001 census) 5,341,642/female 5,095,325); 15–64 years: 63.5% 
(male 12,807,458/female 12,884,745); 65 years or •	 GDP: $585 billion (2008 est.) 
older: 10.8% (male 1,784,652/female 2,568,176) •	 GDP per Capita: $14,500 (2008 est.) 
(2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 76.36 
years; male: 73.11 years; female: 79.77 years (2008 
est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Argentina has 3 regional NICs and its virologic surveillance network consists of laboratories in 
both public and private health care settings. Each NIC works with sentinel units located with 
local provincial health authorities to conduct virologic and epidemiologic surveillance. The 
centers also perform virus isolation and typing and subtyping of viral isolates and send virus 
isolates to the WHO collaborating center in Atlanta. The NICs report weekly information 
on influenza virus circulation through FluNet and provide technical expertise and training to 
surveillance sites and laboratories throughout the country. 
The MOH of Argentina and its Integrated Pandemic Influenza Response Plan and 3 NICs have 
a long-standing and meaningful collaboration with the U.S. CDC that is focused on influenza 
surveillance (seasonal, pandemic, avian, and 2009 H1N1 influenza). This bilateral agreement 
has resulted in the preparation, planning, programming, and implementation of a national 
pandemic influenza response plan, which culminated in the creation of Directive 644/07. 
Argentina’s ILI surveillance system has been augmented considerably through this agreement. 
Technical capacity in laboratories that participated in the virologic surveillance system has been 




•	 Epidemiologic surveillance has been improved by the implementation of the National 
Health Surveillance System (SNVS). 
•	 Argentina has developed an Internet database that provides instant notification of 
influenza activity. The influenza data entered by sentinel surveillance sites and recorded 
in this system are summarized on a weekly basis. 
•	 The software allows graphics to display and update epidemiologic, virologic, and clinical 
information. 
•	 The Argentina MOH used the GPIS created by PAHO and U.S. CDC to implement 
the system throughout the provinces. 
•	 The Argentina MOH created a specific pandemic influenza situation room and an 
influenza pandemic emergency operation center (EOC), which is equipped with 
desktop and notebook computers and an LCD-TV to display a large amount of data. 
•	 These rooms facilitate the rapid analysis and transformation of data into actionable 
information and allow the MOH to quickly provide technical and epidemiologic advice 
to all epidemiologic units in the country. 
•	 The situation room acts as the central place to store and distribute supplies for pandemic 
response (i.e., PPE, medicine, laboratory equipment) for both seasonal and novel 
influenza. 
•	 The EOC also served as a contingency 

center to provide input into how to 

supply disposable PPE, medicine, 

and laboratory supplies to network 

laboratories. The EOC developed an 

epidemiology expert advisory committee 





•	 The new integrated geographic 

information system (GIS) allows for 

the development of a health crisis 

management system. Health facility data 

necessary to analyze the epidemiology, 

transmissibility, trends, effects on health 

facilities, and severity of seasonal or 

pandemic influenza has been incorporated 

into the overall system. The system 

is being enhanced with information 

about ILI and climatic, geographic, and 

demographic data. The new system will 












•	 Argentina has 3 regional NICs that submit isolates to the WHO collaborating center at 
U.S. CDC for characterization. 
•	 The 3 NICs in Argentina have worked closely with U.S. CDC to evaluate the 
capability of local laboratories and provide quality control. They also have undertaken 
extensive training of scientists in typing, subtyping, and characterizing of viruses, as well 
as in RT-PCR, real-time RT-PCR, and reverse genetics techniques. This training was 
enhanced during the first half of 2009, when many labs received U.S. CDC primers for 
the diagnosis of 2009 H1N1 influenza through RT-PCR techniques. 
•	 The Respiratory Virus Laboratory Network has increased its capacity from 26 to 29 
laboratories in 16 of 24 provinces over the past 3 years. PCR activity has been increased 
from 1 laboratory to 22 public and private laboratories with this capacity. 
•	 The ILI sentinel surveillance system contains 20 sentinel units. Data from the system are 
incorporated in weekly reports. Collaborating laboratories in the sentinel surveillance 
network send positive samples and 10% of negative samples to the NICs for typing, 
subtyping, characterizing, and ensuring quality control. 
•	 Argentina’s NICs have been collaborating with U.S. CDC on several projects that 
include the following activities: 
ˏ	 Sequencing influenza virus, RT-PCR, and HI techniques to analyze antigenic and 
genetic differences to determine the circulation of influenza viruses among 
different areas and times. 
ˏ	 Providing recommendations for the selection of vaccine strains for the Southern 
Hemisphere. 
ˏ	 Monitoring antiviral drug sensitivity to guide clinical treatment and prophylaxis of 
influenza. 
ˏ	 Improving laboratory techniques to detect seasonal influenza in Argentina. These 
activities include strengthening the quality control system of laboratories in the 
influenza network and a serologic survey for 2009 H1N1 influenza in the Mar del 
Plata region. 
Preparedness 
•	 The Argentina MOH continues to pursue its national pandemic preparedness plan 
(i.e., Integrated Response Plan for Pandemic Influenza Directive 644/07) and plans to 
consult with experts from PAHO and U.S. CDC on pandemic planning. 
•	 The new pandemic influenza situation room is the focal point for all surveillance and 
response activities for pandemic influenza. The situation room also works closely with 





•	 In the past 3 years, approximately 43 professional staff from 29 network laboratories 
became capable of doing HA and HI assays and conventional PCR, and 22 laboratories 
were trained in real-time RT-PCR. 
•	 In 24 provinces, 80 professionals were trained on how to use the influenza surveillance 
system. 
•	 In 24 provinces, 124 people were trained on how to use the influenza surveillance system. 
•	 In the past 3 years, 6 pandemic exercises and several tabletop exercises were conducted. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 For the first time, rapid response teams with field epidemiologists and influenza experts 
were employed to work through the first wave of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza in 
Argentina. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Argentina created a crisis management system that uses GIS to integrate all 
health facilities in the country and the data needed to analyze the epidemiology, 
transmissibility, and trends of influenza infection, as well as the effect on health 
institutions and the severity of seasonal or pandemic influenza throughout the country. 
•	 The crisis management system combines ILI, climate, geographic, and demographic 
data to explore trends in influenza activities and to understand the effect of these factors 
on the disease. 
Principal Collaborator 
Horacio Enchenique, MD 
Project Manager 
Médico Neumonólogo, Epidemiólgo 
9 de Julio 1925 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
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Brazil 
•	 Capital: Brasilia •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 23.33 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 8,511,965 sq km live births; male: 26.95 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 19.53 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  201,103,330 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 88.6%; male:  0–14 years: 27% (male 26,986,909/ 
88.4%; female: 88.8% (2004 est.) female 25,961,947); 15–64 years: 66.8% (male 
64,939,225/female 66,157,812); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $2.03 trillion (2008 est.) 
6.3% (male 5,182,987/female 7,113,707) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $10,300 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 71.71 
years; male: 68.15 years; female: 75.45 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Brazil, the largest country in South America, launched its national influenza surveillance system 
in 2000. Brazil’s influenza system comprises a network of sentinel surveillance provider units 
that collect clinical samples from suspect cases for laboratory diagnosis and consolidates data 
from outpatients with ILI. The influenza surveillance information system (i.e., SIVEP Gripe) is 
online and data are simultaneously available at all levels of the surveillance network. 
Three NICs are able to isolate viruses, share samples with U.S. CDC, and routinely provide 
information to WHO’s FluNet. The NICs have regular communication with local and regional 
laboratories. The 3rd version of the Brazilian influenza plan is on their Web site; it summarizes 
the current epidemiologic situation in Brazil, explains and adapts WHO guidelines, and 
describes the available infrastructure for managing the 2009 Surveillance. 
•	 Influenza surveillance information is collected through Brazil’s national surveillance 
information system of notifiable diseases (SINAN). 
•	 Seasonal influenza case notification is not mandatory in Brazil unless a novel strain is 





•	 Online forms were used to gather clinical and demographic information. 
•	 Brazil has a surveillance network comprising 22 centers and a Strategic Information 
and Response Health Surveillance Network (CIEVS), which aims to develop activities 
for crisis management infections, including the monitoring of sentinel cases and 
management of epidemic emergencies. 
Laboratory 
•	 Brazil has 3 regional NICs with BSL-3 capabilities. 
•	 The NICs routinely isolate viruses, share samples with other international agencies, and 
provide information to FluNet. 
•	 NICs have regular communication with local and regional laboratories to provide 
technical assistance and monitor influenza testing activities. 
•	 Advanced molecular testing, such as real-time PCR and viral sequencing, are used for 
surveillance of circulating influenza viruses. 
•	 Brazil’s NICs have conducted training and provided additional equipment to enhance 
the diagnostic capacity of their reference laboratories. 
•	 NICs provide technical assistance to local provincial laboratories to improve the 

virologic and disease-based surveillance capabilities.
 
Preparedness 
•	 The 4th edition of the national preparedness plan is being drafted to incorporate lessons 
learned from the H1N1 pandemic. 
•	 Brazil has engaged neighboring countries in joint pandemic preparedness planning and 
border control activities. 
•	 Brazil has weekly, national-level, rapid response, preparedness video conferences with the 
26 states and the federal district. These video conferences discuss adjusting local rapid 










•	 The public health laboratories provide RT-PCR assay training for the 2009 H1N1 
influenza diagnosis for the state laboratory network. 
•	 Brazil continues to provide training to have rapid response teams in all states, including 
remote states. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 A total of 52 reference units were created to monitor cases of possible 2009 H1N1 
influenza. 
•	 An extensive H1N1 communication campaign was developed that included television, 
radio, newspapers, airport public service announcements, and social networking (i.e., 
Twitter, Orkut, Facebook, YouTube). 
•	 A risk communication team was trained to work with clinicians and communities. 
•	 The 63 reference hospitals were provided additional resources to enable them to treat 
possible cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza. 








Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 All the preparedness state plans were evaluated and updated on the basis of the lessons 
learned from the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
•	 The RT-PCR diagnosis for the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was decentralized to 
state and local health agencies. 
•	 The rapid response units within all states were expanded with emphasis on remote states. 
Principal Collaborators 
Marcia Lopes de Carvalho 
Principal Investigator 
National Health Surveillance Secretariat 
Ministry of Health, Brazil 
SCS Quadra 4, Bloco A, 2º andar - Edifício Principal 




Ministry of Health, Brazil 
SCS Quadra 4, Bloco A, 2º andar - Edifício Principal 




Ligia Maria Cantarino da Costa 
Head of National Network of Diagnostic Influenza Laboratories, Brazil 
General Coordination of Public Health Laboratories 
Epidemiological Surveillance Department 
Secretariat of Health 
Ministry of Health, Brazil 
SCS Quadra 4, Bloco A, 3º andar - Edifício Principal 












Influenza Program of GDD Response 
Center for Central America and Panama 
(GDD-RC/CAP) 
U.S. CDC Direct Region Support 
Influenza is a core component of U.S. CDC’s GDD in Guatemala, which covers 8 countries in 
CAP. The mission of the program is to provide leadership and programmatic guidance to 
prevent and control influenza and to contribute to preparedness and response to pandemic 
influenza in the PAHO area. Coverage extends to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic. 
Surveillance 
The CDC-CAP has supported the implementation of national influenza protocols on the basis 
of the PAHO-CDC Generic Protocol for Influenza Surveillance. They provide the MOHs with 
technical assistance, training, and supplies to reinforce sentinel sites and laboratories. The 
influenza surveillance is coordinated to establish a regional influenza surveillance network. 
Regional influenza surveillance courses integrate each country’s epidemiology and laboratory 
national teams. 
Laboratory 
The CDC-CAP supports the national laboratory of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic by 
providing RT-PCR equipment to all national laboratories with IF and PCR reagents and 
laboratory supplies. They support laboratory components in influenza sentinel units in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In the Gorgas Institute Laboratory in Panama City, 
they developed 2 training courses about respiratory virus inmunofluorescency and biosafety 
aspects to reinforce diagnosis capacity in sentinel units of influenza in the region, and they have 
supported regional meetings to harmonize laboratory diagnosis procedures among countries for 
the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
Preparedness 
The inventory of core capabilities developed by U.S. CDC and the WHO checklist were 
implemented in the 8 countries of the region. This provided relevant information about 
preparedness and response components of each country, and this information was used to 
update the technical assistance needs in each country. 
Rapid response activities are focused on the conformation and development of Rapid Response 
Teams (RRTs) at the subnational level. Standard operating procedures and guidelines were 
developed to contribute to the development of a regional network of RRTs on the basis of the 
national teams. 
GDD-CAP conducted regional drills to test the pandemic response plan leading to regional 
updates and improvements. They supported and guided 7 tabletop exercises and 26 drills. 
Countries have been encouraged to conduct more functional exercises that will allow RRT 






support also included developing and implementing national- and subnational-level drills and 
simulations that focus on influenza pandemic case investigation, case management, and health 
care services response. 
During 2009, influenza staff as well as other GDD program staff (e.g., FETP, IEIP) were 
requested to participate in suspected influenza pandemic case or outbreak investigations in 
several countries in the region and were part of the team that conducted the evaluation process 
through WHO GOARN. 
Training 
One hundred and fourteen training activities were conducted during 2009. Topics included 
preparedness and response, diagnostic testing for influenza, influenza and other respiratory virus 
surveillance, risk communication, infection control, and case management. In addition, 12,275 
persons from 8 countries were trained (33.5% in rapid response, 29.5% in preparedness in 
general, and 15.8% in health care services preparedness, among others). The influenza program 
in collaboration with the FETP sponsors 15 health professionals from the region to be trained 
on field epidemiology focusing on influenza and acute respiratory infections. 
Workshops were designed and conducted in 










•	 Writing skills (Guatemala). 
An information system Web platform 
was designed for influenza surveillance 
by sentinel unit and developed and 
implemented a tool that facilitates 
the analysis of surveillance data 
(EpiVigila). 
Influenza Vaccine 
CDC-CAP has worked with select countries to support vaccination against influenza. In El 
Salvador, they developed and evaluated the effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccine. They 
conducted a rapid assessment exercise of the coverage of seasonal influenza vaccination and 
trained technical teams from 12 institutions in 4 regions, including epidemiologists and 
laboratory and field workers on surveillance, sampling, and monitoring. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 CDC-CAP assisted the Guatemalan national laboratory at the start of the pandemic and 
ran all H1N1 tests for 7 weeks until the national laboratory had the capacity to run its 
own samples on equipment purchased and donated by CDC-CAP. 
•	 CDC-CAP donated several hundred kits from its stock to Costa Rica, Honduras, and 






•	 Two visits were made to Costa Rica in May. One visit was for H1N1 surveillance and 
information related to hospital infection control. 
•	 Technical assistance visits with PAHO (GOARN) to Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican 
Republic, and Nicaragua were made to assist countries in their response to the 
pandemic. 
•	 Intensified surveillance was provided for SARI, vaccines, community-based surveillance 
for U.S. CDC-funded H1N1 projects in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. 
•	 In the first 6 weeks of the pandemic, 7 regional alerts were sent. The 1st was issued the 
last week of April and provided an alert and information on the situation in Mexico; the 
other 6 alerts provided technical guidelines and recommendations on the basis of U.S. 
CDC guidelines. 
•	 During the first 2 months of the pandemic, there were daily teleconferences with 
influenza epidemiologists that were subsidized by the influenza program in all the 
countries of the region. 
•	 GDD-RC participated as PAHO GOARN team members during influenza pandemic 
country assessments and responses. Field epidemiologists were deployed to Mexico, 
Argentina, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 
•	 GDD-RC supported the Council of Ministers of Health of Central America, which 
had an emergency meeting on April 28 at the beginning of the pandemic and agreed to 
develop a regional effort related to surveillance, information sharing, and risk 
communication. CDC-CAP assisted the Meeting of Central American Health Ministers 
in developing a unified, regional information system and carried out several risk 
communication workshops to assist in development of strategies and interventions to 




Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Influenza surveillance was coordinated in the region and helped to establish the regional 
influenza surveillance network on the basis of the PAHO-CDC Generic Protocol for 
Influenza Surveillance. 
•	 All countries have identified the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus either at their own 
laboratories or by sending samples to U.S. CDC or to the CAREC laboratory in Belize. 
•	 At the start of the pandemic, only 3 national laboratories had RT-PCR capacity (i.e., 
Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua). Currently all national laboratories except Belize have 
RT-PCR capacity. 
•	 Laboratory capacity was increased to detect 

influenza and other respiratory viruses.
 
•	 Two new NICs were supported. 
•	 The number of sentinel sites were increased 





•	 A protocol was developed to install 

influenza sentinel units in Guatemala and 

El Salvador. We are in the process of adding 

sentinel sites in Costa Rica (Puntarenas), 

Panama (Chiriqui and Cocle), Dominican 

Republic (Santiago), and Belize (Belize City).
 
•	 Technical assistance was provided on 

immunization policies and practices to fight 







Jorge H. Jara, MD, FES 
Influenza Program, UVG-CDC Cooperative Agreement 
Centro de Estudios en Salud. Universidad del Valle de Guatemala (CES-UVG) 
16 Avenida 10-50, Zona 15, Vista Hermosa III. Anexo CDC/CAP-UVG/CES 
C.P. 01015. Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala 
E-mail: jjara@gt.cdc.gov 
Percy Minaya, MD, MSc 
Influenza Program, TEPHINET-CDC Cooperative Agreement 
Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions NETwork (TEPHINET). 
16 Avenida 10-50, Zona 15, Vista Hermosa III. Anexo CDC/CAP-UVG/CES 




Rafael Chacón, MD, MSc 
Influenza Program, CARE-CDC Cooperative Agreement 
Av. Los Abetos #23, Colonia San Francisco, San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A. 
E-mail: rchacon@gt.cdc.gov 
Wilfrido A. Clará, MD, MSc, MPH 
Influenza Program Field Office in El Salvador (TEPHINET-CDC Cooperative Agreement) 
Av. Los Abetos #23, Colonia San Francisco, San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A. 
E-mail: aclara@gt.cdc.gov 
Ethan Gough, MPH 
National Epidemiologist, Director, Epidemiology Unit 
First Floor East Block Building, Belmopan Belize 
E-mail: egough@health.gov.bz 
Fransico Ardón, MD, MPH 
National Epidemiology Center, Director, Ministry of Public Health of Guatemala 
6a av. 3-45 Zone 11, Guatemala City, Guatemala 
E-mail: fardonp@yahoo.com 
Julio Armero, MD, MSc 
Health Surveillance Director, Ministry of Public Health of El Salvador 
Calle ARCE No. 827, San Salvador, El Salvador 
E-mail: jarmero@mspas.gob.sv 
Marco Pinel, MD, MPH 
General Health Surveillance Director, Health Secretariat of Honduras 
Bo. El Centro, Edificio Secretaria de Salud, Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
E-mail: pinelval@yahoo.com 
Maria Ethel Trejos, MD 
Health Surveillance Director, Ministry of Public Health of Costa Rica 
Edificio Norte 3er piso Sede Central MINSA, San José, Costa Rica 
E-mail: vigsalud@netsalud.sa.cr 
Edmundo Sánchez, MD, MSc 
National Health Surveillance Director, Ministry of Public Health of Nicaragua 
Complejo Nacional de la Salud. Dra. Concepción Palacios. Entrada Colonia Primero de Mayo 
Managua, Nicaragua 
E-mail: dgvs@minsa.gob.ni 
Gladys Guerrero, MD 
National Epidemiology Department Director, Ministry of Public Health of Panama 
Ancon Edificio 261 1er. piso 
E-mail: gguerrero@minsa.gov.pa 
Raquel Pimentel, MD, MSc 




U.S. CDC Staff in Central America (GDD-RC/CAP) 
Nivaldo Linares-Pérez, MD, MSc, PhD 
Team Leader Influenza Program 
Regional Office for Central America and Panama 
16 Ave. 10-50 Zona 15 Vista Hermosa III. CP. 01015 
Guatemala City, Guatemala 










Established in 2006, the GDD center in Guatemala (GDD-Guatemala) builds on U.S. CDC’s 
more than 30 years of history of programs, activities, and partnerships in Central America, the 
Dominican Republic, and Panama. Together with partners, including PAHO, U.S. CDC has 
helped the region detect and respond to serious public health threats, including influenza, 
diarrheal and neurologic diseases, and febrile illnesses, such as rickettsia and dengue. 
Coverage 
GDD-Guatemala covers 8 countries: Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama. The influenza program subsidizes an 
epidemiologist in each of the 8 CAP countries, providing links to the MOHs and better 
collaboration during outbreak investigations. GDD-Guatemala has worked across the region in 
pandemic preparedness and rapid response activities in these countries with measurable success 
on the basis of PAHO’s evaluation metrics. 
Activities 
•	 Outbreak response. 




In 2009, GDD-Guatemala responded to 39 outbreaks, most of which achieved a measurable 
public health effect, and laboratory support was provided. They discovered 2 pathogens new to 
the region and increased their laboratory testing capacity by 35%. Laboratory support to test 
for 2009 H1N1 influenza was facilitated in all 8 CAP countries. Additionally, GDD-Guatemala 
trained more than 5,000 participants in short-term regional and national trainings. 
In-Country Field Staff 
Isabella Danel, MD, MPH 
GDD-Guatemala Coordinator 
Nivaldo Linares Pérez, MD, MSc, PhD 
Influenza Lead 
Principal U.S. CDC Program Collaborations In-Country 
•	 Influenza Preparedness, Detection, and Response Program. 
•	 IEIP. 
•	 FETP. 
•	 Laboratory Systems and Biosafety. 




 Pan America Region
 
Mexico 
•	 Capital: México (Distrito Federal) •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 19.01 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 1,972,550 sq km live births; male: 20.91 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 17.02 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  112,468,855 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 91%; male: 92.4%;  0–14 years: 29.6% (male 
female: 89.6% (2004 est.) 16,619,995/female 15,936,154); 15–64 years: 
64.3% (male 34,179,440/female 36,530,154); •	 GDP: $1.578 trillion (2008 est.) 
65 years or older: 6.1% (male 3,023,185/female •	 GDP per Capita: $14,400 (2008 est.) 
3,666,472) (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 75.84 
years; male: 73.05 years; female: 78.78 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
The Mexican National Laboratory Network consists of 31 state laboratories and the National 
Institute of Diagnosis and Epidemiologic Reference (InDRE), in which the country’s NIC 
is located. In Mexico, the response to pandemic influenza is initiated at the local level with 
guidance from federal and state authorities. 
Surveillance 
The major developments that took place in the surveillance system during 2009 include the 
following: 
•	 Inclusion of surveillance of SARI and deaths; previously, sentinel sites reported only ILI. 
•	 Increase in the number of reporting sentinel sites with the addition of hospitals; 

previously, most sites were primary care facilities.
 
•	 Developed a new Web-based reporting system to allow the combining of laboratory and 
epidemiologic information on ILI and SARI cases and deaths. 
•	 Mexico’s Influenza Surveillance System has been enhanced since 2006 to include more 





•	 In 2006, Mexico created the Laboratory Activities Coordination for Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness at InDRE, which developed a comprehensive survey to evaluate the 
influenza surveillance capacity for all 31 state laboratories and one federal laboratory. 
The results were used to implement a plan to reinforce the influenza diagnostic testing 
in state laboratories. 
•	 A total of 31 state laboratories across Mexico have the capacity to perform influenza 
diagnostic tests, such as IFA, 7 laboratories perform RT-PCR, 24 laboratories have 
incorporated real-time RT-PCR testing to confirm diagnosis, and 4 laboratories are in 
the process of implementing viral isolation from cell culture. 
•	 InDRE routinely receives influenza samples from state laboratories for confirmation 
and diagnosis of influenza viruses. InDRE performs real-time RT-PCR testing, isolation 
(embryonated eggs and cell culture), HAI, and differential diagnostics; participates in 
FluNet; and sends samples to WHO collaborating centers for further analysis. 
In addition, InDRE is working to strengthen seasonal and avian influenza detection in the state 
laboratory network by doing the following: 
•	 Developing and enhancing a bioinformatics platform in the National Network of Public 
Health Laboratories (Red Nacional de Laboratorios de Salud Pública. 
•	 Providing standard reagents, such as primers, to influenza network laboratories in 
Mexico. 
•	 Evaluating available commercial rapid 

diagnosis kits for seasonal influenza particular 

to viruses circulating in Mexico.
 




•	 InDRE is in the process of becoming part of 

the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), 

whose members are charged with maintaining 

an integrated network of state and local public 

health, federal, military, and international 

laboratories that can respond to bioterrorism, 





•	 Mexico is in the process of restructuring its 

BSL-3 laboratory by using federal funding. 

The laboratory equipment was acquired with 











•	 The Mexican MOH developed a multisectorial operation strategy for pandemic 





•	 Each group integrates its institutional contingency plan with the country’s sector-wide 
preparedness strategy. Rapid response to outbreaks is integral to this strategy. 
•	 Each state in Mexico has a rapid response team that includes medical doctors, 

epidemiologists, laboratory staff, and equipment.
 
•	 Each state has identified a least 1 hospital as an isolation facility in case of a major 
public health event. 
Training 
•	 Mexico’s MOH has conducted training of health care providers at all levels on diverse 
aspects of influenza, including epidemiologic surveillance. State, jurisdictional, and 
hospital epidemiologists were trained in a new Web-based reporting system and other 
surveillance procedures. A curriculum on data analysis is currently being developed. 
•	 Mexico has provided updated training to its 31 state laboratories on diagnostic 
techniques for influenza, including the proper way to collect, ship, process, and handles 
specimens. 
•	 During the 1st pandemic wave, with support from U.S. and Canadian colleagues, 
thousands of specimens were processed, and personnel from 6 state laboratories were 
trained on real-time RT-PCR. The technique has become standardized at InDRE. 
•	 InDRE participated in the workshop on guidelines of IATA transportation for infectious 
substances, which was supported by PAHO. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
As part of the response to the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak, weekly sessions were held with 
strategic agents at the federal level of the MOH and with state epidemiologists via the Internet. 
During those meetings, the current situation of influenza was reviewed, and mitigation and 
prevention efforts were discussed. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
A weekly national influenza bulletin that reports counts and trends of ILI, SARI, deaths, and 
confirmed 2009 H1N1 influenza cases was developed. The bulletin also includes other 
indicators, such as percentage of visits for ILI in sentinel sites. 
Principal Collaborators 
Hugo López-Gatell, MD, PhD 
Program Investigator 
Director General de Epidemiología 
Francisco de P. Miranda 177, 4o piso
Col. Unidad Plateros, Del. Álvaro Obregón 




Celia M. Alpuche Aranda, MD, PhD 
Laboratory Officer 
Directora General Adjunta del Instituto de Diagnóstico y Referencia Epidemiológicos 
Prol. de Carpio No. 470, 3er piso 
Col. Sto. Tomás, Del. Miguel Hidalgo 
México, D.F. C.P. 11340 
E-mail: celiam@servidor.unam.mx or calpuche@salud.gob.mx 
Ietza Bojórquez Chapela, MD, PhD 
Epidemiologist 
Directora de Investigación Operativa Epidemiológica 
Dirección General de Epidemiología 
Francisco de P. Miranda 177, 3er piso
Col. Unidad Plateros, Del. Álvaro Obregón 
México, D.F. 01480 
E-mail: ibojorquez@dgepi.salud.gob.mx 
Ethel Palacios Zavala, MD 
International Program Coordinator DGE/InDRE 
Dirección General de Epidemiología 
Francisco de P. Miranda 177, 5o piso
Col. Unidad Plateros, Del. Álvaro Obregón 
México, D.F. 01480 
E-mail: pethel@dgepi.salud.gob.mx 
Rita Flores León, MSc 
International Laboratory Program Coordinator 
Dirección General de Epidemiología 
Francisco de P. Miranda 177, 5o piso
Col. Unidad Plateros, Del. Álvaro Obregón 
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Paraguay 
•	 Capital: Asuncion •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 23.83 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 406,752 sq km live births; male: 27.84 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 19.62 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  6,375,830 (July 2010 est.) 
 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 94%; male: 94.9%;  0–14 years: 29.5% (male 955,532/ •	
female: 93% (2003 est.) female 924,165); 15–64 years: 64.6% (male 
2,068,545/female 2,048,207); 65 years or older: 6% •	 GDP: $28.27 billion (2009 est.) 
(male 175,865/female 203,516) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $4,100 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 75.99 
years; male: 73.39 years; female: 78.71 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2009. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 1st year of the cooperative agreement. 
In 1997, Paraguay started virologic surveillance of influenza and other respiratory viruses at 
sites with the capacity to take samples and ship them to the Central Public Health Laboratory 
(El Laboratorio Central de Salud Pública) for detecting respiratory viruses by IFA. In 1998, the 
LCSP began performing cell culture to isolate and characterize viral strains, and the laboratory 
was designated as a NIC. 
In 2004, influenza was included in the list of notifiable diseases to the National Office of 
Communicable Disease Surveillance. Paraguay prepared its 1st version of a National Influenza 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan in 2005. This plan was reviewed and in June 2007, a 2nd version 
was developed. In 2006, sentinel surveillance of influenza and other respiratory viruses was 
implemented, and in 2008, the nationwide enhanced surveillance of unusual or unexpected 
SARI was implemented. 
159
 
Objectives for the coming year are to 
•	 Implement Paraguay’s NIPPP and communication strategy in the subnational levels. 
•	 Strengthen national surveillance systems to be able to detect emerging infectious 
diseases, such as pandemic influenza. 
•	 Develop national and subnational capacity to respond to outbreaks. 
Principal Collaborators 
Project Investigators 
Fernando Allende, MD 
Director General 
Direccion Vigilancia de la Salud 
Ministerio de la Salud 





Directora General del LCSP (NIC) 













•	 Capital: Lima •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 29.53 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 1,285,220 sq km live births; male: 32.02 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 26.93 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  29,907,003 (July 2010 est.) 
otal population: 87.7%; male: ears: 29.7% (male 4,409,227/ •	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  T 0–14 y
93.5%; female: 82.1% (2004 est.) female 4,253,836); 15–64 years: 64.7% (male 
9,501,597/female 9,381,139); 65 years or older: 5.6% •	 GDP: $249.5 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 770,389/female 864,711) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $8,500 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 70.44 
years; male: 68.61 years; female: 72.37 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Peru is the 3rd largest country in South America and has a population of approximately 28 
million people. Peru has 15 regional laboratories involved in laboratory surveillance for 
influenza and other respiratory viruses by using IFA. IFA-positive samples are sent for virus 
isolation and identification to the NIC located in the National Institute of Health in Lima. 
Peru has concentrated on developing local capacity for rapid response to outbreaks of 
respiratory disease, viral respiratory disease control, and risk communication by using 
workshops and information sharing among its 34 regional health directors. In addition, 
Peru has developed a national pandemic plan and recently modified their national pandemic 
response plan on the basis of lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
Surveillance 
•	 Sentinel surveillance has been implemented in 50 health centers throughout the 
country, including 30 health centers supported by U.S. CDC and U.S. Naval 
Medical Research Center Detachment (NMRCD). Of these 50 centers, 6 are newly 
implemented by the MOH. Nasal or pharyngeal swabs are processed at the Instituto 




•	 The MOH has recently implemented a Web-based database, whereby all groups (i.e., 
DGE, INS, and NMRCD) are submitting laboratory and epidemiologic data. Overall, 
23 sites perform SARI surveillance in Peru. 
Laboratory 
•	 After WHO declared the pandemic, the real-time RT-PCR protocol and method for 
detecting 2009 H1N1 influenza virus was implemented at INS and NMRCD for all 
samples collected at sentinel surveillance sites. Additional cell culture inoculation and 
nucleic acid sequencing was performed at NMRCD. 
•	 The MOH is currently planning to implement real-time RT-PCR at several of the 
regional laboratories for the upcoming influenza season. 
Training 
•	 Technical assistance has been provided by using video and teleconference and continues 
to be provided to national and regional alert response teams. 




H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
On the basis of the case definition for 2009 H1N1 influenza in May 2009, the Peru MOH 
established a slightly modified surveillance system. After the WHO declaration of the pandemic, 
an active surveillance system was established to define the procedures for detecting, notifying, 
investigating, following, and controlling 2009 H1N1 influenza in Peru. This system was halted 
on July 7 and changed to a mitigation phase. During the H1N1 pandemic, Peru intensified 
influenza surveillance systems by 
•	 Reinforcing sentinel surveillance of SARI through an online platform with information 
about hospitalization, comorbidities, outcomes, treatment, and other variables. 
•	 Optimizing and defining the scope of the pandemic in Peru by reporting ARI cases in 




•	 Active surveillance was implemented in all airports. For example, during the middle of 
the 2009 H1N1 influenza crisis, travel restrictions to Mexico were implemented. 
•	 A telephone hotline was developed to receive public reports on respiratory diseases. 
•	 The health department implemented antiviral treatment to symptomatic high-risk 
groups. 
•	 The clinical and epidemiologic forms of influenza cases were entered into the NMRCD 
database or directly into the MOH Web-based platform. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 The MOH-implemented and -supported telephone hotline helped to identify several 
cases among international travelers. 
•	 Peer-reviewed publications by the MOH (i.e., DGE, INS) and NMRCD have described 
the clinical and epidemiologic features of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Principal Collaborators 
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South-East Asia Regional Office 
(SEARO) 
Human Influenza Surveillance: SEARO 2010
 
U.S. CDC Assignees 
WHO National Influenza Center 
SEARO Headquarters 
SEARO 
Single Cooperative Agreement 
Multiple Cooperative Agreements 
Sustainability Cooperative Agreement 0 262.5 525 1,050 1,575 Miles 
U.S. CDC Direct Regional Support 
Surveillance and Response for Pandemic and Avian Influenza by Regional Offices of WHO 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
WHO-SEARO is located in New Delhi, India. The office serves 11 countries with more than 
1.7 billion people. Member countries are Bangladesh, Bhutan, DPR Korea, India, Indonesia, 
Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. Six of the 11 countries 
receive U.S. CDC Influenza Division cooperative agreement funds, including Nepal and Sri 
Lanka, which are receiving funds for the 1st time this year. In 2009, SEARO staff provided 
training, support, and technical assistance to member countries; developed standardized  





           
In 2010, SEARO will focus on the following: 
•	 Enhance countries’ capacities to more efficiently carry out surveillance and response for 
influenza. 
•	 Assist countries in revising their pandemic preparedness plans to ensure they are in line 
with new WHO guidance. 
•	 Set up a regional database to track and monitor results of specimens submitted by NICs 
in the region. 
•	 Strengthen laboratory infrastructure and build laboratory and epidemiology capacities 
to accurately and promptly diagnose influenza with pandemic potential. 
Surveillance 
•	 SEARO has assisted in strengthening pandemic influenza surveillance and response in 
WHO-SEARO member countries. 
Laboratory 
•	 Standard operating procedures for laboratories have been revised and shared with 
member countries. 
Preparedness 
•	 SEARO established bilateral arrangements among member countries for fast specimen 
shipping and processing. 
•	 Standard laboratory procedures were reviewed. 
Training 
•	 Rapid response and containment training at the sub-national level was conducted in 
Maldives, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. 
•	 Training of trainers for outbreak investigation and early warning alert and response took 
place in November 2008 in Indonesia, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. 
•	 A regional workshop was held in June 2009 in Bangkok for NICS regarding H1N1 U.S. 
CDC test kits. 
•	 Respiratory infection control and hospital preparedness and contingency planning 
workshops were held in different countries. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 SEARO established bilateral arrangements among member countries for rapid specimen 
shipping and processing. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 SEARO developed a guide for enhanced surveillance and monitoring of ILI/SARI entitled, 
A Practical Guide to Conducting ILI/SARI and Respiratory Event-based Surveillance. 
•	 SEARO established arrangements among member countries for influenza diagnosis with 
fast specimen shipping and processing. 






U.S. CDC Field Staff 
WHO South-East Asia Regional Office 
Suzanne Westman, MD , MPH 
I.P. Estate Mahatma Ghandi Marg 
New Delhi 110002, India 
E-mail: westmans@searo.who.int 
Principal Investigator 
Jai P. Narain 
WHO South-East Asia Regional Office 
I.P. Estate, Mahathma Gandhi Marg 
New Delhi, 11000, India 
E-mail: NarainJ@searo.who.int 
WHO SEARO Regional Adviser 
Khanchit Limpakarnjanarat 
WHO South-East Asia Regional Office 
I.P. Estate, Mahatma Ghandi Marg 
New Delhi 11000, India 
E-mail: KhanchitL@searo.who.int
Influenza Division Staff 
Karen Siener, MPH 
Project Officer 
Estramural Program Office, Influenza Division 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A-20 










•	 Capital: Dhaka •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 57.45 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 144,000 sq km live births; male: 58.44 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 56.41 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  158,065,841 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 43.1%; male:  0–14 years: 33.4% (male 
53.9%; female: 31.8% (2003 est.) 26,364,370/female 24,859,792); 15–64 years: 
63.1% (male 49,412,903/female 47,468,013); •	 GDP: $228.4 billion (2008 est.) 
65 years or older: 3.5% (male 2,912,321/female •	 GDP per Capita: $1,500 (2008 est.) 
2,529,502) (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 63.21 
years; male: 63.14 years; female: 63.28 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began in 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement. 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is one of the most populous countries in the world with 
an estimated 165 million people. Bangladesh faces serious challenges in controlling human and 
avian influenza. Each year, during April through October, seasonal influenza causes ILI in 10 
Bangladeshis for each 100 person-years. Of people ill with influenza, 3% have laboratory-
confirmed co-infections with different influenza types. 
In June 2009, Bangladesh identified its 1st case of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. The 
pandemic spread rapidly throughout the country, causing illness among an estimated 8.6 
million people and a case fatality proportion among laboratory-confirmed cases of 0.9%. In 
September 2009, as the 1st wave of the pandemic was subsiding, animal health authorities and 
the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) identified 
outbreaks of avian influenza among domestic poultry. 
Bangladesh, a country with approximately 183 million poultry, has reported influenza A 
(H5N1) outbreaks in 287 farms throughout the country since February 2007. The spread 
of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza and these avian influenza outbreaks are of great concern 





Approximately 50% of Bangladeshis poultry are raised in backyards. Although transmission of 
avian influenza to humans occurs infrequently, in March 2008, the 1st human case of influenza 
A (H5N1) in Bangladesh was identified through a population-based human influenza study 
in Dhaka. Public health authorities are very concerned that the circulation of pandemic 2009 
H1N1 along with the significant rate of co-infections of influenza A (H5N1) and other avian 
influenza A viruses (H2, H7, H9) in domestic poultry may predispose Bangladesh to the 
development of further novel influenza strains with pandemic potential. 
To prevent and control human seasonal and pandemic influenza, as well as avian influenza, 
Bangladesh’s Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control, and Research (IEDCR) has taken a 
leadership role. The IEDCR has partnered with national and international organizations to 
understand the burden of disease caused by seasonal influenza and to guide the country through 
pandemic response. IEDCR is the organization within the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare that is responsible for disease surveillance and outbreak investigation. 
Surveillance 
•	 The IEDCR partnered with the ICDDR,B to conduct ILI and SARI surveillance in 12 
hospitals throughout Bangladesh. The main objectives were to identify clusters of SARI 
that may represent public health events of international concern and to characterize the 
epidemiology of seasonal influenza circulating in Bangladesh—information necessary to 
guide annual prevention and control efforts. 
•	 Four of the sentinel surveillance hospitals have completed the 1st phase of a study, 
estimating the national burden of influenza disease in Bangladesh as 9 hospitalizations 
for each 1,000 children aged less than 5 years. The primary investigators of these efforts 
have circulated manuscripts for publication in peer-reviewed journals in an effort to 
disseminate their findings and better guide regional influenza control efforts. 
•	 The IEDCR plans to strengthen the surveillance system by implementing a software 
system with the help of the U.S. HHS, CDC, and IEIP to allow public health officers 
throughout the country to report influenza cases by using the Internet. 
•	 The IEDCR plans to expand influenza surveillance to 18 new sites throughout 






•	 The IEDCR laboratory is designated as the NIC by WHO and is capable of testing 
human samples by RT-PCR to identify seasonal, pandemic 2009 H1N1, and H5N1 
influenzas. 
•	 The IEDCR remodeled its facilities and in 2009, installed a prefabricated BSL­
3 influenza laboratory. The BSL-3 laboratory will help IEDCR phase in influenza 
surveillance activities that are currently being conducted with the assistance of 
ICDDR,B’s laboratory facility. 
•	 USAID and U.S. CDC funding has been leveraged to assist ICDDR,B, an important 
IEDCR partner, to construct a state-of-the-art BSL-3+ facility and an animal BSL-2 
facility to understand better the risk of avian and human influenza in Bangladesh and 
explore opportunities to control this risk. 
•	 The ICDDR,B facilities have initiated poultry sample testing during 2009, leading to 
the identification of several outbreaks of avian influenza. 
Preparedness 
•	 By request of the MOH, the IEDCR is currently revamping its pandemic response and 
avian influenza plan. The IEDCR is collaborating with the Department of Livestock 
Services, WHO, USAID, ICDDR,B, and DANIDA (i.e., the Danish government) to 
revise this living document. 
•	 Standard operating procedures to roll out nonpharmaceutical interventions, triage, and 
alternate care facilities during a pandemic are currently being revised to reflect lessons 
learned during the 1st wave of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Training 
•	 Although the IEDCR does not have a formal training program, the IEDCR has 
partnered with WHO and IDDCR,B to facilitate the prevention and control of 
influenza, as well as the informal and formal training of young government scientists. 
Special Influenza Projects 
•	 The IEDCR has partnered with ICDDR,B on an ambitious research agenda to 
characterize the influenza strains circulating in Bangladesh, estimate the burden 
of influenza disease, explore long-term sequela of frequent influenza illnesses (e.g., 
cognitive developmental delays), and pilot and test nonpharmaceutical interventions to 
control influenza (e.g., handwashing and respiratory hygiene interventions). 
•	 The IEDCR has partnered with ICDDR,B and the Department of Livestock Services 
to identify the risk factors associated with poultry and human infection with avian 
influenza (e.g., influenza A/H5N1). 
•	 A comprehensive list of these research projects is provided in the Research Section of 





The IEDCR has a variety of funding and technical partners within the Bangladeshi government 
and with international organizations. Each partner provides a different perspective, core capac­
ity, and funding source to leverage the various influenza prevention and control efforts of the 
government of Bangladesh. These partners include 




•	 DANIDA (Danish government). 
•	 CARE International. 
U.S. CDC Field Staff 
Steven Luby, MD 
U.S. Government Health Attaché 
Division Director of Health Systems and Immunization Division 
ICDDR,B (CDC, CCID) 
Eduardo Azziz-Baumgartner, MD, MPH 
Head of Influenza Cluster, ICDDR,B 
(CDC, Influenza Division) 
Principal Investigator 
Mahmudur Rahman, MD 
Director, Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research 
Mohakhali, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh 
E-mail: mrahman@citechco.net 
Project Manager 
A.S.M Alamgir, MD, PhD 
Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research 










•	 Capital: New Delhi •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 32.31 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 3,287,590 sq km live births; male: 36.94 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 27.12 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  1,173,108,018 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 61%; male: 73.4%;  0–14 years: 31.5% (male 
female: 47.8% (2001 census) 189,238,487/female 172,168,306); 15–64 years: 
63.3% (male 374,157,581/female 352,868,003); •	 GDP: $3.319 trillion (2008 est.) 
65 years or older: 5.2% (male 28,285,796/female •	 GDP per Capita: $2,900 (2008 est.) 
31,277,725) (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 69.25 
years; male: 66.87 years; female: 71.9 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 




•	 FY 2009 is the 1st year of a new 5-year sustainability cooperative agreement. 
India provides a unique opportunity to study influenza transmission and prevalence among 
various populations because of the socioeconomic, ethnic, and geographic diversity of its 
population. The U.S. CDC, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies, supports 
international response measures against avian and pandemic influenza in India through multiple 
implementing partners. 
India’s NIC is part of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), Department of Health 
Research within the Ministry of Health and Family Affairs (MOHFW). The India NIC, which 
is located at the National Institute of Virology, Pune, has a long-standing collaboration with 
the U.S..CDC in seasonal, avian, and pandemic influenza surveillance. The bilateral agreement 
between the India NIC and the U.S. CDC has been ongoing since 2004 and has provided 







ICMR conducts epidemiologic and virologic influenza surveillance in different geographic areas 
of India by collaborating with 9 regional centers. Collectively, more than 16,000 specimens 
have been collected from surveillance sites, and approximately 800 isolates have been well 
characterized since the beginning of the CDC-ICMR influenza network, which started in 2004. 
The India NIC has worked closely with U.S. CDC to establish state-of-the-art laboratories 
and has trained extensively with U.S. CDC scientists on typing, subtyping, PCR, real-time 
PCR, and reverse genetics techniques. Notable progress of laboratory surveillance capacity has 
occurred over the past 5 years, and the success of this partnership has led to significant 
enhancements benefiting both India and the global influenza surveillance network. 
In 2010, ICMR plans to build on these activities and work closely with the influenza network 
by enhancing regional surveillance systems, developing standardized influenza laboratory 
procedures, conducting laboratory training workshops, enhancing preparedness plans, 
strengthening the capabilities of 4 of the regional centers, conducting expanded H1N1 
surveillance in hospitalized cases, and supporting a health care facility preparedness initiative. 
Surveillance 
•	 Assist ICMR with conducting virologic surveillance for seasonal influenza throughout 
India to understand the viral characteristics and seasonality of influenza in India. 
•	 Advance influenza virus sequencing, real time RT-PCR, and HI techniques to analyze 
antigenic and genetic differences in order to ascertain influenza virus circulation among 
different geographic areas with different temperate zones. 
•	 Provide isolates and data for vaccine representative strains. 
•	 Provide technical guidance for surveillance activity to create disease burden estimates. 
•	 Contribute seasonal influenza isolates for annual vaccine strain selection for influenza. 
•	 The CDC-ICMR influenza network is coordinating with the National Center of Disease 
Control (NCDC) in Delhi to create a larger network of influenza surveillance units in 
India. 
•	 Build capacity for disease surveillance and laboratory networks for rapid detection of 
avian influenza. 
•	 Share influenza-related educational and informational materials and create public health 
messaging systems. 
•	 Compare the influenza surveillance data with climate, geography, and demographic data 
to explore trends of influenza seasonality. 






Multicentric influenza surveillance network in India





























India has 9 influenza laboratories that are capable of influenza diagnostic tests, such as virus 
isolation, HA and HI, and RT-PCR and real-time RT-PCR testing to confirm diagnosis for 
seasonal influenza. Most of these laboratories can also test for H5N1 and H1N1. Laboratory 
techniques and guidance that further strengthen seasonal, avian, and pandemic influenza  
laboratorial detection in India include the ability to 
•	 Build capacity by developing a network of 9 laboratories for influenza surveillance 
throughout India. 
•	 Train staff at NIV, Pune, and extending training for additional network members in 
India and the region. 
•	 Trained staff to detect pandemic H1N1 by using real-time PCR and create surge  
capacity at many laboratories in India. 
•	 Provide technical guidance for creating BSL-3 plus and BSL-4 laboratories and  
developing standard operating procedures (SOPs). 
•	 Provide standard reagents, such as HA/HI and PCR reagents, to influenza network 
laboratories in India. 
 
•	 Strengthen the quality control system of influenza diagnostic network laboratories. 
•	 Enhance rapid sequencing and phylogenetic analytic capability at NIV, Pune. 
Preparedness 
•	 Assist government of India in training for early detection, rapid response, and 

containment of avian and pandemic influenza at its source.
 
•	 Assist the MOHFW in increasing awareness and response in order to minimize the risk 
of the spread of human infections and disease. 
•	 Provide technical guidance for developing and implementing training modules for rapid 
response and containment, physician awareness, and infection control in health care 
facilities jointly developed by India MOH, U.S. CDC, and WHO. 
•	 Make a self-assessment monitoring and evaluation tool available to enable India to take 
inventory of their capacity to handle potential pandemics and to identify possible gaps 
for future implementation of pandemic plans. 
•	 Develop the skills and laboratory network capacity to detect novel influenza viruses with 
NIV, Pune, as the focal point for laboratory detection of an influenza pandemic. 
Training 
•	 Extended training opportunities and developed capacity and human resources at the 
collaborating institutions in India. 
•	 Provided hands-on training of laboratory staff in India to identify potential pandemic 
influenza by PCR. 
•	 Conducted technical training workshops on seasonal influenza laboratory detection for 
all influenza surveillance network laboratories in NIV, Pune. This training is ongoing 
yearly. 
•	 Provided technical guidance for the training physicians at the tertiary care level for 
early warning signs, developed a surveillance network, and identified possible H5N1 
infections. 
•	 Provided training for regional RRT teams made up of health and veterinary 












•	 Trained WHO-supported district, state, and regional surveillance medical officers of the 
National Polio Surveillance Program and state-level consultants of the Revised National 
Tuberculosis Control Program on Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness and Response. 
•	 Undertook state-level tabletop exercise related to implementing the pandemic plan in 
partnership with the MOH and the WHO country office. 
•	 Provided training on respiratory infection control and prevention in health care facilities 
that included case management guidelines for avian and pandemic influenza and how to 
appropriately use of PPE for health care workers. 
•	 Extended the following training to influenza network members in India and the region: 
ˏ	 Real-time PCR assay training for Co-PI from the regional center: CMC Vellore, 
September 16–18, 2008. 
ˏ	 The NIC at NIV, Pune, participated as an expert committee member and 
delivered a lecture on the principles of real-time PCR for influenza or avian 
influenza at the NICD-WHO hands-on laboratory training on influenza or avian 
influenza with special reference to molecular characterization: National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases, Delhi, December 18–20, 2008. 
ˏ	 Two staff members from VPCI, Delhi, trained at NIV for influenza isolation and 
antigenic analyses techniques, February 2–6, 2009. 
ˏ	 A 1-day orientation program for the influenza disease burden study for 29 
physicians: Vadu study site, February 23, 2009. 
Special Influenza Projects 
•	 Developed broad activities that encompassed the epidemiologic, basic, and applied 
research aspects of avian and pandemic influenza with multiple partners in India. 
•	 Facilitated technology transfer for various research tools, including capacity to test for 
human exposure to H5N1 and creation of reverse genetics modified Indian H5N1 as 
potential vaccine candidate immunogens. 
•	 Developed programs to assess host-viral interacting proteins at the molecular level that 
may eventually help explain the pathogenesis of influenza in different host species. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 U.S. CDC’s Influenza Division provided the novel H1N1 detection kits within weeks of 
the H1N1 outbreak. Further, NIV provided scientific and technical support for real-
time PCR, SOPs, reagents, and positive control to all regional laboratories. 
•	 Refresher trainings for network laboratories involved in the diagnosis of H1N1 and 
laboratory-based surveillance of ILI, including the government of India’s National 
Centers for Disease Control (NCDC). 
•	 The following trainings for detection of 2009 H1N1 influenza by real-time PCR and 
conventional PCR were undertaken by NIV, Pune: 
ˏ	 Real-time PCR-based diagnosis of 2009 H1N1 influenza, Southeast Asia 
(organized by WHO, SEARO); June 8–12, 2009, Bangkok, Thailand. Two staff 










Twelve participants from 9 countries (i.e., India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Timor Liste, Thailand) were trained in detecting 
2009 H1N1 influenza by real-time and conventional PCR. 
ˏ	 Regional ICMR network members (14 staff from AIIMS, VP Chest, 
NICED,CMC Vellore, KIPM Chennai, RMRC Dibrugarh, and PGIMR 
Chandigarh) were given refresher courses in detecting H1N1by molecular tests, 
June 17–18, 2009. 
ˏ	 Four ICMR network members (11 staff from Bhubaneswar, Patna, Jabalpur and 
Andaman and 2 from Jodhpur) were given refresher courses for H1N1 detection 
by molecular tests, August 24–25 and 27–28, 2009. 
ˏ	 Four staff members of Kasturba Hospital Mumbai (Maharashtra state health 
system) and 2 staff member of Jodhpur were trained in detecting 2009 H1N1 
influenza by real-time PCR and conventional PCR, September 11–12, 2009. 
ˏ	 During the peak of the H1N1 outbreak in late July through August 2009, NIV, 
Pune, was handling more than 500 specimens each week for influenza testing by 
PCR. 
•	 The NIC, Pune, recorded more than 11,000 cases of ILI and SARI in August 2009 
(peak of H1N1 outbreak in Pune) with approximately 20% positivity for influenza A 
by real-time PCR. Approximately 50% of the influenza cases were novel H1N1, and the 
remaining were influenza H3 or seasonal H1. 
•	 Of the 1,084 SARI cases, most patients had milder illness, and 25 deaths were recorded. 
A total of 44 isolates of novel H1N1 have been isolated, and 4 full-length sequences 
carried out.


























Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 The influenza network collected 4,030 respiratory specimens in 2009 and isolated and 
characterized 307 influenza viruses. Of these, 107 isolates have been sent to U.S. CDC’s 
Influenza Division for further antigenic analysis. Data indicates that influenza A (H1N1 
and novel H1N1), A (H3N2), and type B cocirculated in India. 
•	 An extensive analysis of 4 years of seasonal influenza data collected has shown that 
seasonality varies according to geographic location: 
ˏ North India demonstrates peak activity in winter and limited activity during rains. 
ˏ Eastern and Western India demonstrate highest activity during rains and limited 
activity in winter.
 
ˏ South India demonstrates peak activity in cooler season during rains.
 
•	 Genetic analysis of HA sequences from influenza type A H1 (n = 137), H3 (n = 142), 
and type B (n = 124) demonstrated that all circulating strains in India clustered with 
corresponding vaccine strains during 2004–2009. 
•	 Influenza is the causative agent in at least 5% of acute respiratory infections (isolation). 
•	 In 2009, several isolates were identified with the oseltamivir resistance at H274Y in the 
Neuraminidase gene among H1 isolates and resistant to adamantane (S31N) in some 
H3 isolates. 
•	 The NIC at NIV, Pune, served as a strong pillar of support for the in-country response 
to the pandemic H1N1 outbreak. It quickly handled the surge in testing for novel 
H1N1 by real-time PCR and provided in-country training for other centers for H1N1 
testing. 
•	 The NIC at Pune identified the outbreak of novel H1N1 within days and provided 
necessary support for further confirmation of infection elsewhere. 
•	 Phylogenetic analysis of all 8 gene segments of 4 novel H1N1 identified that Indian 
isolates were genetically close to A/California-04 /2009, with greater than 99% identity 
at amino acid level. 
•	 The novel H1N1 virus showed resistance for amantadine but sensitivity to oseltamivir. 
•	 The India NIC developed a Web site: http://www.idbi-india.org to 
ˏ Share techniques and experiences and enhance communication with network 
laboratories and other laboratories about influenza disease burden. 
ˏ Strengthen communication and cooperation with others and improve 
management of network laboratories. 
ˏ Collect and publish the latest seasonal, avian, and pandemic influenza news. 
•	 In addition, 2 research studies addressing issues related to influenza disease burden and 
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Indonesia 
•	 Capital: Jakarta •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 31.04 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 1,919,440 sq km live births; male: 36.14 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 25.68 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  242,968,342 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  otal population: 90.4%; male: 94%;  0–14 y •	 Tears: 28.4% (male 34,343,198/ 
female: 86.8% (2004 est.) female 33,175,135); 15–64 years: 65.7% (male 
78,330,830/female 77,812,339); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $932.1 billion (2008 est.) 
5.8% (male 6,151,305/female 7,699,548) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $3,900 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 70.46 
years; male: 67.98 years; female: 73.07 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
There are 2 cooperative agreements between the Indonesian MOH and U.S. CDC. The 1st 
is the Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement (with Center for 
Biomedical and Pharmaceutical Research and Development (Cbp-Rd), National Institute of 
Health Research and Development [NIHRD]). 
•	 The 1st influenza cooperative agreement with NIHRD began in September 2004 and 
ended in September 2009. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 1st year of a new 5-year sustainability cooperative agreement with 
NIHRD. 
•	 The cooperative agreement with the Directorate General of Disease Control and 

Environmental Health [DDCEH]) began in September 2006.
 
•	 FY 2009 is the 3rd year of the cooperative agreement with the DDCEH. 
The Republic of Indonesia is the world’s 4th most populous country and has approximately 245 
million people. The country spreads over 5,300 km and includes more than 17,000 islands, 
6,000 of which are inhabited. Surveillance for influenza occurs within the MOH. The NIHRD 
is designated as the country’s NIC and conducts surveillance for patients with ILI in a network 
of 20 primary care facilities and for patients with SARI in 15 hospitals. NIHRD also provides 







In 2009, DDCEH implemented an early warning surveillance system (EWARS) for 22 priority 
diseases, including ILI, pneumonia, and avian influenza in the provinces of Lampung and Bali. 
DDCEH plans to expand the system to 2 other provinces in 2010: North Sulawesi and West 
Kalimantan. To raise awareness of influenza during the past year, DDCEH conducted training 
for doctors on detecting H1N1 and avian influenza, awareness training for industrial sectors 
on influenza (both avian and pandemic), and multisectoral training on pandemic preparedness 
across several provinces in Indonesia. 
ILI and SARI Surveillance 
•	 In 2009, data collection instruments were revised to better capture ILI disease burden 
data. In addition, specimen referral systems were developed to establish frontline testing 
for both ILI and SARI patients at the regional reference laboratories. 
•	 The SARI surveillance system was expanded in Tangerang district to capture 
population-based data on the effect of novel H1N1 (nH1N1) in Indonesia. Both 
surveillance systems were useful in monitoring the emergence of nH1N1 in Indonesia. 
•	 There are plans to conduct a national workshop on long-term plans for influenza 
surveillance in January 2010 followed by an in-depth review of surveillance activities. 
Objectives of this mission will be to integrate various logistic and data management 
activities and ensure long-term support of influenza surveillance in Indonesia. 
•	 DDCEH implemented community-based surveillance in 2 provinces: East Java 
(2 districts) and Lampung (2 districts). Village surveillance workers were recruited to 
collect morbidity data from the community and private practitioners and risk factor 
data. 
•	 During the first quarter 2010, the surveillance subdirectorate will conduct an in-depth 
review and on the basis of the results, the subdirectorate hopes to expand the system 








•	 Over the past 5 years, NIHRD used cooperative agreement funds to develop an 
extensive network of 12 regional laboratories and several hospitals with real-time PCR 
laboratory capacity. 
•	 NIHRD engaged the regional laboratories in ILI and SARI surveillance activities. 
Preparedness 
•	 Given the wide scale H5N1 epizoonotic in Indonesia and the continued occurrence of 
H5N1 infection in humans, epicenter containment and pandemic preparedness are a 
high priority for the MOH. 
•	 To test protocols for epicenter containment, the MOH conducted an operational 
simulation exercise in South Sulawesi province in April 2009. 
•	 EWARS was successfully implemented in 2 provinces this year by using a combination 
of U.S. CDC and WHO funding. 
•	 The MOH developed an influenza pandemic surveillance guideline for field health 
officers and a surveillance guideline for officers at the Port Health Office. 
•	 DDCEH developed a national contingency plan to respond to an influenza pandemic.
The drafts of that plan were used to inform decision makers during the H1N1 pandemic. 
Training 
By using U.S. CDC funds, the MOH established the following training activities in 2009: 
•	 EWARS surveillance, epidemiology, laboratory, and information management. 
•	 Simulation exercises for epicenter containment in South Sulawesi province. 
•	 Surveillance for H1N1 and H5N1 for doctors of primary care facilities and private 
doctors. 
•	 Pandemic preparedness and business continuity for industrial sectors. 
•	 Multisectoral pandemic preparedness and response in 10 provinces and 84 districts. 
Special Influenza Projects 
•	 A community-based KAP survey was conducted in North Sumatra where clustered cases 
of H5N1 occurred. 
•	 Population-based surveillance for patients with SARI has been implemented in 
Tangerang district to characterize the burden of disease associated with novel H1N1 
infection in Indonesia. 
Principal Collaborators 
U.S. CDC Field Staff 
Frank Mahoney, MD 
U.S. Embassy Jakarta 
U.S. CDC Office, Influenza 
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Catharina Praptiningsih, MDDs, MEpid 
Medical Epidemiologist 
E-mail: praptiningsihcy@state.gov 
Amalya Mangiri, MScPH 
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•	 Capital: Kathmandu •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 46 deaths/1,000 live 
•	 Area: Total: 147,181 sq km births; male: 45.97 deaths/1,000 live births; female: 
•	 Population: 46.04 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)  28,951,852 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 48.6%; male:  0–14 years: 35.6% (male 5,253,150/ 
62.7%; female: 34.9% (2001 census) female 5,056,249); 15–64 years: 60.1% (male 
8,328,202/female 9,074,562); 65 years or older: 4.3% •	 GDP: $33.25 billion (2009 est.) 
(male 581,872/female 657,817) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $1,200 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 65.81 
years; male: 64.62 years; female: 67.05 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
•	 In FY 2009, Nepal applied for and was awarded their 1 st U.S. CDC Surveillance and 
Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza cooperative agreement. 
•	 Grant awarded on August 1, 2009. 
Nepal is a mountainous country with most people living in rural areas, and many are dependent 
on poultry and animal farming. With support from the World Bank, Nepal prepared a joint 
Health and Agriculture National Avian Influenza and Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response Plan in 2006, and later that year, an Operational Influenza Plan. In 2008 and 2009, 
eastern Nepal experienced an H5N1 avian outbreak; no human cases were detected. The U.S. 
CDC grantee, the Patan Academy of Health Sciences will collaborate with Nepal’s Ministry of 
Health and Population (MOHP) to build capacity in the country to monitor and detect 
circulating influenza viruses. 
Surveillance 
•	 Nepal proposes to set up 3 sentinel surveillance sites at 3 key hospitals: Patan in 
Katmandu, Nepalgunj Medical College in western Nepal, and BP Koirala Institute of 
Health Sciences in eastern Nepal. 
•	 With U.S. CDC support, Nepal plans to increase capacity to create and maintain a 
mechanism for regular virologic and epidemiologic surveillance. Currently, there is no 
routine virologic sample collection protocol in place in Nepal. To date, hospitals only 









•	 Currently, the government’s National Public Health Laboratory, the national 
reference laboratory, has real-time RT-PCR and is testing for the H1N1 virus. The Patan 
Academy laboratory, with the support of the U.S. CDC grant, plans to purchase a 
real-time RT-PCR and upgrade their laboratory to conduct routine molecular diagnostic 
testing. 
•	 Nepal aspires to move toward fulfilling the terms of reference to become a WHO NIC. 
This will include collecting and sharing influenza virus isolates and maintaining active 
communication with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network. 
Preparedness 
•	 With support from the World Bank, Nepal prepared a joint Health and Agriculture 
National Avian Influenza and Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan in 
2006 and later that year an Operational Influenza Plan. Nepal will prepare the 3 sentinel 
hospitals to mobilize technical teams capable of responding at the district level to an 
influenza outbreak. 
Training 
•	 The MOHP offered lab technicians training on correct techniques for taking and 
handling nasopharyngeal swabs and specimens. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 As with other outbreaks, when a cluster of cases are reported, the government sends a 
medical team to investigate. During the current H1N1 epidemic, cases were 1st 
concentrated in the countryside, but then spread to the more populated Katmandu 
valley. 
•	 An increasing number of samples are being collected and sent to the laboratory. Tamiflu, 
masks, gloves, and shipping ice packs are being provided to all zone and regional 
hospitals. 
•	 Airport screening (native or foreigners) is ongoing. Passengers with possible cases of 
H1N1 are sent to an infectious diseases hospital for further work-up and therapeutic 
interventions. 
Principal Collaborators 
Arjun Karki, MD 
Principal Investigator 
Vice Chancellor 
Patan Academy of Health Sciences 
P.O. Box No. 26500 
Kathmandu, Nepal 
E-mail: drakarki@pahs.edu.np 
Kedar Prasad Baral, MD, MPH 
Deputy Project Director 
Patan Academy of Health Sciences 





 Southeast Asia Region
 
Sri Lanka 
•	 Capital: Colombo •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 18.14 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: Total: 65,610 sq km live births; male: 19.9 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 16.3 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.) 21,513,990 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  otal population: 90.7%; male:  0–14 y •	 Tears: 23.6% (male 2,593,007/ 
92.3%; female: 89.1% (2001 census) female 2,490,631); 15–64 years: 68.1% (male 
7,153,250/female 7,488,816); 65 years or older: 8.3% •	 GDP: $96.43 billion (2009 est.) 
(male 825,361/female 962,925) (2010 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $4,500 (2009 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 75.3 
years; male: 73.22 years; female: 77.47 years (2010 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
•	 In FY 2009, Sri Lanka applied for and was awarded their 1st U.S. CDC Surveillance 
and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza cooperative agreement. 
•	 Grant awarded August 1, 2009. 
Sri Lanka is a high-risk country for avian influenza because it attracts migratory birds and has 
a large poultry industry and a large number of people keeping poultry in their backyards. The 
country has only one major port of entry. Sri Lanka’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and 
Response activities began in 2005 with support from the WHO and the World Organization 
for Animal Health (OIE). With additional support from the World Bank in 2008, the country 
initiated the National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Program headed jointly 
by the MOH and Livestock Development and Agriculture. The Epidemiology Unit in the 
MOH will oversee the new U.S. CDC-funded program, which will complement current and 
ongoing influenza-related activities. 
Surveillance 
Sri Lanka currently has 20 sentinel hospitals selected as centers of influenza surveillance. 
U.S. CDC funding will be used to increase their capacity to conduct regular virologic and 
epidemiologic surveillance and to monitor and detect circulating influenza strains. As many 
as 30 samples of ILI are to be collected each month from the inpatient and outpatient 
departments. Data on ILI patients are routinely included in the national influenza surveillance 





Sri Lanka’s main government laboratory, the Medical Research Institute (MRI), is a WHO 
NIC. The laboratory is equipped with real-time RT-PCR and can test for the H5N1 and H1N1 
viruses. Sri Lanka collects and shares influenza virus isolates and maintains communication 
with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network. With U.S. CDC support, the 
MOH proposes to strengthen their influenza laboratory surveillance by improving laboratory 
diagnostic facilities. Sri Lanka proposes to set up an information management computer 
network that links the NIC, the Epidemiology Unit, and the regional influenza sentinel sites. 
Preparedness 
Sri Lanka has prepared a National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan and has a National 
Steering Committee and a National Technical Committee on Avian and Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness that all meet regularly. Preparedness plans for all 26 administrative districts have 
been developed. The National Communication Strategy on Avian and Pandemic Preparedness 
was developed and is periodically updated. The MOH has stockpiled Tamiflu that can be used 
during the H1N1 pandemic. 
Training 
With U.S. CDC funds, the MOH Epidemiology Unit and the MRI is planning to train 
regional epidemiologists, hospital infection control nursing officers, and laboratory technicians 
on influenza laboratory and epidemiologic surveillance. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
There have been 115 confirmed H1N1 
cases from June 2009, when the first 
H1N1 case was identified to October 
15, 2009. More than 90% of these were 
visitors from other affected countries. 
Most were detected by using airport 
surveillance and screening. Sustained 
community transmission was confirmed 
on October 16, 2009. As a result, 
strategies in case identification and 
laboratory surveillance were modified: 
airport screening was suspended, and 
only epidemiologically important 
patients, or those with severe illness 
from treating hospitals, were tested. 
There has been another 70 confirmed 
cases since then. Sri Lanka reports 
weekly to WHO and U.S. CDC on 






•	 Medical Research Institute NIC. 
•	 Health Education and Promotion Bureau. 
•	 Department of Animal Production and Health (DAPH). 
Paba Palihawadana, MD, MSc, MBBS 
Principal Investigator 
Chief Epidemiologist 
Epidemiology Unit, Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition 
231 De Saram Place, Colombo 010 
Sri Lanka 
E-mail: paba@health.gov.lk 
Wasu Jayasinghe, MD, MSc, MBBS 
Medical Officer 
AI/AFP Team 
Epidemiology Unit, Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition 
231 De Saram Place, Colombo 010 
Sri Lanka 
E-mail: wasujayasinghe@gmail.com 
Patrick Glew, MPH 
Epidemiologist 
Epidemiology and Prevention Branch 
Atlanta, Georgia 
Jaclyn King, MPH 
Epidemiologist 
Epidemiology and Prevention Branch 
Atlanta, Georgia 
Pamela Kennedy 
Data Base Developer 










•	 Capital: Bangkok •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 18.23 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 514,000 sq km live births; male: 19.5 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 16.89 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 66,404,688 
 •	 e Structur •	 Literacy Rate:Ag e:  Total population: 92.6%; male:  0–14 years: 21.2% (male 7,104,776/ 
94.9%; female: 90.5% (2000 census) female 6,781,453); 15–64 years: 70.3% (male 
22,763,274/female 23,304,793); 65 years or older •	 GDP: $570.1 billion (2008 est.) 
8.5% (male 2,516,721/female 3,022,281) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $8,700 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 72.83 
years; male: 70.51 years; female: 75.27 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 




•	 FY 2009 is the 1st year of a new, 5-year sustainability cooperative agreement. 
The Thai National Institute of Health (NIH) is located within the Department of Medical 
Sciences (DMSc), Thailand Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and employs 215 permanent 
and 237 project-based staff. The Thai NIH has been recognized by WHO as a NIC since 1972. 
The Thai NIH comprises many scientific groups within its public health laboratory 
infrastructure and serves as the country’s national reference laboratory and the research and 
development arm of the MOPH for infectious and noninfectious diseases. The Thai NIH 
laboratory is compliant with ISO standards and accredited by the Bureau of Laboratory Quality 
Standard, Thailand, and other international organizations, including WHO. The role of the 
NIC is to act as the national reference laboratory for influenza and other respiratory viruses, 
including influenza surveillance and research in close collaboration with the U.S. CDC. 
Surveillance 
•	 There are 10 established sentinel influenza surveillance hospitals throughout the 5 








•	 The Thai MOPH has recently integrated an 

additional 8 sites as part of its efforts to enhance the 

country’s influenza surveillance program.
 
•	 In 2009, the NIC processed 3,428 specimens with 

811 (23.7%) positive results for seasonal influenza 

from the 10 sentinel sites, and approximately 20 

influenza specimens from neighboring regional 

countries were sent for confirmation. The surveillance 

data and influenza viral strains obtained were shared 

with WHO and U.S. CDC.
 
•	 Surveillance data was reported to the Thai MOPH to 

be used in policy decisions to enhance the national 

influenza prevention and control in Thailand.
 
•	 During the last 5 years, the NIC expanded the 
virologic surveillance system, which is fully capable of monitoring circulating influenza 
strains and detecting new variants and drug resistant strains. 
•	 Since 2008, the NIC and Bureau of Epidemiology (BOE) integrated and harmonized 
virologic and epidemiologic surveillance to establish an effective and timely influenza 
surveillance system capable of detecting and reporting an increase in influenza activity 
for the country’s alert system. 
•	 Passive surveillance data from BOE is used to estimate seasonal, specific, baseline rates 
of reported influenza. 
Laboratory 
The NIC has the capacity for the following: viral RNA extraction; RT-PCR for detection of 
influenza A and B; influenza virus isolation by cell culture method by using MDCK-cell; 
influenza A subtyping by real-time RT-PCR; strain analysis by hemagglutination inhibition 
(HI); immunofluorescence testing; whole genome sequencing of novel viruses; and sequence 
analysis of selected specimens to describe influenza genetic diversity for vaccine development 
purposes. 
•	 Antiviral drug resistance testing was implemented in 2008 by using neuraminidase gene 
sequencing and fluorescence-base NA enzyme inhibition assay. 
•	 The DMSc has 1 NIC and 14 regional medical science centers (RMSCs) that conduct 
PCR testing for influenza specimens. 
•	 During the novel H1N1 pandemic, the capacity for influenza testing at the NIC 
laboratory was approximately 400–500 specimens each day and a total for all the 
RMSCs of 700–1,400 specimens each day. 
Preparedness 
•	 The Thai National Committee on Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness, chaired by the deputy Prime Minister, developed the first national 
strategic plan for avian influenza control in 2005 on approval of the Thai cabinet. 
•	 In 2008, this plan was modified as the 2nd National Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza 







•	 On April 28, 2009, the National Action Plan for Preparedness Response to Pandemic 
Outbreaks of Influenza Virus was approved by the Thai cabinet and published. 
•	 The action plan for Laboratory Diagnosis of Pandemic Influenza and Avian Influenza 
Virus (2006) was updated to the action plan for laboratory diagnosis of the pandemic 
2009 H1N1 influenza virus. 
Training 
•	 In support of the WHO influenza program, the NIC provided technical support to 
organize hands-on workshops in PCR technology specific to pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza virus to 14 NIC laboratory staff from 7 countries (i.e., Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Indonesia, Maldives Nepal, Sri Lanka, Timorese), in addition to training 14 DMSc 
regional network laboratory staff and 32 Thai regional hospital staff. 
•	 The NIC hosted laboratory scientists from Laos, Myanmar, and North Korea in PCR 
diagnostics testing, virus isolations, laboratory quality assurance, and biosafety systems. 
Networking 
•	 The Thai NIC provides a monthly report to the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance 
Network (GISN) to support vaccine strain selection decisions. 
•	 The NIC participated in the WHO EQAP and preformed continuous quality 

improvements in accordance of WHO criteria.
 
•	 The NIC provides technical support and confirmatory testing for the national 

laboratories of neighboring countries.
 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 At the onset of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak, Thailand had the 
capacity to process specimens for the H1N1 virus by using real-time PCR technology 
and supported national efforts to combat the influenza pandemic. 
•	 In collaboration with the university laboratories, the Thai NIC conducted drug 
resistance monitoring and follow-up of genetic variations by virus characterization. 
Approximately 150 viral isolates were shared with WHO. 
•	 The capacity of the Thai DMSc (i.e., Thai NIH and RMSCs) is 22 PCR units that 
were deployed strategically among the NICs, 14 regional medical centers, and 7 mobile 
laboratories to cover the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza testing during May–October 
2009. A total of 67,769 specimens were tested with 26,231 (38.7%) positive results for 
the H1N1 virus. The facilities operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and provide results 
within 24 hours. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
In collaboration with the MOPH, the NIC has integrated the virologic and epidemiologic 
ILI surveillance for early warning system and effectively developed rapid response capacity 
for testing pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus and drug resistance strains. The Bureau of 
Epidemiology, Department of Disease Control, plans to adapt and model their surveillance 




Thailand’s Future Plans for Expansion of Laboratory Facilities with Capability of 
PCR Testing 
The Thai government has initiated plans to expand the number of testing sites. In phase I, 
approximately 25 laboratories located in provincial hospitals are being included through 
training and upgrading of infrastructure. Initial plans indicate that these will be used for testing 
of influenza only; however, to have a better return on investment and to provide comprehensive 
support to national surveillance activities, it has been considered prudent to use these facilities 
for diagnosis of other emerging infectious diseases too. 
In phase II, the country likely will have a network of approximately 100 PCR facilities that will 
provide invaluable support to any infectious diseases program at local and national levels. 
Principal Collaborators 
Thailand’s Key Partners 
•	 The MOPH. 
•	 The Bureau of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Thai Department of Disease Control 
(DDC). 
•	 The BOE, Thai Department of Disease Control. 
•	 The National Institute of Health, Department of Medical Sciences (Thai NIH, DMSc). 
•	 The RMSC. 
•	 The Sentinel Influenza Surveillance Hospitals. 
•	 The Provincial Health Office. 
•	 The International Health Policy Program. 
•	 The Ministry of Interior. 
Nonprofit Organizations 
•	 The Virology Association of Thailand. 
•	 The Influenza Foundation of Thailand. 
International Partners 
•	 U.S. CDC, IEIP. 
•	 WHO. 
Pathom Sawanpanyalert MD, DrPH 
Project Director, Principle Investigator 
Director, National Institute of Health, Department of Medical Sciences 
Ministry of Public Health, Tiwanon Road, Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand 
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Deputy Director, Thai National Institute of Health, Department of Medical Sciences 
Ministry of Public Health, Tiwanon Road, Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand 
E-mail: krongkaew.s@dmsc.mail.go.th or krongkaewdaeng@yahoo.com 
Malinee Chittaganpitch, BSc, MSc 
Chief, WHO National Influenza Center, Thailand 
Thai National Institute of Health, Department of Medical Sciences 
Ministry of Public Health, Tiwanon Road, Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand 
E-mail: malinee.c@dmsc.mail.go.th 
U.S. CDC Staff in Thailand 
Mark Simmerman, PhD, RN 
Chief of Influenza Section, International Emerging Infections Program 
Thailand MOPH, U.S. CDC Collaboration 
E-mail: msimmerman@cdc.gov 
Susan A. Maloney, MD, MHSc 
Director 
International Emerging Infections Program 
DDC 7 Building, 3rd Floor 
Ministry of Public Health, Soi 4 
Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand 
Sonja Olsen, MD 
Medical Epidemiologist 
International Emerging Infections Program 





           
             




Established in 2004, GDD-Thailand and national and regional partners support essential public 
health functions to rapidly detect and respond to Southeast Asia’s emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases. These health threats range from pneumonia, including influenza and pandemic 
influenza threats, to hand, foot, and mouth disease (HMFD), tuberculosis, and zoonotic diseases. 
Coverage 
GDD-Thailand is connected by field activities throughout Southeast Asia and is founded on 
U.S. CDC’s history of collaboration, which dates back to the establishment of the world’s 1st 
FETP in 1980. This foundation has provided some of the most innovative public health work 
in the world, including the1st site of U.S. CDC’s IEIP in 2001 and support responses to the 
post-September 11th anthrax events, SARS, and the subsequent and continued threat of avian 
influenza. 
Activities 
•	 Outbreak response. 





In 2009, GDD-Thailand responded to 9 outbreaks within 24 hours. They discovered 1 
pathogen new to the world and increased their laboratory testing capacity by 107%. In 
addition, GDD-Thailand trained 10 FETP graduates and more than 1,500 participants in 
short-term regional and national trainings. 
Staff 
In-Country Field Staff 
Sue Maloney, MD, MPH 
GDD-Thailand Coordinator 
Mark Simmerman, MD, MPH 
Influenza Lead 
Principal CDC Program Collaborations In-Country 
•	 Influenza Preparedness, Detection, and Response Program. 
•	 IEIP. 
•	 FETP. 
•	 Immigrant, Refugee, and Migrant Health. 











Western Pacific Regional Office 
(WPRO) 
Human Influenza Surveillance: WPRO 2010
 




WHO National Influenza Center 
WPRO 
WPRO Direct Funding 
Influenza Cooperative Agreement 
Sustainability Cooperative Agreement 0 310 620 1,240 1,860 
Miles 
U.S. CDC Direct Region Support 
Surveillance and Response to Pandemic and Avian Influenza by Regional Offices of the World 
Health Organization 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 4th year of the agreement. 
The Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) is located in Manila, Philippines. The office serves 
37 countries and territories, covering approximately one-third of the world’s population— 
approximately 1.6 billion people. WPRO is one of the most diverse WHO regions because its 
member states range from the highly developed (e.g., Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic 
of Korea, Singapore), to the rapidly developing (e.g., China, Vietnam), and those with few health 
resources (e.g., Laos). WPRO staff continue to provide training, support, and technical assistance 
to member countries. During the past 7-year period, U.S. CDC assistance and support has 
focused on pandemic preparedness, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance, infection control, 
rapid response for containment, and outbreak investigation throughout the region. In addition, 
several countries get funding support directed to the MOH through their WHO country office. 
These countries are Laos, Cambodia, China, Vietnam, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. 
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WPRO published its surveillance guidance for countries in WPRO in November 2008. The 
document is entitled, A Practical Guide to Harmonizing Virological and Epidemiological Influenza 
Surveillance; it can be located online at the following Web site: http://www.wpro.who.int/internet/ 
resources.ashx/CSR/Publications/GuideToHarmonizingInfluenzaSurveillance-revised2302.pdf. 
China 
•	 WPRO-China supported the weekly data collection and analysis activities at the 
China NIC throughout the year. They also supported virus isolates identification and 
validation at the China NIC. 
•	 WPRO funded 6 Chinese official study tours at the WHO collaboration center for 
reference and research on influenza at the Office of Health Protection in Australia 
from February 23 to February 26, 2009 to learn about seasonal influenza surveillance 
experiences and pandemic preparedness plans and to visit influenza laboratories and 
sentinel hospitals in order to study surveillance activities. 
Cambodia 
•	 The number of sentinel sites was increased from 5 to 7 sites as of May 2009. 
•	 The following activities have been supported to enable ILI surveillance: 
ˏ Refresher training for staff from ILI sentinel sites. 
ˏ Supervision of ILI sentinel sites by U. S. CDC-supported WHO and MOH staff. 
ˏ Training workshop for the staff in the newly added 6th and 7th sentinel sites. 
ˏ Financial support to Institute Pasteur Cambodia to provide laboratory services for 
the ILI surveillance program.
 
ˏ Quarterly report from the ILI surveillance system.
 
ˏ Publication of the annual ILI report.
 
•	 The Cambodia Early Warning and Response Network (CAM EWARN) activities 
include 
ˏ	 Ongoing upgrades to the U.S. CDC Web site. 
ˏ	 Production of monthly surveillance bulletins. 
ˏ	 Installation of remote SMS systems in all operational health and provincial health 
departments has been completed. The CAM EWARN surveillance data form for 
these sites is now automatically updated to the servers. 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) 
•	 WPRO participated with the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Project and Kenan 
Institute’s cross-border surveillance exercises and drafted a case scenario on a human AI 
case to assist with these cross-border needs. 
•	 Support was provided to the Lao National Center for Laboratory and Epidemiology 
(NCLE) with interpretation, investigation, and response to suspected human AI at the 
national level and by providing human resource support in the field in border areas. 
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•	 WPRO worked with national surveillance staff to improve and disseminate influenza 
outbreak surveillance and control training to provincial- and district-level staff. The 
training has occurred during poultry AI outbreaks and fever or respiratory disease 
outbreaks in numerous provinces. WHO staff have travelled with central-level staff 
to the outbreaks to support surveillance and control efforts and provided on-the-spot 
training about PPE, appropriate Tamiflu use, isolation and quarantine, and line listing 
efforts. 
•	 WPRO has installed an electronic indicator-based surveillance tool, the Lao Early 
Warning and Response Network (Lao EWARN). WHO trained provincial staff from 
all provinces in Lao PDR and national staff on the use of this electronic format to 
facilitate rapid reporting of 19 reportable conditions, including acute respiratory illness 
to the central level and rapid local response at the provincial level. This new database has 
significantly enhanced national weekly surveillance efforts. 
•	 As part of International Health Regulations, community event-based surveillance 
(CEBS) pilot, projects were established in 4 provinces of Lao PDR. One such pilot 
has been supported by WHO and the Vientiane Capital Public Health Department. 
These pilots have been developed to increase the capacity at the community and district 
levels to detect disease clusters that include human and animal AI outbreaks. A formal 
evaluation of all 4 pilots is underway, which will be used to inform the potential rollout 
of CEBS to the rest of the country. 
Laboratory 
•	 Patrick Reading was recruited as temporary advisor to Mataika House, Fiji, from 
February 22 - 28, 2009, for influenza laboratory training and technical assistance on 
real-time PCR diagnosis of influenza, good laboratory practice, and development of 
recommendations on the management of the laboratory and future development. 
•	 A laboratory freezer and refrigerator were procured for the national influenza laboratory 





           
 
            
             
               
               






•	 WHO supported NCLE to roll out a laboratory-based ILI surveillance project to receive 
laboratory specimens from patients experiencing ILI symptoms at large hospitals in 3 
new sentinel sites in 2 provinces in June 2009. The program will build on the success 
and experience of the current ILI program within Vientiane capital. 
Preparedness 
The Consultation for the Establishment of the Regional Clinical Advisory Network on 
Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) in WPRO was held in Manila, Philippines, December 
17–18, 2008. 
•	 The meeting was attended by 11 Temporary Advisors from 10 countries. The WHO 
secretariat consisted of 7 representatives from Geneva Headquarters, WPRO, and the 
Country Office in the Philippines. 
•	 The objectives of the consultation were to 
ˏ Develop draft terms of reference and operational procedures for the regional 
clinical advisory network.
 
ˏ Discuss the membership of the network.
 
•	 The terms of reference, operational procedures, and membership of the regional, clinical 
advisory network were discussed and drafted during the consultation. The meeting
concluded with recommended next steps for the members of the consultation and WHO. 
Lao PDR 
•	 The 1st provincial pandemic plan was drafted in Vientiane Province with support by U.S. 
CDC and WHO. This first provincial plan is an operational plan for responding to a 
pandemic influenza and uses the national plan drafted in early 2008 as a guideline. It has 
been used since as a model for drafting provincial operational plans in all Lao provinces. 
Training 
•	 A hands-on training workshop on laboratory database software was conducted to 
address the data management needs of the NICs in WPRO, November 19–21, 2008. 
•	 At least 1 person from each of the following NICs in the region participated: Cambodia, 
China, Lao PDR, Fiji, South Korea, Malaysia (2), Mongolia, Philippines, PNG, 
Singapore, and Vietnam. 
•	 Four major activities were conducted during the workshop: 
ˏ Introduction of the database software. 
ˏ Options for transferring data from the existing database to the new database 
software. 
ˏ Hands-on practice on each module of the software. 
ˏ Feedback from the participants on how to improve the database software. 
•	 At the end of the training, the participants were able to properly set up the database 
software system, manage data for daily activities in the NICs efficiently, and perform 
analysis and general reports by using the database software. 
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•	 A 5-day training workshop on influenza virus isolation and characterization of seasonal 
influenza viruses was completed from March 30, 2009 to April 3, 2009, in Singapore. 
This workshop was co-sponsored by the Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention 
Center and WHO WPRO. This workshop aimed to teach basic laboratory techniques 
essential for the isolation and subsequent characterization of seasonal influenza viruses 
for the purpose of influenza surveillance. The training was held at the Singapore 
Polytechnic. 
•	 Fourteen trainees from the WPRO and SEARO regions attended the workshop, and 
the countries represented were Cambodia, Laos, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. 
Special Influenza Projects 
WPRO published disease burden guidance for countries in WPRO in November 2008. The 
document is entitled, A Practical Guide for Designing and Conducting Influenza Disease Burden 
Studies, and can be found online here: http://www.wpro.who.int/internet/resources.ashx/CSR/ 
Publications/GuideforDesigning andConductingInfluenzaStudies.pdf. 
Principal Collaborators 
U.S. CDC Field Staff through June 2009 
Weigong Zhou, MD, PhD 
WHO, WPRO 
United Nations Avenue 1000 
Manila, Philippines 
E-mail: waz6@cdc.gov 
Influenza Division Staff Project Officers 
Vashonia Smith, MPA 
Project Officer 
WPRO, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A-20 
Atlanta, GA 30333 
E-mail: vdw8@cdc.gov 
Theresa Turksi, MPH 
Project Officer 
China, Mongolia, Philippines, SPC/PPHSN 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A-20 




Margaret McCarron, MPH 
Epidemiology and Surveillance Officer 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1600 Clifton Road, MS A-32 








•	 Capital: Phnom Penh •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 56.59 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 181,040 sq km live births; male: 63.76 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 49.1 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 14,753,320 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  ears: 33.2% (male 2,389,668/ •	 Total population: 73.6%; male:  0–14 y
84.7%; female: 64.1% (2004 est.) female 2,338,838); 15–64 years: 63.2% (male 
4,372,480/female 4,627,895); 65 years or older: 3.6% •	 GDP: $29.24 billion (2008 est.) 
(male 193,338/female 319,421) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $2,100 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 61.69 
years; male: 59.65 years; female: 63.83 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement 
•	 Began June 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Cambodia 1st reported a case of 2009 H1N1 influenza virus infection in June 2009. As of 
October 2, 2009, 120 cases of H1N1 have been reported from 8 provinces. Three of the cases 
have been fatal. 
Under the MOH, the Cambodia Communicable Disease Control Department (CCDC) 
conducts infectious disease surveillance, monitoring 12 diseases and syndromes. Data on these 
conditions are collected and recorded in each provincial health department and compiled 
nationally. In the case of a suspected outbreak of the H5N1 subtype, rapid response teams have 
been trained to verify the outbreaks, conduct early mitigation and containment interventions, 
and immediately implement infection control measures, if necessary. One functioning, 
nongovernmental National NIC, the Pasteur Institute, which performs diagnostic testing for 
influenza, including the H5N1 and H1N1 subtypes, is currently in the country. 
The United States Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2) upgraded its detachment 
in Phnom Penh beginning in July 2006. In that year, an Influenza Division epidemiologist 
was assigned to the detachment as director and received partial funding from the U.S. CDC 




clinic-based surveillance for the causes of acute fever and by using that data, provided the 
government with information on the epidemiology, symptomology, and viral characteristics of 
influenza. These results complement the MOH’s ILI surveillance. 
Surveillance 
•	 SARI surveillance has been 

implemented for the 1st time at 

3 hospitals in Phnom Penh and 

Kandal Province. All specimens 

are tested for influenza viruses at 

the National Institute of Public 

Health (NIPH). Training on 

reporting requirements, such as 

completion of case report forms 

and proper specimen collection 

and transport, was conducted 

before commencement of 

surveillance at each site.
 
•	 National ILI surveillance was expanded to 2 new sites in Siem Reap and Svay Rieng 
Provinces. Initial training was conducted for staff from these new sites. 
•	 Weekly ILI surveillance reporting from sentinel sites has been upgraded from paper 
submissions to electronic transfer directly to the MOH ILI database by using SMS 
mobile devices. 
•	 In response to the H1N1 pandemic, the MOH set up a new toll-free hotline as part of 
event-based surveillance to disseminate information and detect and coordinate response 
to suspected H1N1 cases in communities or hospitals. 
•	 New guidelines and operational plans for emerging disease outbreaks, including AI, are 
under review by the Division of Communicable Disease Control, MOH. 
Laboratory 
•	 Technicians in the molecular laboratory of NIPH completed training conducted by staff
from the U.S. CDC Influenza Laboratory on real-time RT-PCR testing for influenza 
viruses. In addition, the molecular laboratory completed acquisition of equipment, 
reagents, and consumables for RT-PCR testing. 
•	 RT-PCR testing at NIPH for influenza viruses began April 2009 with samples from 
1 national ILI surveillance site. Since then, NIPH has expanded influenza testing 
responsibilities to include testing of all samples from SARI surveillance and outbreak 
investigations of respiratory disease. 
•	 NIPH acquired testing capability for H1N1 virus in June 2009 and has confirmed 
H1N1 infection in cases detected through ILI surveillance, SARI surveillance, and 
contact investigations of confirmed cases. 









•	 A 17-month provincial multisector pandemic planning pilot project in Siem Reap 
Province was completed. The aim of the pilot was to inform national-level decision 
makers on policy requirements to support implementation of local-level plans and to 
provide a model planning process for use in other provinces. 
•	 A functional pandemic simulation exercise was conducted involving approximately 60 
players, 30 observers, 6 facilitators, and an exercise management and logistics support 
team of 25. 
•	 The National Health Sector Pandemic Response Plan is currently being revised and 
adapted to accommodate the H1N1 virologic and epidemiologic characteristics. 
Training 
•	 Four refresher MOH-WHO training courses on ILI surveillance were conducted for 
staff from participating sentinel sites in Cambodia. The objectives of these courses were 
to go over surveillance procedures, share ILI data, and discuss general or site-specific 
problems or concerns. Courses were held in Prey Veng Province, November 2008, and 
in Sihanoukville, March, June, and September 2009. Each course lasted 2 days and was 
attended by 40–50 participants. 
•	 During October 2008 and June 2009, the MOH’s Department of Hospital Services, 
with support from WHO, conducted a 2-day training course about infection control for 
AI in humans at 18 referral hospitals throughout Cambodia. Course participants 
included physicians, medical assistants, nurses, midwives, and other hospital personnel. 
Each course was attended by approximately 30–35 hospital staff members. The 
objectives of each course were to provide basic information on infection control of AI in 
hospital settings and information about the disease and case management. WHO and 
Calmette Hospital (a designated AI referral hospital in Cambodia) staff also helped to 
conduct parts of the training. 
•	 A National Hospital Emergency Preparedness Workshop organized by the MOH’s 
Department of Hospital Services and supported by WHO was held in Kampong Cham 
Province, September 7–8, 2009. A total of 78 senior hospital and provincial health 
department management staff who are responsible for hospital emergency response 
plans attended. NGOs involved in hospital support also attended. The objectives of 
the workshop were to determine priority activities for hospital management during 
epidemics, particularly 
low-resource settings, and 
identify gaps in hospital 
preparedness to manage 
major epidemics and 
make recommendations 
to address these gaps. 
During the workshop, 
participants received 
training on H1N1 
infection control, surge 
capacity issues, and 
clinical management of 
severe H1N1 cases. 
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•	 Rapid containment training and community awareness for H1N1 was conducted in 10 
provinces by MOH’s Rapid Response Teams. Participating provinces were Bathambang, 
Siem Reap, Kampong Chhnang, Pursat, Pailin, Banteay Mean Chey, Kampong Thom, 
Preah Vihear, Oudar Mean Chey, and Kampong Speu. Training sessions were conducted 
May–September 2009. A total of 1,240 individuals participated from Rapid Response 
Team members and physicians at the provincial, operational district, and health 
community levels. 
Special Projects 
•	 The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) completed its 
pilot project on village-based surveillance in Koh Kong Province, along with external 
evaluations conducted by human and animal health partners. In addition, CARE 
completed focused group discussions with Village Surveillance Teams, an end line 
survey, and qualitative and quantitative data analyses for the project. 
•	 A draft of the National Guidelines on Infection Control was completed by a working 
group led by the Department of Hospital Services, Cambodian MOH. The guidelines 
were initially written in the Khmer language, subsequently translated into English, and 
forwarded to experts in infection control for external review and comments. Once final­
ized, these guidelines will be used to develop training materials for hospitals nationwide. 
•	 A national infection control policy and strategic operational plan are currently under 
development. 
•	 WHO supported printing of information, education, and communication materials for 
infection control among health care workers and in the community during a pandemic. 
Principal Collaborators 
Field Staff 
Paul Kitsutani, MD, MPH 
Director 
CDC Influenza Program, Cambodia 
U.S. Embassy, Cambodia 
Unit 8166, Box P 
APAO, AP 96546 
E-mail: kitsutanip@kh.cdc.gov 
Borann Sar, MD, PhD 
Molecular Biology Lab Specialist 
U.S. Embassy, Cambodia 
Unit 8166, Box P 




U.S. Embassy, Cambodia 
Unit 8166, Box P 




Tom Wierzba, PhD, MPH 
Director 
U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 
U.S. Embassy, Cambodia 
Unit 8166, Box P 
APAO, AP 96546 
E-mail: wierzba@namru2.org.kh 
Principle Investigator 
Ung Sam An, MD, MPH 
Director 
National Institute of Public Health 
#2, Kim Yi Sung Blvd., Khan Tuol Kork 




Sok Touch, MD, MPH 
Director 
Communicable Disease Control Department 
Ministry of Health, Cambodia 




Sovann Ly, MD, DTMH, MCTM 
Deputy Director 
Communicable Disease Control Department 
Ministry of Health 




Buth Sokhal, Pharmacist 
Deputy Director 
National Institute of Public Health 
#2, Kim Yi Sung Blvd., Khan Tuol Kork 





Michael O’Leary, MD, MPH 
WHO Representative 
World Health Organization 
WHO Representative Office 
No. 177-179 corner Pasteur (51) and 254 




Public Health Specialist 
World Health Organization 
WHO Representative Office 
No. 177-179 corner Pasteur (51) and 254 
P.O. Box 1217, Phnom Penh 
Cambodia 
E-mail: asgarin@wpro.who.int 
Maggs Mac Guinnes 
Technical Officer, Emergency Preparedness 
World Health Organization 
WHO Representative Office 
No. 177-179 corner Pasteur (51) and 254 





 Western Pacific Region
 
China 
•	 Capital: Beijing •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 21.16 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 9,596,960 sq km live births; male: 19.43 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 23.08 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  1,330,141,295 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 90.9%; male:  0–14 years: 20.1% (male 
95.1%; female: 86.5% (2000 census) 142,085,665/female 125,300,391); 15–64 years: 
71.9% (male 491,513,378/female 465,020,030); •	 GDP: $7.8 trillion (2008 est.) 
65 years or older: 8% (male 50,652,480/female •	 GDP per Capita: $6,100 (2008 est.) 
55,472,661) (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 73.18 
years; male: 71.37 years; female: 75.18 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Sustainable Influenza Surveillance Networks and Response to Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza 
•	 Began August 2009. 
•	 Previous agreement (Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative 

Agreement) began September 2004 and ended August 2009.
 
Influenza is a core component of U.S. CDC’s GDD program in China, which is identified 
in-country as an important emerging infectious disease for decades. The United States has been 
able to provide data derived from analysis of Chinese influenza viruses to assist the WHO with 
the twice annual influenza vaccine strain consultations. 
For more than 20 years, the U.S. CDC has supported Chinese influenza work through 
assistance to the WHO. In addition, for approximately 20 years, the U.S. CDC influenza 
group has provided support to the national-level Chinese influenza laboratory. Most recently, 
this support has been provided through the Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks 
Cooperative Agreement, (September 2004–August 2009). Since late 2007, the Influenza 
Division has had 1 medical epidemiologist assigned in China. 
The pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus challenged all aspects of the clinical and public 
health systems in China. To avert serious complications and excess deaths from this pandemic, 





improved clinical guidelines, vaccine development and deployment, and rapid expansion of 
laboratory capabilities. The existing Chinese influenza surveillance network, which consisted of 
a widespread hospital-based sentinel surveillance system and laboratory network, had to process 
a significant influx of cases and samples more quickly and conduct sophisticated tests of the 
viruses’ genetic characteristics, including drug resistances. 
Surveillance 
At the beginning of FY 2009, there were 197 sentinel surveillance hospitals located throughout 
China that fed into 63 network laboratories. As the pandemic progressed, the surveillance
system expanded to 556 sentinel hospitals and 411 network laboratories capable of performing 
PCR tests on influenza specimens. Other surveillance activities in FY 2009 were 
•	 An improved influenza surveillance Web site that includes an online forum for network 
laboratories to discuss issues of mutual interest, including surveillance techniques, 
troubleshooting, and exchanging results. In addition, other functions were added to 
collect, manage, and analyze influenza surveillance results (http://www.cnic.org.cn). 
•	 Continuing to develop and distribute influenza weekly reports in Chinese and English 
to share information with national and international partners. 
Laboratory 
After several years of peer review, assessments, and training, the Chinese NIC applied to become 
the 5th WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control of Influenza in 
2007. Much progress has been made toward achieving this goal. The WHO conducted an 
on-site review of progress in November 2009 with favorable results. This positions China as an 
even stronger global partner in influenza laboratory surveillance and provides another major 
source of technical assistance for other countries. Other laboratory accomplishments in FY 2009 
include the following: 
•	 Selected and sent representative influenza virus strains circulating in mainland China 
to the WHO Collaborating Centers for Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control of 
Influenza at the U.S. CDC (110 strains) and to Japan’s National Institute of Infectious 





•	 Drafted pandemic preparedness guidelines that included storage and administration 
guidelines for vaccines and antiviral drugs during the different pandemic phases. 
•	 In response to the spread of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus, supported the 
expansion from 63 to 411 network surveillance laboratories. 
•	 Developed M2 and neuraminidase (NA) genotyping methods for antiviral drug 
susceptibility surveillance. In addition, conducted antiviral susceptibility tests, 
establishing biologic methods for NA inhibitors (NAIs) and adamantine drugs. 
Preparedness 
Preparedness planning was widely tested during the H1N1 pandemic in China. Like other 
countries, China discovered which preparedness activities were worth keeping and which 
needed to be changed. Before the pandemic, guidelines were drafted on the storage and use of 
vaccines and antiviral drugs during different pandemic phases. 
Training 
China continued to provide up-to-date training on influenza testing, infection control, and 
epidemiology to medical practitioners through relevant on-site and classroom discussion. Key 
features of trainings in FY 2009 were 
•	 Trained 306 people from the initial 63 network laboratories on seasonal influenza 
laboratory detection: HA/HI assay, PCR, rapid diagnostic kits detection, chicken 
embryo passage technique, and single radial hemolysis technique. 
•	 Trained 40 provincial staff on infection control for respiratory diseases. In turn, these 
participants will take the curriculum to their provinces and train others in these 
techniques. 
•	 Trained 130 laboratory technicians and managers from the initial 63 network 
laboratories on influenza surveillance quality control and Good Laboratory Practices. 
•	 Trained 12 people from 6 provincial U.S. CDCs on avian influenza nucleic acid 
detection technology. 
•	 Provided hands-on training for 27 people from 10 provincial U.S. CDCs on laboratory 
techniques. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
•	 Developed nucleic acid detection kit for influenza A H1N1. 
•	 Urgently provided influenza A H1N1 nucleic acid detection kits to the national 
surveillance network and other countries. 
•	 Conducted training on pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza laboratory detection 
techniques for 34 U.S. CDC staff from 11 important port cities and 30 members of 
China CDC rapid response teams. 
•	 Convened “China—ASEAN Training Course on Influenza A (H1N1) Laboratory 
Detection Techniques” for 16 laboratory technicians from 8 ASEAN countries. 





Shu Yuelong, PhD 
Director 
China National Influenza Center 
China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention 
Yingxin Street, #100, Xuanwu District 




China National Influenza Center 
China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention 
Yingxin Street, #100, Xuanwu District 
Beijing, Peoples Republic of China 10005 
E-mail: xinli0003@hotmail.com 
U.S. CDC Staff in China 
Jeffrey McFarland, MD 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
U.S. Embassy China 
PSC 461, Box 50 
FPO AP 96521 
E-mail: jwm5@cdc.gov 
Song Ying MD, MS, MHS 
Program Officer 
U.S.-China Cooperation Program on Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Embassy China 
PSC 461, Box 50 
FPO AP 96521 
E-mail: songying@cn.cdc.gov 
Zhou Suizan, MPH 
Influenza Program Officer 
U.S.-China Cooperation Program on Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 




 Western Pacific Region (WPRO)
GDD-China 
EID 
Established in 2006, the China-U.S. Collaborative Program on EID integrates essential public 
heath functions to rapidly detect and respond to China’s infectious disease and health threats. 
For more than 20 years, U.S. CDC has supported and collaborated with the Chinese national 
influenza laboratory. In 2001, the China FETP began its 1st cohort and today has graduated 
more than 100 public health officers who work in leadership positions throughout China’s 
public health community. The EID program integrates these established activities with new 
abilities in emerging infections and health communication for greater health effect. 
Activities in China are directed at helping the country reach its population of 1.5 billion people. 
The program strengthens infectious disease outbreak investigations and response at the national 
and provincial levels, enhancing avian influenza and pandemic preparedness, and improving 
the strategic development of infectious disease surveillance systems. Responses have included 
pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, human enterovirus 71 (i.e., 
a dangerous form of hand, foot, and mouth disease), Streptococcus suis, plague, and foodborne 
risks, such as salmonella, brucellosis, cholera, and botulism. 
Activities 
•	 Outbreak response. 




In 2009, EID responded to 13 outbreaks, 73% of which achieved a measurable public health 
effect, and communication support was provided. They trained 13 FETP graduates and more 
than 1,000 participants in short-term regional and national trainings. 
Staff 
In-Country Field Staff 
Jeff McFarland, MD, MPH 
EID Coordinator and Influenza Lead 
Principal CDC Program Collaborations In-Country 
•	 Influenza Preparedness, Detection, and Response Program. 
•	 IEIP. 
•	 FETP. 
•	 All-Hazards Preparedness and Response. 





            
              
               
         
 
             
             
Western Pacific Region
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) 
•	 Capital: Vientiane (Viangchan) •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 79.61 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 236,800 sq km live births; male: 88.9 deaths/1,000 live births; 
•	 Population: female: 69.88 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  6,993,767 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 68.7%; male: 77%;  0–14 years: 41% (male 1,374,966/ 
female: 60.9% (2001 est.) female 1,362,945); 15–64 years: 55.9% (male 
1,846,375/female 1,885,029); 65 years or older: •	 GDP: $14.22 billion (2008 est.) 
3.1% (male 91,028/female 117,191) (2008 est.) •	 GDP per Capita: $2,100 (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 56.29 
years; male: 54.19 years; female: 58.47 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Laos receives support through the WHO WPRO cooperative agreement and CARE 
International. 
•	 Began February 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 was the 4th year of support to Laos. 
U.S. CDC operations in Lao PDR were recognized and legitimized through bilateral arrangements 
between the governments of Lao PDR and the United States (represented by the U.S. Embassy) 
in May 2006 with both Ministries of Health and Agriculture. This agreement has opened the door 
for U.S. CDC assistance in addressing emerging disease concerns principally through capacity-
building measures in countering the AI threat through pandemic preparedness. 
Surveillance 
•	 The U.S. CDC-WHO collaboration organized a National Workshop on Surveillance 
and Response of Notifiable Selected Diseases, July 8–10, 2009. A total of 95 
participants from 17 provinces and various concerned sectors from the MOH (e.g., 
secretariats office, 6 central hospitals, Deptartment of Hygiene and Prevention, Curative 
Dept.) attended. The purpose workshop was to review the situation of the surveillance 
system and make recommendations for further progress and improvement. 
•	 A U.S. CDC-CARE hotline was used to identify the Phongsaly HPAI outbreak of January 
2009 and the fowl cholera outbreak of March 2009. The hotline functioned during the 
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pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak and averaged 1,200 calls daily since June 2009. 
Hotline operations were successfully transitioned to the National Emerging Infectious
Disease Coordinating Office (NEIDCO) with support from the World Bank. 
•	 With support from the U.S. CDC-WHO Lao Collaboration, NCLE is now regularly 
contributing to the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network. 
•	 The U.S. CDC-WHO Lao Collaboration supported transformation of routine national 
surveillance into the Lao EWARN contributing to significantly improved accuracy and 
completeness of reporting. 
•	 Expansion of the Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) Virologic Surveillance Network to the 
north and south of the country, provided first time virologic evidence of seasonal (H1, 
H3, and FLU B) influenza in Laos, as well as capturing A/H1N1 clusters throughout 
the country. 
•	 Completion of a uniform CEBS evaluation by using CARE-supported activities 
targeting remote ethnic minorities. Lessons learned are being used to develop the Lao 
National CEBS Strategy. 
•	 The National Center for Laboratory and Epidemiology is now producing the 1st daily 
and weekly influenza report that takes advantage of the various surveillance systems and 
laboratory findings. 
Laboratory 
•	 Completion of biosafety enhancements and equipment procurement and installation 
for the new laboratory extension at the NCLE in December 2008 was accomplished 
through the U.S. CDC-WHO collaboration in partnership with Pasteur Laos. 
•	 U.S. CDC experts provided training to NCLE staff in establishing cell culture and 
improved testing reliability of real-time PCR, enabling NCLE to submit its 1st viral 
influenza isolates to the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network in the near 
future. 
•	 NCLE’s increased laboratory capabilities allowed for detection of 2009 H1N1 influenza 
by using U.S. CDC provided primers and reagent that led to the early detection of the 
pandemic virus in June 2009 with more than 270 cases subsequently identified. 
•	 NCLE received its 1st shipment of essential 

materials and reagents to support labora­
tory diagnostic functions through a 2-year 






•	 The 1st Field Epidemiology training class 

started in February 2009 through the U.S. 

CDC-WHO Lao Collaboration. Eight 

students from 5 provinces (and representation 

from the animal health sector) began a year­
long training activity consisting of three 

4-month modules: each consisting of 1 month 

classroom training and 3 months of supervised 

Participants are trained in establishing 
first-time cell culture and HIT 
capabilities for influenza viral isolation at 





           
field activity. The purpose of this training activity was to develop and 
decentralize epidemiology capabilities in support of provincial and district surveillance 
and outbreak response activities. 
Infection Control 
•	 U.S. CDC-WHO supported the training on case management and infection control 
of 2009 H1N1 influenza for 6 central hospitals (63 people), May 28–29, 2009. The 
purpose of this training workshop was to inform central hospital staff about the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, clinical management of pandemic H1N1 cases, and appropriate 
infection control measures. 
•	 A train-the-trainer course on clinical management and infection control of 2009 H1N1 
influenza in 3 regions of Lao PDR (i.e., Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, Champasak prov­
inces) was held June 23–30, 2009. The training course was attended by 256 participants. 
Principal Collaborators 
Field Staff 
Andrew Lee Corwin (Captain Ret.), PhD, MPH 
Influenza Coordinator 
American Embassy 
Rue Bartholonie, That Dam 
P. O. Box 114 
Vientiane, Lao PDR 
Viengphone Khanthamaly, MD 
U.S. CDC Assistant 
American Embassy 
Rue Bartholonie, That Dam 




Bounheuang Kounnavong, DVM 
Agricultural Scientist 
American Embassy 
Rue Bartholonie, That Dam 
P. O. Box 114 
Vientiane Capital 
Lao PDR 
U.S. CDC-WHO Collaboration 
Reiko Tsuyuoka, PhD 
World Health Organization 
125 Saphanthong Road, Unit 5, Ban Saphanthongtai, Sisattanak District 





Justin Denny, MD 
World Health Organization 
125 Saphanthong Road, Unit 5, Ban Saphanthongtai, Sisattanak District 
P. O. Box 343 
Vientiane Capital 
Lao PDR 
Irwin Law, MD 
World Health Organization 
125 Saphanthong Road, Unit 5, Ban Saphanthongtai, Sisattanak District 
P. O. Box 343 
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Capital:•	  Ulaanbaatar 
Area:•	 1,564,116 sq km 
Population:•	  3,086,918 (July 2010 est.) 
Age Structure:•	  0–14 years: 28.4% (male 433,835/ 
female 416,549); 15–64 years: 67.7% (male 
1,013,215/female 1,015,221); 65 years or older:
3.9% (male 51,093/female 66,168) (2008 est.) 
Life Expectancy at Birth:•	 Total population: 67.32 
years; male: 64.92 years; female: 69.84 years (2008 est.) 
Infant Mortality Rate:•	 Total: 41.24 deaths/1,000 
live births; male: 44.41 deaths/1,000 live births; 
female: 37.92 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.) 
Literacy Rate:•	 Total population: 97.8%; male: 98%; 
female: 97.5% (2000 census) 
GDP:•	 $9.792 billion (2008 est.) 
GDP per Capita:•	 $3,300 (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Sustainable Influenza Surveillance Networks and Response to Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza 
•	 Began August 2009. 
•	 Previous agreement (Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative 

Agreement) began September 2004 and ended August 2009.
 
Landlocked between Russia and China, Mongolia is an expansive country of sparse population 
and harsh geographic and climate extremes. The influenza surveillance cooperative agreement 
between Mongolia and U.S. CDC started in 2004 and has enabled advances in the development 
and enhancement of laboratory capacity during the past 5 years. With the support of the 
cooperative agreement, sentinel surveillance sites for outpatient and hospital-based surveillance 
have been established in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar (UB) and several provinces (i.e., 
Darkhan-uul, Dornod, Dornogobi, Khovd, Orkhon, Uvurkhangai) in the different geographic 
regions of the country. National influenza workshops have been held each year since 2005 to 
educate and update representatives of all stakeholders of the influenza pandemic preparedness 
plan. 
Surveillance 
During the 2009 influenza season, activity was low, and there was only a small increase of ILI 
cases. Sentinel site specimen collection remained vigilant throughout the year, subsequently 
detecting the 1st case of H1N1 in Mongolia in fall 2009. 
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Mongolia has 2 tiers of influenza surveillance, epidemiologic and virologic: 
•	 Epidemiologic surveillance is based on clinical diagnosis of ILI outpatient and inpatient 
visits. 
•	 Routine weekly information about ILI and all outpatient visits from all 21 provinces 
and 9 city districts of UB city. 
•	 Daily active reporting by phone about ILI for all outpatient visits at 64 sentinel sites in 
UB and 7 provinces. 
•	 Weekly active reporting by phone for pneumonia hospitalizations and all patients from 
15 hospital-based sentinel surveillance sites. 
•	 Virologic surveillance is based on daily collections of samples in sentinel sites following 
influenza virus detection by real-time RT-PCR and virus isolations by using MDCK cell 
culture and embryonated hen eggs. 
Laboratory 
•	 Routine influenza virus detection and isolation is performed at the Virology 
Department, NIC, National Center for Communicable Disease in UB. Laboratory staff 
is skilled in real-time PCR and other critical techniques for the detection of influenza 
viruses and antiviral resistance. 
•	 Mongolia joined the WHO EQAP in 2007, and the last 5 panels sent were deciphered 
100% by the NIC Mongolia laboratory. 
•	 During the 2008–09 influenza season, 6,100 samples were tested with 309 (5.1%) 
positive results, mostly seasonal influenza A (H1N1) viruses. 
•	 Thirteen representative influenza viruses were sent to WHO collaborating centers in 
Tokyo and the United States for further characterization. 
•	 During FY 2009, 522 nasopharyngeal samples were collected from SARI surveillance 
sites (i.e., Selenghe province and Baganuur district, UB ). Of these, 522 specimens were 







             
             
 
Preparedness 
The Fourth National Influenza Workshop (NIW4) was organized October 9–10, 2008 in UB. 
This meeting was well attended by 220 participants from many agencies across the Mongolian 
government: the MOH; the National Emergency Management Center; the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture; the State Professional Inspection Agency; WHO country offices; UNICEF; the 
U.S. Embassy in Mongolia; the UB city Professional Inspection Agency, VI; Health Sciences of 
University of Mongolia; NCHD; directors of health departments from 21 provinces and UB 
districts; heads of selected family general practitioners; epidemiologists; officers of emergency 
departments from all provinces and UB districts; the National Center for Communicable 
Disease (NCCD); and the Center for Infectious Diseases with Natural Focci. In addition, 
representatives from U.S. CDC, Japan, WPRO, and WHO attended. 
At NIW4, a pandemic influenza inventory assessment took place by using a modified U.S. 
CDC tool to address Mongolia’s needs. Preparedness plans began to develop at the aimak 
(county) district levels. Preparedness materials can be viewed at the NIC, Mongolia Web site: 
http://www.flu.mn/eng/index.php?option=com.content&task=view&id=110&Itemid=52. 
Other preparedness activities include 
•	 A 1-day retrospective assessment of nationwide pandemic preparedness for the 2003–04 
influenza seasons. 
•	 An evaluation of the Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan (IPPP) in Khan-Uul and 
Bayanzurkh districts of UB took place December 2008 at the NCCD with 30 
participants, including 2 district chancelleries of governors and the heads of the district 
health department, District Emergency Management Agency, district hospitals, 
epidemiologists, and physicians. 
•	 A new version of the IPPP assessment tool for provinces and UB districts is based on 
the U.S. CDC assessment tool. P. Nymadawa was appointed by the project team as a 
consultant for drafting the new tool and for organizing the entire exercise. 
•	 Five teams (25 participants) from the Mongolian government were trained and 
conducted the assessment in 21 provinces and 9 districts of UB city March 2009. 
•	 In each province or city districts, 15–25 officers from all relevant branches 
(approximately 600 officers) participated in the IPPP assessment workshops. The final 
report has been produced in English and Mongolian. Please see the report at the NIC, 
Mongolia Web site: http://www.flu.mn/eng/index.php?option=com.content&task=view 
&id=110&Itemid=53. 
Training 
Throughout 2009, staff development and training continued to be a priority for Mongolia as 
several scientists attended training in Asia, Europe, and the United States about monitoring and 
evaluation, emerging infectious diseases, SARI surveillance, and influenza burden of disease issues. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
On April 27, 2009, when WHO announced that pandemic phase alert would be raised from 
3rd to 4th because of the increasing number of 2009 H1N1 influenza virus infections in United 
States and Mexico, the Mongolian State Emergency Committee held a meeting and requested 
the related ministries and agencies take urgent actions. In Mongolia, the 1st suspected case 
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of 2009 H1N1 influenza was registered on May 6, 2009, when 7 artists from Mongolia, who 
were travelling in Mexico, returned home. They were monitored by camera at the airport in 
Moscow, and 2 of them were isolated because they were feverish. When the other 5 returned to 
Mongolia, the MOH took rapid response measures and isolated all 103 passengers and 7 aircraft 
staff at the NCCD. They were given prophylactic doses of Tamiflu and samples were taken from 
5 suspected cases. No influenza viruses were detected. Since May 2009, the NIC in Mongolia 
has been asked to investigate more than 50 suspected cases and more than 700 contact cases of 
2009 H1N1 influenza virus. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
•	 Gradual shift to test all samples collected by real time RT-PCR. 
•	 Mongolia has developed a Web site in English and Mongolian (http://www.flu.mn) for 
rapid sharing of information. The Web site has been functional since April 2009. 
Principal Collaborators 
P. Nymadawa, MD, PhD, DSc (Med) 
Principal Investigator 
Scientific Advisor and Project Director 
NIC, National Center of Communicable Diseases 
Ministry of Health, Mongolia 
Nam Yan Ju Street 1 
Bayanzurkh District 
Central Post Office: PO Box 13 
Ulaanbataar City, Mongolia 210-648 
E-mail: nymadawa@gmail.com 
B. Darmaa, MD, PhD 
Director, Department of Virology 
NIC, National Center of Communicable Diseases 
Ministry of Health, Mongolia 
Nam Yan Ju Street 1 
Bayanzurkh District 
Central Post Office: PO Box 13 
Ulaanbataar City, Mongolia 210-648 
E-mail: darmaa2001@yahoo.com 
Other Partners 
•	 World Bank, especially on IPPP activities. 
•	 National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), especially on IPPP activities. 
•	 USAID, especially on IPPP activities. 
•	 WHO, technical consultation. 
•	 Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Industry (MOFALI), surveillance of influenza 




              
                 
             
                




•	 Capital: Manila •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 21.2 deaths/1,000 live 
•	 Area: 300,000 sq km births; male: 23.86 deaths/1,000 live births; female: 
•	 Population: 18.42 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  99,900,177 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:    0–14 years: 35.5% (male •	 Total population: 92.6%; male:
92.5%; female: 92.7% (2000 census) 17,392,780/female 16,708,255); 15–64 years: 
60.4% (male 28,986,232/female 29,076,329); •	 GDP: $327.2 billion (2008 est.) 
65 years or older: 4.1% (male 1,682,485/female •	 GDP per Capita: $3,400 (2008 est.) 
2,215,602) (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 70.8 
years; male: 67.89 years; female: 73.85 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Sustainable Influenza Surveillance Networks and Response to Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza 
•	 Began August 2009. 
•	 Previous agreement (Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative 

Agreement) began September 2004 and ended August 2009.
 
The Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM) is the NIC of the Philippines and continues 
to receive the U.S. CDC grant for its 5th year of operations to complete the DISN. In addition 
to continuing its surveillance activities at established sentinel sites, the NIC initiated the influenza 
burden of disease (BOD) activity in 1 of the regions of the country, increasing its partners and 
stakeholders. The fifth year also marked the occurrence of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic 
internationally and locally, and highlighted the significance of the role of the NIC. 
Surveillance 
For FY 2009, the network maintained the number of sentinel sites it had established in the first 
4 years of the grant. 
•	 The influenza sentinel surveillance network is set up in 11 of the 17 regions of the 
Philippines. There are 17 Influenza Surveillance Officers working on influenza 
throughout the country. 
•	 A total of 23 sentinel sites were added to the existing system, increasing the number of 
sentinel sites from 35 to 54 (33 health centers, 20 hospitals, and 1 processing zone). 
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•	 A total of 16 health centers and 6 hospitals were added in the Cordillera Autonomous 
Region, where BOD activity is conducted for the Philippines. 
•	 An influenza sentinel site was opened at the One Stop Processing Zone, an immigration 
site where testing was conducted on Filipino deportees arriving in boats from Malaysia 
and Indonesia. This site was operated in collaboration with the Department of Social 
Welfare and Development and the Region IX Bureau of Quarantine. 
•	 Appropriate quality control and assurance activities were implemented on influenza 
laboratory and data management activities throughout the country. 
•	 Monitoring of sentinel sites was conducted to ensure adherence to standard operating 
procedures and validate some information collected. 
The primary activity of the NIC involves initial identification of influenza virus type and 
subtype, as well as isolation of other viruses, such as adenovirus, enterovirus, HSV-1, and RSV 
through viral culture. In addition, the NIC performs rapid viral identification for specimens 
from suspected respiratory infection outbreaks by using real-time PCR. 
•	 The NIC continued to provide representative isolates on a regular basis to the WHO 
Collaborating Center for Influenza Reference and Research, Melbourne, Australia, for 
confirmation and higher antigenic characterization. 
•	 Performance in the WHO External Quality Assessment Program (EQAP) demonstrated 
the competence of the NIC to identify seasonal influenza, and satisfied the WHO global 
standards. 
•	 The EQAP showed its proficiency in identifying avian influenza viruses by using PCR. 
•	 The NIC provided weekly updates on influenza activity in the country to the WHO 
FLUNET. 
Preparedness 
The NIC was actively involved in pandemic preparedness planning with the Department 
of Health. Discussion topics relevant to the NIC included algorithms used in specimen 
receipt, processing, testing, and communication flow of results and data. The efficiency of the 
algorithms was put to the test once pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza started in the Philippines. 
The surveillance network established under the U.S. CDC grant was pivotal in alerting health 
officials of the outbreak of H1N1 in the country. 
Influenza surveillance officers (ISOs) were crucial in extending assistance to health workers in 
the nonsentinel sites on the basis of correct specimen collection, storage, and shipment. The 
NIC was commended by the WHO-WPRO for its prompt and efficient response during the 
pandemic. As a result of working through the H1N1 pandemic, the NIC can be can be further 
strengthened through the following lessons learned: 
•	 The NIC’s surge capacity plan should be revised and upgraded on a regular basis. 
•	 Communication flow between the NIC and National Epidemiology Center (NEC) 
should be upgraded and strengthened to encourage optimal response to pandemics and 
other public health emergencies. 
•	 Data communication systems currently in place among different departments within the 
NIC should be reviewed and strengthened to enhance awareness and share information. 
•	 Future plans should include adopting a bar coding system by the NIC for specimen 
receipt, processing, and reporting of results. 
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Training 
The NIC and NEC collaborated to provide all ISOs in the sentinel sites with refresher training on 
the collection of epidemiologic, clinical, and specimen collection. This training was conducted for 
both the old and new ISOs to ensure operations across all the sites were standardized. 
•	 Intensive training was conducted in the data entry processing, cleaning, validation, and 
reporting procedures to the regional offices. 
•	 Similar training was performed among the ISOs 





•	 Nurses and medical technologists from nonsentinel 

sites and other government and private hospitals were 

trained on data and specimen collection, storage, 

and shipment immediately after the onset of the 

pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak.
 
•	 At least 10 of these training sessions were conducted 

during May–June 2009, resulting in noticeable 

improvement in the receipt of specimens for 

pandemic H1N1 processing at RITM.
 
•	 The NIC’s epidemiologist and biostatistician attended the Practical Aspects of 
Conducting Burden of Disease Studies at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, 
Australia, through a fellowship program in November and December 2008. Their 
exposure to this training will assist with conducting the BOD study. 
•	 The NIC participated in the China-ASEAN Training Course on Influenza A (H1N1) 
Laboratory Detection Techniques in Beijing, June 2009. 
To increase laboratory capacity in response, the Department of Health (DOH) upgraded and 
procured a complete line of real-time PCR equipment for 5 government hospitals, September 
2009. These hospitals included the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center in northern 
Philippines; the San Lazaro Hospital, Lung Center of the Philippines in Metro Manila; the 
Vicente Sotto General Hospital in Central Visayas, and the Davao Medical Center in southern 
Philippines. Laboratory staff were trained in these new techniques and given a certificate of 
proficiency after being tested on these techniques by the NIC. 
H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
The NIC assumed the lead role in detecting cases of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak
in the Philippines. Through the Influenza Surveillance Project, real-time PCR detection of 
circulating human and avian influenza subtypes was established at RITM. This same technology 
was adopted for detecting the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus by using primers and probes
developed by CDC and made available through the WHO. To date, more than 11,500 samples 
were tested by the NIC for the pandemic subtype. The NIC also established close links with the 
DOH and the NEC for rapid reporting of cases detected in the country. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
The network has attained broader surveillance coverage in its 5th year, thus, is confident in the 
representation of its results. The initiation of the BOD study will provide the DOH with informa­
tion critical to the development of policies relative to influenza control. Its response to the pan­
demic 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak was appropriate, timely, and gained recognition from the 




Remigio Olveda, MD, CESO III 
Principal Investigator 
Director IV, Research Institute for Tropical Medicine 
9002 Research Drive, Filinvest Corporate City 
Alabang, Muntinlupa City 1781, 
Philippines 
E-mail: rolvedamd_ritm_doh@yahoo.com 
Members of the Project Management Team (PMT) 
•	 Agnes V. Barrientos, MD. 
•	 Marilla G. Lucero, MD, PhD. 
•	 Veronica L. Tallo, PhD. 
•	 Marilu O. Venturina, CPA. 
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NIC Staff 
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Director IV, National Epidemiology Center 
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Other Partners 
•	 Regional centers for health development. 
•	 Regional Epidemiology and Surveillance Unit. 
•	 Local government units. 
•	 Bureau of Quarantine, Region IX. 
•	 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Region IX. 
•	 National Children’s Hospital, Manila. 
•	 St. Louis University Hospital, Baguio City. 
•	 Notre Dame Hospital, Baguio City. 
•	 Baguio Medical Center, Baguio City. 




Western Pacific Region 
Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community, Pacific Public Health 
Surveillance Network 
U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Developing Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative 
Agreement 
•	 Began in 2005. 
•	 FY 2008 was the 4th year of the agreement. 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) is an international organization with a 
membership of 22 Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs). Established in 1947, SPC 
was created to carry out activities on social, economic, and health issues to develop the region’s 
land, marine, and human resources. Within the framework of SPC is the Pacific Public Health 
Surveillance Network (PPHSN), which is dedicated to communicable control and surveillance 
with a specific focus on outbreak-prone diseases. 
The current Influenza Surveillance Networks Cooperative Agreement between SPC PPHSN 
and the U.S. CDC supports the development of influenza surveillance networks across a vast 
geographic area, including both the north and south Pacific, covering 10 time zones and wide 
geographic, sociopolitical, and cultural diversity. In addition to H1N1 influenza, a broad 
spectrum of outbreak-prone diseases in PICTs such as dengue, cholera, and dysentery, and 
natural disasters, including floods and tsunamis stretched the resources of SPC and PPHSN in 
FY 2009. 
Surveillance 
There was increased focus during implementation and follow-up visits on the integration of 
laboratory and ILI surveillance during FY 2009. Limited surveillance infrastructure and human 
resources in many PICTs continued to be a constraint to strengthening influenza surveillance, 
yet SPC PPHSN was able to accomplish several surveillance activities in FY 2009 that included 
•	 Increasing the number of sentinel sites to 45 located in 13 PICTs following new 

implementations and follow-up visits.
 
•	 Strengthening laboratory-based and syndromic surveillance for influenza through 
frequent follow-up visits to PICTs by project staff. 
•	 Developing a standard operating procedure for ILI surveillance and promoting its use in 
PICTs. 




•	 Training of sentinel site and laboratory personnel on how to correctly collect 
nasopharyngeal samples occurred during all implementations and follow-up visits. 
•	 Developing a joint SPC-WHO proposal for a regional approach to syndromic 
surveillance; this includes ILI and SARI syndromic surveillance. The PPHSN meeting in 
March provides a venue for PICTs to discuss this proposal. 
Laboratory 
FY 2009 saw the number of testing sites with IFA microscopy capability increase from 10 to 
14 in 13 PICTs as 4 new sites were established in 2009 in the Pacific Region. Several follow-up 
visits to PICT laboratories provided on-site training on IFA and influenza sample packaging and 
shipping. The status of infrastructure, trained staff, and resources in many PICT laboratories 
has challenged the implementation and sustainability of a laboratory-based surveillance project. 
There is a compelling need to establish a regional reference laboratory in the North Pacific to 
make significant enhancements with the public health laboratory services in the region. With 
these challenges in mind, activities leading toward stronger influenza laboratory surveillance in 
the Pacific included 
•	 Increased the number of samples sent to reference laboratories; 623 of 3,077 samples 
tested at the WHO in Melbourne since January 1, 2009, came from PICTs. 
•	 Developed and implemented standard operating procedures for laboratory influenza 
testing sites, revising SOPs as needed, during all follow-up visits. 
•	 Established streamlined sample shipping arrangements to additional reference 
laboratories (i.e., Institute of Environmental Sciences and Research, Wellington, NZ; 
Mataika House, Suva, Fiji; and Hawaii State Laboratory) that allowed faster and more 
reliable sample transport. 
•	 Worked closely with the Pacific 

Island Health Officers Association 

(PIHOA) to ship influenza samples 

for laboratories in the U.S.-affiliated 

Pacific Islands (USAPIs). PIHOA 

also provides support and technical 





•	 Supported influenza sample shipping 

arrangements from PICTs to reference 





•	 Worked towards developing a strategic 

approach for further enhancement of 

testing capabilities with stakeholders 

with the aim of implementing 

expanded PCR capabilities and 

strengthening influenza sample 








The Pacific Islands experienced severe disease outbreaks and natural disasters in FY 2009, and 
although the effects of these events were profound, the region responded to these trials by 
strengthening its network of preparedness activities. Through SPC’s Public Health Surveillance 
and Communicable Disease Control Section and the Pacific Regional Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Project (PRIPPP) of PPHSN, technical assistance and consultation on influenza 
preparedness was provided to all 22 PICTS. Some of the preparedness activities for 2009 
included 
•	 Implemented routine influenza surveillance in 4 new sites and support in 10 existing 
sites. 
•	 Strengthened sample shipping arrangements to facilitate the transportation of samples 
for outbreak-prone and emerging diseases. 
•	 Provided educational materials on the prevention of transmission of influenza. 
•	 Provided templates of educational materials to PICTs to adapt for local use, including 
the translation into local languages of key messages on cough and sneeze etiquette and 
proper use of PPE. 
A close working relationship with PRIPPP continued as the program has been involved in 
developing procurement and stockpile strategies, pandemic planning, and reviewing existing 
plans, emergency exercises, and communication plans. 
Training 
One of the major challenges with influenza surveillance in the Pacific is the shipping of samples. 
Resolution of this issue is paramount as laboratory staff throughout the PICTs were trained 
to package influenza samples according to International Airport Transport Association (IATA) 
requirements. Efforts continue to address technical training to increase laboratory capability 
throughout the Pacific. Some of these training efforts in FY 2009 were as follows: 
•	 Clinicians, nurses, and laboratory staff were trained on sample collection, storage, and 
transportation. 
•	 Presentations on influenza surveillance were provided during all implementation and 
follow-up visits. 
•	 At least 2 laboratory technicians were certified as sample shippers in each of 10 USAPI 
laboratories; the PIHOA Regional Laboratory Coordinator provided training. 
•	 Over the course of the project, 33 laboratory technicians were trained in IFA methods 




 H1N1 Activities, FY 2009 
The Pacific Islands faced an enormous 
challenge presented by the pandemic 
2009 H1N1 influenza during spring 
and summer 2009. With enhanced 
communication through PacNet 
and PacNet Restricted, the PPHSN 
Web site, and person-to-person 
communication from technical 
experts proved to be the primary 
communications tools for the region. 
Complicated solutions were needed to 
address the volume of information and conflicting data from many agencies. 
The SPC PPHSN and PICTs faced challenges in applying or modifying recommendations to 
suit the Pacific Island context. Limited surveillance infrastructure and human resources in some 
PICTs meant that fragile surveillance systems for H1N1 started slowly and were difficult to 
sustain. The SPC PPHSN used available resources to find solutions and mount a widespread 
H1N1 response that included the following: 
•	 Led discussions with WHO about options available to PICTs regarding border closure 
and quarantine. These discussions considered the International Health Regulations and 
recognized the unique situation faced by small, isolated, and vulnerable Pacific Island 
communities. 
•	 Developed posters, advisories, and guidance posters on cough and sneeze etiquette that 
were widely used throughout the region and translated into local languages. 
•	 Provided antiviral medication, PPE, and additional influenza testing reagents to PICTs. 
•	 Provided ongoing support to pandemic task forces and health personnel. Visits were 
made to Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, the Cook Islands, and Kiribati. 
•	 Encouraged and supported PICTs to develop surveillance systems and share information 
collected on PacNet during technical advisory visits. 
•	 Evaluated the response to pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza in the 22 PICTs. 
•	 Improved pandemic and risk communication is underway through a an agency 
collaboration approach among SPC, UNICEF, and WHO that focused on producing 
educational materials, media training, and developing new communication plans and 
systems. 
Notable Achievements, 2009 
During the pandemic, samples from PICTs represented the 2nd largest group of samples sent to 
WHO-Melbourne after Australian specimens. 
SPC is working with partners to facilitate a regional approach to surveillance and laboratory 
testing of influenza and other diseases. SPC led discussions with WHO about options 
available to PICTs regarding border closure and quarantine. These discussions considered the 
International Health Regulations and recognized the unique situation faced by small, isolated, 
and vulnerable Pacific Island communities. 
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At the 39th Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations and 
Conference of the Pacific Community, a meeting held in Tonga, October 2009, PICTs 
acknowledged the work of the SPC Public Health Division during a particularly challenging 
period. 
Principal Collaborators 
Justus Benzler, MD 
Principal Investigator 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Specialist 
Public Health Surveillance and Communicable Disease Control Section 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
BP D5, 98848 Noumea Cedex, New Caledonia 
E-mail: justusb@spc.int 
Tom Kiedrzynski, MD 
Epidemiologist 
Public Health Surveillance and Communicable Disease Control Section 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 




Public Health Surveillance and Communicable Disease Control Section 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
BP D5, 98848 Noumea Cedex, New Caledonia 
E-mail: salae@spc.int 
Anthony Kolbe 
Influenza Surveillance Specialist 
Public Health Surveillance and Communicable Disease Control Section 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 




Pacific Regional Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Project 
Public Health Surveillance and Communicable Disease Control Section 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 





•	 U.S. CDC (funding agency since 2005). 
•	 WHO. 
•	 PIHOA. 
•	 Ministries of Health in Pacific Island Countries and Territories. 
•	 AusAID and NZ Aid through the Pacific Regional Influenza Pandemic Preparedness 
Project implemented by SPC. 
Reference Laboratories 
•	 WHO Collaborating Center, Melbourne. 
•	 Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) Wellington, New Zealand. 
•	 Pasteur Institute, Noumea, New Caledonia. 
•	 Mataika House, Suva, Fiji. 
•	 Hawaii State Laboratory, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
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Vietnam 
•	 Capital: Hanoi •	 Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 23.61 deaths/1,000 
•	 Area: 329,560 sq km live births; male: 24.01 deaths/1,000 live; female: 
•	 Population: 23.19 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)  89,571,130 (July 2010 est.) 
•	 •	 Literacy Rate:Age Structure:  Total population: 90.3%; male:  0–14 years: 25.6% (male 
93.9%; female: 86.9% (2002 est.) 11,418,642/female 10,598,184); 15–64 years: 
68.6% (male 29,341,216/female 29,777,696); •	 GDP: $246.6 billion (2008 est.) 
65 years or older: 5.8% (male 1,925,609/female •	 GDP per Capita: $2,900 (2008 est.) 
3,055,212) (2008 est.) 
•	 Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 71.33 
years; male: 68.52 years; female: 74.33 years (2008 est.) 
U.S. U.S. CDC Direct Country Support 
Development of Influenza Surveillance Network in Vietnam 
•	 Began April 2005. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 5th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Surveillance and Response to Avian and Pandemic Influenza in Vietnam, 2006–2010 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Community Mobilization for Enhanced Surveillance and Prevention of Avian Influenza in 
Vietnam (Development of a Model) 
•	 Began September 2006. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 4th year of the cooperative agreement. 
Influenza and Other Emerging Infectious Diseases in Vietnam 
•	 Began August 2009. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 1st year of the cooperative agreement. 
239
 
Animal-Human Interface Studies: Pilot Surveillance Project for Influenza Viruses Infecting 
Humans and Animals in Vietnam 
•	 Began September 2009. 
•	 FY 2009 is the 1st year of the cooperative agreement supplement. 
Since January 2009, H5N1 outbreaks have 
resulted in 4 human cases, all of which were 
fatal. The last human case was reported in April 
2009. In total (i.e., January 2003–October 
2009), there have been 111 A (H5N1) human 
cases and 56 deaths reported from 36 provinces 
and municipalities throughout Vietnam, repre­
senting the highest rates per population experi­
enced by any country. 
In April 2009, North America confirmed cases of human infection caused by a “quadruple reas­
sortment” virus not previously detected in animals or humans. Vietnam reported its 1st case of 
pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza May 31, 2009, and its 1st death August 3, 2009. By October 
11, 2009, more than 10,000 cases had been laboratory confirmed, and more than 36 deaths 
were reported. 
In August 2009, the U.S. CDC Influenza Division placed a Veterinary Medical Epidemiologist 
in the Influenza Program of CDC-Vietnam, at the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi. Along with this 
position, the Influenza Program began the Animal-Human Interface (AHI) initiative in 
Vietnam. The Chief of the AHI initiative works in collaboration with the Chief of the Influenza 
Program. 
The AHI initiative is a collaborative effort between CDC-Vietnam and Vietnamese collabora­
tors to identify and study gaps in knowledge related to the influenza virus and other zoonotic 
diseases, such as animal-to-human transmission characteristics, virus reassortment, geographic 
cohabitation, risk of transmission, and other risk factors associated with disease transmission. 
Surveillance 
•	 Data collected from Vietnam’s 15 sentinel sites since implementation indicate that more 
than 2.4 million outpatients were screened, of whom 332,301 (14%) met the WHO 
case definition for ILI; of these, 24,012 patients were tested by RT-PCR, and 5,163 
(22%) were found to be infected with influenza viruses. 
•	 The outpatient sentinel surveillance was helpful in documenting the shift in influenza 
subtypes over the 1st several months of the pandemic. By September 2009, 52% of the 
influenza-positive samples were pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza, whereas by October, 
that proportion dramatically increased to 93%. In 2009, 50 seasonal influenza virus 
isolates were sent to the WHO Collaborating Center, Atlanta, for characterization and 
vaccine strain selection, of which 2 isolates contained the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influ­
enza strain. 
•	 The Severe Viral Pneumonia (SVP) surveillance component of the National Influenza 
Surveillance System has identified 719 cases across the country to date. Ten percent of 
these were confirmed to be caused by influenza. Of note, seasonal influenza (A/H1, 
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A/H3, and B) was responsible for more than twice the number than those caused by 
H5N1 (40 vs. 17, respectively). This component has proved to be sensitive for human 
H5N1 infections, detecting 17 of the 18 infections reported in Vietnam since the 
inception of the SVP surveillance. In the first 5 months of the current pandemic, this 
system captured 7 cases of 2009 H1N1, 2 of which were fatal. 
Laboratory 
•	 The National Institutes of Infectious and Tropical Diseases, Hanoi, and the Hospital 
for Tropical Diseases, Ho Chi Minh City, in partnership with National Institute of 
Health (NIH) / Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Oxford Research Group, 
have advanced diagnostic and research capacity to study influenza viruses, including 
pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Preparedness 
•	 Since March 2008, the U.S. CDC Influenza Division has assigned an epidemiologist 
to the WHO country office in Vietnam to provide technical support to the MOH, 
United Nations (UN) agencies, bilateral development agencies, and nongovernmental 
organizations for communicable disease surveillance and control programs, particularly 
activities related to influenza A (H5N1) and pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
The technical support has helped with developing, revising, and testing of avian 
influenza and pandemic influenza preparedness plans for the government agencies and 
organizations; coordinating activities and sharing information among partners; and 
developing and disseminating communication messages and materials. 
Training 
•	 A series of 3 training courses were held from May 1–20, 2009, to train preventative 
medicine staff on increasing capacity for avian influenza surveillance and epidemiology. 
A total of 70 participants were trained from 63 provinces, 4 regional institutes, and the 
General Department of Preventative Medicine and Environmental Health. 
•	 Two training courses were held December 2008 for preventative medicine staff at state 
and private health units on the early detection and reporting of A (H5N1) clusters and 
methods for epidemic control. The training was held for 60 preventative medicine staff 
trainees in Nha Trang and Dak Lak provinces. 
Special Influenza Projects 
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•	 An AHI pilot project was initiated in 2009 as part of a supplement to the U.S. 
CDC surveillance cooperative agreement with the National Institute of Hygiene and 
Epidemiology (NIHE). The AHI initiative, which is part of the Influenza Program, 
U.S. CDC-Vietnam, including the in-country placement of a veterinary medical 
epidemiologist and a medical epidemiologist, works side-by-side with MOH and 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development professionals to find people, pigs, 
and poultry living in close proximity, and seeks to determine how the influenza virus 
is transmitted from animals to humans and vice versa. During the study, human and 
animal health workers at the commune level will identify people confirmed to have the 
current 2009 H1N1 influenza strain of the pandemic influenza virus and who live in 
close proximity to pigs and poultry. Samples will be collected for laboratory analysis, 
which will allow NIHE and National Center for Veterinary Diagnostics scientists to 
determine human and animal populations potentially at risk. With this information, 
scientists will be able to follow exposed populations of animals and study which risk 
factors lead to dangerous genetic mutation of the influenza virus. 
•	 A newly developed U.S. CDC cooperative agreement for research on influenza and 
other emerging infections was approved 2009. This cooperative agreement will address 
molecular co-evolution of human and avian influenza viruses in Vietnam, burden of 
influenza illness studies, development of risk factor studies, and evaluation of new 
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Research and Training 
The Influenza Division’s international programs conduct a wide range of laboratory, clinical, 
and epidemiologic research. The general goals of the research address critical gaps in knowledge 
that advance programs towards prevention and treatment of influenza. Areas of research include 
the following: clinical studies to evaluate the effectiveness of antiviral medications and vaccines; 
the development of new diagnostic tests; work to understand risk factors for severe influenza 
infection; laboratory studies to better design vaccines and improve vaccine production; work 
to understand the effect of influenza on various populations; studies of the interface between 
animals and humans; and other areas. The research agenda is designed to complement and 
extend the core programmatic work of the Influenza Division in building capacity for influenza 





Meeting on Influenza Research and Preparedness at 
the Animal-Human Interface 
During April 1–3, 2009, the 2nd meeting on Influenza Research and Preparedness at the 
Animal-Human Interface was held at U.S. CDC. The purpose of the meeting was to provide 
updates on the research activities of the Avian Influenza Cooperative Research Centers and 
to enhance communication and coordination among investigators, U.S. CDC, and human 
and animal health authorities regarding influenza research at the animal-human interface. A 
second goal of the meeting was to improve preparedness at the animal-human interface through 
discussions of the animal and public health agency roles, responsibilities, notification plans, 
communication strategies, and plans of action related to the detection of potential or confirmed 
human novel influenza A infections in the United States. 
To facilitate this planning, 3 brief tabletop exercises that simulated the detection of novel 
zoonotic swine, avian, and human influenza A infection in the United States were performed. 
This meeting was attended by zoonotic influenza researchers, animal and health officials 
from the United States and other countries that had previous experience with the detection 
and control of H5N1 and other novel influenza A viruses, U.S. CDC, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of the Interior staff, and other guests from academia, 
professional animal and health organizations, and the poultry and pork industries. 
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Influenza Reagent Resource’s (IRR’s) roles in pandemic preparedness and influenza research are 
•	 To manufacture and distribute influenza diagnostic kits, viruses, and reagents to public 
health, commercial, domestic, and international research laboratories. 
•	 To improve pandemic preparedness, enhance detection and control of seasonal 

influenza, and provide better access to reagents via a secure, Web-based system.
 
•	 To augment U.S. CDC’s international pandemic preparedness plan to provide a surge 
option (~$10+ M per year) which can be exercised to distribute reagents and diagnostic 
kits to domestic and international public health laboratories. 
During the H1N1 pandemic, U.S. CDC and IRR coordinated with WHO to provide RT-PCR 
H1N1 and seasonal influenza diagnostic kits and other materials to 150 countries supporting 
more than 300 laboratories internationally. These kits and reagents were also provided to more 
than 120 public health laboratories domestically in 50 states and territories. IRR also facilitated 
the manufacture and distribution of an H1N1 supplemental WHO influenza reagent kit to 
approximately 100 laboratories globally and the 2009–2010 WHO influenza reagent kit to 
more than 150 laboratories globally. 










# State Labs 
Distributed 
Total Kits 
Int & Dom 
H1N1 RT-PCR 873 665 
50 + DC+ 
PR 124 
1,538 
516Seasonal RT-PCR 118 
150 306 
398 
WHO H1N1 HI 
Supplemental 44 36 44 48 43 48 92 
WHO H1N1 
HI Kit 96 79 96 71 45 71 167 
In addition to augmenting the H1N1 pandemic response, IRR will provide better access to 
quality influenza-related reagents by manufacturing and distributing influenza viruses a la carte 
and as panels, recombinant proteins, antisera, monoclonal antibodies, RNA standards, nonin­
fluenza respiratory pathogens and more. Institutions that have access to these reagents are quali­
fied domestic and international WHO national influenza centers and public health laboratories, 
commercial test developers, vaccine manufacturers, and research institutions. 
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Burden of Disease and Risk 
Factors 
Bangladesh 
Population-based Surveillance in Kamalapur 
Kamalapur is a densely populated, urban, low-income community in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where 
influenza surveillance has been ongoing since 2004. The study in this community will measure 
the incidence of influenza, assess the proportion of persons infected with pandemic influenza 
(H1N1) who develop severe illness, measure the rate of secondary household transmission of 
influenza, and characterize the full spectrum of illness among persons who are infected with 
pandemic influenza. Because this site was established before the emergence of A (H1N1) 
influenza, it has been invaluable in understanding the epidemiology of pandemic influenza. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Several manuscripts have been submitted for publication during 2009, and more are being 
drafted to share this site’s important findings. 
Mirpur Population-based Study 
This study aims to assess the rate of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza in relation to attributable 
risk of secondary tobacco exposure, indoor air pollution, and infrequent handwashing to the 
frequency, duration, or severity of laboratory-confirmed influenza. The study also explores 
genome-wide associations (e.g., potential associations between single nucleotide polymorphisms 
in genes involved in the toll-like receptor signaling immune response pathway) with duration 
and severity of 2009 H1N1 influenza. In addition, the study assesses potential associations 
among the duration and severity of influenza disease and delayed cognitive development in a 
birth cohort of Mirpur children participating in an ongoing amebiasis study. 
Initial Findings and Progress 
Preliminary data analyses of the 1st year of incidence of respiratory viruses and household data 
is ongoing. 
Surveillance and Epidemiology of Influenza 
The purpose of this study was to estimate national influenza rates among outpatient populations 
in Bangladesh by establishing surveillance at sentinel hospitals and clinics throughout 
Bangladesh. 
Findings and Conclusions 
This study is entering its 3rd year of data collection and has yielded important estimates of 
national influenza rates among outpatient populations. The findings from the 1st phase of this 
study were instrumental for guiding pandemic response (e.g., allocating masks and oseltamivir 
to rural hospitals during the 1st phase of the pandemic). A manuscript presenting these data has 
been prepared and is currently under review. The study now intends to provide robust burden of 
disease data from hospitalized case-patients, estimate mortality rates, and quantify the pandemic 




       
              
              
           
 
Analyses of Pandemic 2009 (H1N1) Epidemiology 
Investigators at IEDCR and ICDDR,B have compiled data from all laboratory-confirmed 
pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza case-patients to quantify and explore their epidemiologic 
characteristics, including case severity, case fatality rates, association with risk factors for severe 
disease, and secondary attack rates. 
Findings and Conclusions 
The preliminary findings of this investigation have been published in an open-source journal 
and are being updated for publication in a peer-reviewed journal to guide regional response to 
the pandemic. The data were useful to WHO and other international partners in assessing the 
epidemiology and severity of the pandemic. 
Cambodia 
U.S. CDC-Supported Studies at the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 
2 (NAMRU-2) Detachment, Cambodia—Surveillance Initiation at 9 Health 
Centers Outside Phnom Penh 
Although greatly improving, Cambodia still lacks sufficient information on the epidemiology, 
clinical presentation, and etiology of infectious diseases, including influenza. 
Approach 
To improve public health interventions beginning in December 2006, NAMRU-2 initiated 
surveillance at 9 health centers in 2 provinces outside Phnom Penh. Patients 2 years and older 
with acute fever (i.e., temperature greater than 38°C) of at least 24 hours in duration were 
enrolled following written informed consent. 
Timeline 
The study is planned to continue until 2012. 
Progress and Initial Conclusion 
Our data published in Epidemiology and Infection in 2009 suggested that 15.1% of 2,257 patients 
were RT-PCR–positive for influenza. When compared to influenza-negative patients, influenza-
positive patients were more likely to have cough and sore throat. Each year, influenza peaked 
during the rainy season. In 2008, the predominant subtype was A H1N1 and antigencially related 
to A/Solomon Island/O3/2006. Data suggested that influenza was an important contributor to 
health care use with nearly 1 in 5 fever patients infected with this virus. 
U.S. CDC-Supported Studies at the U.S. NAMRU-2 Detachment, Cambodia— 
Burden of Disease in 2 Cambodian Communes 
Purpose,Approach, and Timeline 
In mid-2009, to further characterize the burden of disease from influenza, we established a 
longitudinal study of 15,500 persons residing in 2 Cambodian communes with the help of 
the MOH. At baseline, persons were polled to obtain health care use patterns and estimate 
the incidence of influenza morbidity and mortality. Passive surveillance will be established at 5 




Progress and Initial Conclusion 
Census results suggested that during the 2-week reporting period, which was the peak season for 
influenza, 18% of patients reported having symptoms consistent with an ILI. Of these patients, 
only 5% sought care at a government clinic, whereas most sought help at a pharmacy or from a 
private medical clinic. In addition to research, this site will be used to train government staff on 
methods for studying influenza epidemiology and interventions. The study will continue for 5 
years. 
CDC-Pasteur Cambodia Study—Epidemiology of Human Influenza in Kampong 
Cham Province, Cambodia, 2008–2009 
Population-based surveillance for influenza has never been conducted in Cambodia in the past. 
Information on disease burden of influenza in Cambodia is lacking, but is critical to create data 
to support possible introduction of seasonal influenza vaccination in this country. 
Approach 
•	 Prospective, active, community-based surveillance for estimating the incidence of 
influenza in 20 semirural villages in 2–3 districts in Kampong Cham Province (one of 
the most populated provinces in Cambodia), as well as 5 districts in Kampong Cham 
City. Persons of all ages with a documented fever of greater than or equal to 38°C are 
eligible for enrollment. 
•	 Case-control study to determine risk factors for severe outcomes of influenza by using 
patients recruited under a current hospital-based study (Kampong Cham Provincial 
Hospital) on etiologies of acute lower respiratory infections (SISEA). 
•	 Population-based, active, death surveillance in a high-risk area by using verbal autopsies 
for estimating frequency of influenza-related mortality and risk factors. 
Timeline 
The project began in early 2009 and is expected to conclude in the 2nd half of 2010. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Case enrollment at the community and hospital levels is ongoing. 
Kenya 
Transmission of Pandemic and Seasonal H1N1 in Urban and Rural Communities 
in Kenya 
The justification is to understand better household and community transmission of seasonal and 
pandemic influenza. 
Approach 
Weekly visits to all households in Kibera and Lwak catchment areas combined with surveillance 
at a free clinic will allow us to trace the spread of laboratory-confirmed influenza among 




Weekly surveillance started September 2009 in Kibera and will likely start November 2009 in 
Lwak. Biweekly surveillance has been ongoing since 2006. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Analyses on seasonal influenza transmission patterns are currently being conducted. 
India 
Population-based, Longitudinal Burden of Disease Study of Influenza in India 
The burden of disease related to influenza virus infection in India is not yet well defined but 
likely to be substantial given that India accounts for 20% of global childhood deaths caused 
by acute respiratory infections. To address this issue, a population-based, longitudinal, burden 
of disease study has been implemented at 2 sites in rural India, both of which have ongoing 
community and demographic surveillance systems. 
Study Aims and Objectives 
•	 Estimate the incidence of laboratory-confirmed influenza among persons hospitalized 
for acute respiratory illnesses and acute exacerbations of chronic medical conditions. 
•	 Characterize the clinical spectrum of inpatient and outpatient disease related to 
influenza; evaluate different clinical case definitions and syndromes to predict influenza; 
and describe the seasonality of influenza. 
•	 Determine risk factors for severe disease caused by influenza, including underlying 
chronic conditions, demographics, smoking, and socioeconomic status. 
•	 Describe the health care use of the population and define the burden of respiratory 
disease for those who did not seek care or refused hospitalization for severe respiratory 
illness. Describe obstacles to care. 
•	 Estimate the annual mortality rate from severe respiratory disease and influenza in the 
population. 
Approach 
Persons living in the Ballabhgarh (Delhi suburb) and Vadu (Pune suburb) Demographic 
Surveillance Study areas that seek inpatient medical attention and meet the specific study 
enrollment case definition are enrolled in the study. Clinical and epidemiologic information and 
oropharyngeal and nasal swab specimens are collected from all consenting and enrolled persons, 
as per protocols. As of October 2009, Ballabhgarh has enrolled more than 3,300 households; 
1,900 patients have been screened; and 77 patients have been enrolled, of which 7 are 
laboratory-confirmed to be positive for influenza. Likewise, Vadu has enrolled 954 households, 
screened 1,054 patients, and enrolled 423 patients, of which 56 are positive for influenza. The 
study is in progress to determine the incidence of influenza, especially the presence of novel 
H1N1 in these communities. 
Timeline 





Enhanced SARI Surveillance during the 2009–2010 Pandemic 
The epidemiology of novel H1N1 infection in tropical countries is not well described. On June 
24, 2009, novel H1N1 was 1st identified in Indonesia. To characterize the epidemiology of 
novel H1N1 in Indonesia, we implemented enhanced surveillance for hospitalized patients with 
SARI in a network of 12 hospitals in Tangerang District, Indonesia, in early June 2009. 
Approach 
We identified all hospitals that manage patients with respiratory illness in Tangerang District 
and trained clinicians to identify SARI patients, collected clinical specimens, and completed 
a standardized case investigation form. Throat and nasal swabs were tested by RT-PCR in the 
Indonesian NIC by using primers from the U.S. CDC. 
Timeline 
Surveillance was implemented in late June 2009 and will continue throughout 2010. 
Progress 
During June 28–September 3, 2009, we identified 216 patients with SARI, including 19 
patients (9%) with novel H1N1 infection. Patients with novel H1N1 infection were identified 
in 7 hospitals and ranged in age from 11 months to 54 years (median age 20 years); 59% were 
male. The age specific rate for hospitalization ranged from 5.7 per 100,000 population in 
persons 0–4 years of age to 0 among persons more than 60 years of age. The number of patients 
with novel H1N1 infection peaked in mid-July, which is the low season for seasonal influenza 
transmission in Banten, Indonesia. The median time from symptom onset to hospital admission 
was 2 days, ranging 1–8 days. Six patients with novel H1N1 infection had complicated courses 
of illness, including 2 patients who died. Among the 19 patients with novel H1N1, 6 had 
underlying medical conditions, including asthma and tuberculosis. All patients with novel 
H1N1 infection were treated with oseltamivir. 
Conclusion 
We observed a rapid rise in the number of SARI patients with novel H1N1 infection shortly 
after introduction of this virus in Indonesia. The age distribution, clinical features, and 
mortality of hospitalized patients are similar to that observed in other countries. We anticipate 
much higher rates of disease during peak season for influenza transmission in Indonesia. This 
work will continue to monitor influenza after the pandemic. 
Kenya 
Population-based Surveillance for Influenza and Other Respiratory Diseases in 
Nairobi and Kisumu, Kenya 
The purpose of this project is to understand the burden of influenza and other respiratory 
viruses in an urban and rural setting in an equatorial African country, and to understand the 





In each catchment area (approximately 25,000 people per catchment area), weekly household 
visits are performed to record episodes of respiratory illness. All residents have access to a free 
clinic in each site where samples are collected, if patients meet the case definition criteria for 
ILI or SARI. In Kisumu, the clinic is attached to an inpatient facility. In Kibera, follow-up is 
performed on patients who are hospitalized at the referral hospital. 
Timeline 
Started October 2006; no scheduled end date. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Burden analysis is currently being done; projected draft of results are expected December 2009. 
Case-Control Study to Assess Risk Factors for Severe Influenza Infection, 
Bondo, Kenya, 2007–2009. 
This project was conducted to understand risk factors for severe influenza infection. 
Approach 
Cases from active hospital-based surveillance in Bondo District, Western Kenya, were selected, 
and age-matched community controls have been identified. Approximately 60 cases and twice 
as many controls have been identified. 
Timeline 
Enrollment is complete. Analysis is being completed. A draft manuscript is projected for 
December 2009. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Initial findings identified potential risk factors for infection. 
Surveillance for Hospital-Acquired Infections, Kenya 
This project was undertaken to understand the burden of hospital-associated respiratory 
infections (HAIs) in Kenya and the relative contribution of influenza and other viruses to HAIs. 
Approach 
Surveillance has been established in multiple wards in 3 hospitals in Kenya. Testing for multiple 
pathogens is conducted at the CDC-Kenya IEIP laboratory. 
Timeline 
Surveillance started July 2009 and is scheduled to continue for 2 years with a plan for the 
introduction of interventions, such as improved safe water access after the 1st year. 
Preliminary results are expected early 2010. 
Prospective Evaluation of Admitted Patients with Pandemic H1N1 in Kenya 
The purpose of this prospective evaluation is to understand the clinical presentation, course, and 




Surveillance is being performed on all H1N1 patients admitted to area hospitals. Standard data 
are being collected on H1-positive patients. 
Timeline 
Surveillance is ongoing. 
Peru 
NMRCD-CDC Burden of Illness and Risk Factors for Transmission of Seasonal 
Influenza in 4 Distinct Regions of Peru 
The epidemiology, incidence, and economic burden of influenza disease are not well 
characterized in Peru. 
Approach 
This study includes a prospective cohort to estimate incidence and disease burden and assess 
risk factors and seasonality patterns for influenza (i.e., seasonal and pandemic H1N1 influenza), 
and to evaluate alternative routes of viral transmission. To accomplish these goals, a prospective 
population-based cohort study was implemented in 4 locations that are representative of the 
geographic and climatic diversity of Peru (i.e., coastal, highlands, jungle, tropical dry forest) for 
a 3-year period, June 2009–June 2012). 
A total of 375 households (i.e., approximately 1,500 persons per site) are enrolled in each 
location. ILI screening is conducted 3 times each week among each of the household’s 
occupants (active site visits). Once ILI cases have been identified, they are sampled by using 
throat and nose swabs for laboratory identification of etiologic agent. In addition, they receive 
follow-up visits for 15 days to assess the economic burden of influenza by using in-depth 
questionnaires. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
As a result of this active surveillance, we have identified 938 ILI cases; 540 (44%) were positive 
for H1N1. We have also identified a cumulative attack rate of 7.7% for H1N1 and 3.3% for 
other etiologies in Lima. Data generated throughout this study will allow us to determine 
groups at high risk for influenza infection. This data will allow Peruvian policy makers and 
program managers to make more informed decisions regarding development of prevention 
and control measures for the country. Furthermore, our data will likely be quite useful in 





Development and Validation 
of Enhanced Surveillance and 
Diagnostics 
Evaluation of Case Definitions for SARI Associated with Influenza 
To understand the burden of influenza worldwide, appropriate and standard methods to 
identify cases are required. U.S. CDC and others have advanced SARI as a surveillance 
and research case definition in recent years. U.S. CDC has engaged partners in projects to 
understand how well SARI captures the true burden of influenza and other respiratory viruses. 
Work in Guatemala, Egypt, and Thailand IEIP sites have been undertaken in recent years, 
and this work will lead to improved surveillance guidelines and the ability to understand the 
influenza-associated disease burden across regions and sites. 
Kazakhstan 
Validation of a Real-Time PCR Test Commercially Available in Central Asia for 
the Detection of Influenza A and B Viruses 
For logistical reasons, it is more convenient and less expensive for the regional laboratories in 
Kazakhstan to use commercial influenza primers from Russia (Amplisense) than to use the 
primers provided by U.S. CDC for real-time PCR testing of respiratory specimens. Very limited 
comparison testing suggests that the Amplisense kits work well, but a larger sample is needed to 
confirm this data. 
Approach 
Seven sentinel site laboratories will use Amplisense to detect influenza A and B. All positive 
results and a subset of negative results will be sent to the RSES for testing by using U.S. CDC 
primers and protocols. The sensitivity and specificity of the Amplisense tests will be calculated 
by using the U.S. CDC test results as a reference (gold standard). 
Timeline 
The timeline for this project is Kazakhstan’s influenza season, which is week 39 of 2009 to week 
16 of 2010. 
Kenya 
Comparative Study of Relative Yield of Nasopharyngeal (NP) Swabs Versus 
Oropharyngeal (OP) Swabs in Detecting Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza, 
Kenya 





Surveillance samples in 2 refugee camps in Kenya (i.e., Dadaab and Kakuma) are being separat­
ed into separate cryovials and tested separately. Testing for influenza is performed at the CDC-
Kenya IEIP laboratory. 
Timeline 
The project started May 2009 and is expected to continue for a year. Preliminary analysis will be 
performed November 2009. 
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Influenza Prevention Projects 
Bangladesh 
Prevalent, High-Risk, Respiratory Hygiene Practices in Urban and Rural 
Bangladesh 
The 1st phase of this project, which aimed to explore and pilot scalable nonpharmaceutical 
interventions to improve respiratory hygiene, documented that study participants frequently 
coughed or sneezed into the air and did not wash their hands after covering their mouth or nose 
while coughing or sneezing. The study suggests that culturally appropriate, cost-effective, and 
scalable interventions need to be developed in order to improve respiratory hygiene practices 
and assess their effectiveness in reducing respiratory pathogen transmission. 
A manuscript that details study findings is being circulated for review and publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal. Investigators are preparing the concept and funding requests for the next 
phase of the study that plans to assess the health effects of a scalable public health intervention 
to improve respiratory hygiene. 
Prevention of Secondary Transmission of Novel A (H1N1) Influenza by 
Promoting Handwashing with Soap (BISTIS Study) 
This study, which is completing its 1st phase, measures the secondary attack ratio of influenza 
among household contacts of index cases with influenza, tests the efficacy of an intervention 
promoting handwashing with soap for prevention of intrahousehold transmission of influenza, 
and identifies risk factors, other than handwashing with soap, for intrahousehold transmission 
of influenza in rural setting. 
Initial Findings and Progress 
This study will be entering its 2nd phase during 2010, at which time a series of manuscripts to 
share findings from phase one will be drafted and shared with stakeholders. 
India 
Direct and Indirect Protection by Influenza Vaccine Given to Children in India 
Influenza vaccines are in routine use in children in the United States, and although licensed 
in India, they are seldom given. Indeed, it is not known whether influenza vaccine efficacy 
in a tropical, developing country will be the same as in developed countries. This study will 
determine whether immunization of young children with influenza virus vaccine will protect the 
immunized children and older children and adults who are around them. By undertaking these 
studies in India, the 2nd most populous country in the world, information can be obtained that 
will be useful in India and in other tropical, developing countries. 
Approach 
This study is being conducted in 3 rural villages outside of Delhi, India. It has 2 parts: weekly 
household surveillance for FARI for persons of age groups, and vaccination of children aged 6 
months to 10 years (randomized at the household level) with either Trivalent Influenza Vaccine 
(TIV) or the control vaccine, IPV. FARI surveillance data will be used to evaluate the direct 
effects of vaccination among children, as well as the effect of vaccinating only children on the 
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incidence of influenza among these older persons (herd immunity). The total population under 
surveillance for all 3 villages is approximately 20,000, with an estimated 3,500 children eligible 
for vaccination. In addition, a small subset of vaccinated children (n = 200) will be enrolled into 
an immunogenicity study, which will measure their immune response to vaccination and risk 
factors affecting immunogenicity. 
Progress 
The site preparatory work, site sensitization, and training of field and laboratory staff have 
been completed. Successful development of a household randomization strategy to address the 
direct effects of influenza vaccine protection has been completed. All required human subject 
approvals and drug controller clearances have been obtained. Proformas developed, piloted, 
and data management issues are being addressed. A vaccine campaign will start by the end of 
November 2009. 
Timeline 
July 2008–June 2011 
Senegal 
Direct and Indirect Protection by Influenza Vaccine Given to Children in 
Senegal 
Influenza vaccines are in routine given to children in the United States, and although licensed in 
Senegal, they are seldom given. It is not known whether influenza vaccine efficacy in a tropical, 
developing country will be the same as in developed countries. This study will determine 
whether immunization of young children with influenza virus vaccine will protect the 
immunized children and the older children and adults who are around them. By undertaking 
these studies in Senegal, information can be obtained that will be useful in Senegal and in other 
tropical, developing countries. 
Approach 
This study is being conducted in a rural site in Niakhar, Senegal. The total population under 
surveillance is approximately 18,000, with an estimated 3,500 children eligible for vaccination. 
Twenty communities have been randomized into 2 arms of 10. In 1 arm, all children aged 6 
months to 10 years receive the southern formulation of trivalent inactivated vaccine (TIV). In 
the other arm, children receive inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). Weekly household surveillance 
for febrile acute respiratory illness for persons of all age groups will be conducted. Both the 
total (direct plus indirect) effects of vaccination among children, as well as the indirect effect 
on unvaccinated persons in the community, will be measured. In addition, a small subset of 
vaccinated children have been enrolled into an immunogenicity study that will measure their 
immune response to vaccination and risk factors affecting immunogenicity. 
Progress 
The study completed vaccination in June 2009 and is nearing the end of a complete year of 
follow-up among communities. The 2nd round of vaccination will be underway in May and 
June 2010. 
Timeline 





Household Influenza Transmission in Bangkok and Effectiveness of 
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions To Reduce Transmission 
The influenza section of the U.S. CDC IEIP in Thailand collaborates with the Queen Sirikit 
National Institute of Child Health and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences 
to conduct a study of household influenza transmission (HITS) in Bangkok. 
Approach 
HITS enrolls the families of children with laboratory-confirmed influenza infection to study 
the effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions to reduce influenza transmission. Index 
cases are prospectively identified by rapid influenza testing and then confirmed by RT-PCR 
testing. Consenting households are randomized to 1 of 3 study arms: control, handwashing, 
and handwashing plus surgical face mask use. To identify secondary infections, research nurses 
conduct home visits on days 1, 3, and 7 following enrollment. During these visits, respiratory 
swab specimens are collected from all household members and tested for influenza. The 
duration of viral shedding is also measured in the pediatric index cases from each household. 
Finally, blood is drawn from participants for antibody testing to detect mild and asymptomatic 
influenza infections. 
Timeline 
Enrollment began in April 2008, and as of October 2009, 499 households had been enrolled. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Secondary transmission of influenza has occurred in 37% of all households and 18% of all 
family members. More than 90% of ill children in the HITS study sleep in the same room 
as their parents, a factor that may explain the high secondary transmission rates. Preliminary 
analysis has not demonstrated a protective effect of the interventions against secondary influenza 
infections. Further analysis is ongoing. The human and laboratory infrastructure established to 
conduct the HITS study has also been used to study the performance of influenza rapid tests 







Assessment of Health-Seeking Behaviors and Animal-to-Human Interface 
Approach 
Involving 1,200 households (principal sampling unit) from paraurban and rural communities in 
Laos, this work will be carried out in collaboration with CARE International and the National 
University for Health Sciences, Laos. 
Proposed Timeline 
•	 Design completed January 2009. 
•	 Training completed March 2009. 
•	 Field activities March–April 2009. 
•	 Analysis June–July 2009. 
•	 Presentation and publication March–April 2010. 
Bangladesh 
Avian Influenza Surveillance, Influenza A Surveillance in Bangladesh Poultry 
During the Pandemic 
This surveillance aims to identify any influenza A strains that are cocirculating in domestic 
poultry in Bangladesh to identify poultry die-off caused by influenza and related viral disease 
and to conduct passive surveillance in order to identify unusual poultry die-off suspected of 
novel influenza. Findings of this surveillance system have demonstrated that outbreaks of 
influenza A (H5N1) and other viruses are circulating concurrently with pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza. 
Serosurvey Among Poultry Workers Exposed to Influenza A (H5N1) 
The investigative team has recently collected epidemiologic data and serum from people who 
worked in farms with influenza A (H5N1). The team has also completed data collection 
among persons in rural Bangladesh who work at poultry wet markets. At the end of the study, 
during 2010, investigators intend to quantify rates of seroconversion among poultry workers 
to influenza A (H5N1) and other avian influenza viruses—an important issue in a country in 
which 69% of the population raise poultry as an important protein source. 
National Influenza Surveillance and a Case-Control Study on Avian Influenza 
These complementary projects are collecting national representative information about poultry-
rearing practices and exploring risk factors for the infection of backyard poultry and dispersion 
of avian influenza in the community. Data collection is entering its final quarter of 2009 but 
is expected to continue during 2010. Preliminary findings suggest that current multilateral 
response efforts may be ineffective to control avian influenza. These preliminary findings are 
being incorporated into manuscripts to help guide regional response to avian influenza. 
265
 
Evaluation of CARE Intervention To Promote Safer Animal Husbandry 
This study intends to assess community awareness before and after and adoption of government 
recommended avian influenza prevention strategies. Baseline findings have been sent to local 
health authorities. These findings suggest that the rural population of Bangladesh is unaware 
of the risk posed by influenza circulating among poultry. A peer-reviewed manuscript is being 
prepared for the wider dissemination of study findings pending the postintervention evaluation. 
CARE Bangladesh will complete its intervention to promote the safer husbandry of poultry 
during early 2010 when the postintervention evaluation will take place. 
Avian Influenza Ethnographies 
IEDCR and ICDDR employ the expertise of anthropologists who are exploring how people 
in rural Bangladesh raise poultry and perceive avian influenza outbreaks. The findings of this 
ethnography have yielded a wealth of information that challenges traditional concepts of 
community education as a mainstay of avian influenza prevention and control. Findings have 
been shared among regional stakeholders, and a 2nd phase of these projects intends to develop 
scalable, culturally appropriate interventions that may have more effect than those currently 
promulgated by international bodies. 
Cambodia 
Active Surveillance for Avian Influenza Viruses in Rural Adults, Cambodia 
Approach 
NAMRU-2 and U.S. CDC in Bangkok completed a full year of active surveillance for avian 
influenza viruses among 1,600 rural adults. Each week, field staff follows up with enrolled 
adults in their homes and asks about influenza symptoms. If symptomatic, serum samples and 
throat and nasal swabs are obtained. Serum samples are also collected at baseline and annually 
thereafter. 
Timeline 
The study will continue for 2 additional years. 
Progress and Initial Conclusion 
At baseline, Cambodia serology data suggested that high and low pathogenic avian influenza 
virus infections were rare events, despite adults being routinely exposed to poultry. Preliminary 
data from Thailand indicated that H5 infections were slightly more common but final 
confirmation is pending. 
Kenya 
Surveillance in Migratory Birds in Kenya 
Surveillance has been conducted to understand the prevalence and distribution of circulating 




Annual surveillance is performed on birds at multiple sites around Kenya before, during, and 
after the migratory bird season. This project is a joint one with Walter Reed Project, Kenya 
National Museums, and the Division of Veterinary Services, Kenya. Testing was performed at 
CDC-Kenya laboratories with additional testing at U.S. CDC in Atlanta. Results are pending. 
Timeline 
The study started 2006 and will continue through 2010. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
A summary of the first 3 years is being drafted. 
Analysis of Poultry Trade Networks, Kenya 
The spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) around the world has been a source of great 
concern for several years. H5N1 has been reported in birds in more than 60 countries, and 
understanding how the virus spreads globally will help predict transmission patterns and design 
better intervention and control measures. Some debate exists about whether the virus is spread 
primarily through the movements of migratory birds or through the international trade of 
poultry. 
Approach 
The Influenza Division has collaborated with the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture, Division of 
Veterinary Services to undertake an analysis of poultry trade in Kenya. The project seeks to use 
network analysis to characterize the density of the trade network and then model the spread 
of virus through this network to gain a better understanding of the role that trade might play 
in the spread of avian influenza. A better understanding of poultry trade networks will aid in 
developing interventions to stop the spread of virus in areas prone to sustained transmission 
through domestic poultry populations. 
Poultry Trade Network Analysis, Kenya 
This study is being conducted to understand the national poultry trade network so that timely 
and effective interventions can be implemented in the case of an avian influenza outbreak. 
Approach 
Joint project with U.S. CDC and the Department of Veterinary Services, Kenya. Extensive 
interviews with poultry owners, sellers, and market workers are conducted to understand trade 
network. 
Timeline 
The study started in 2008 and will conclude in 2009. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
The analysis is ongoing. A report is expected in late 2009. 
Live Bird Market Surveillance, Kenya 
The purpose of this project is to understand the prevalence and distribution of circulating avian 




              
               
             




             
            
 
Approach 
In collaboration with the Department of Veterinary Services, a sampling of market birds is done 
monthly at the same 5 markets. Testing will be performed at the CDC-Kenya IEIP laboratory, 
DVS laboratories. 
Timeline 
The study started March 2009 and is planned for 2 years. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
Awaiting testing at new avian BSL-3 laboratory in Kisumu (expected to be functional 
November 2009). 
Nigeria 
Survey of Knowledge,Attitudes, and Practices Related to Reporting of Suspect 
Human Cases of Avian Influenza and Other Notifiable Infectious Diseases in 
Nigeria 
An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in poultry was detected in Nigeria in 
January 2006 with continued sporadic reports of outbreaks in birds. In January 2007, the 1st 
human case of avian influenza H5N1 was identified. A broad range of public health response 
and control measures were undertaken in response to this threat, including strengthening the 
detection and reporting of priority diseases, such as avian influenza. 
Approach 
To understand the barriers to complete and timely reporting of priority diseases by health care 
workers, a survey of physicians working at urban public hospitals is being conducted in 6 large 
cities in Nigeria. The knowledge, attitudes, and practices of these physicians related to their 
reporting of human avian influenza infections and other priority notifiable infectious diseases will 
be evaluated. The sources of information and types of information technology that physicians
routinely use to acquire new medical and public health knowledge will also be assessed to improve
efforts to effectively disseminate public health communications intended for physicians. 
Peru 
Occupational Exposure to Zoonotic Influenza in Peru 
In an effort to better understand transmission of zoonotic influenza to humans after intense 
occupational exposure to swine and avian species (i.e., backyard poultry, backyard swine, formal 
and formal poultry and swine farmers, slaughter houses, live bird markets, game-bird breeders), 
we will conduct a prospective, 3-year cohort study of transmission of zoonotic influenza among 
1,500 adults exposed to swine and birds. 
The objectives of the study are to determine the prevalence of antibodies to avian and swine
influenza among humans, particularly against those strains that have been shown to possess the 
ability to cross the human-avian-swine species barrier; estimate the incidence of zoonotic influenza 
infection; determine risk factors for zoonotic influenza infection; study the presence of influenza




The study will be conducted in areas of Peru with large concentrations of potentially exposed 
humans. Questionnaires and serum collections from participants will be obtained at 0, 12, 24, 
and 36 months. Active surveillance for influenza virus infections among human participants 
and related animal populations will be performed. During the active surveillance, if participants 
develop ILI, they will be asked to seek medical attention within 48 hours of symptom 
development at specific medical treatment facilities where a medical worker will collect 2 
pharyngeal swabs for virus detection and collect epidemiologic information from participants. 
Serologic assays, RT-PCR, viral isolation, and nucleic acid sequencing will be used to identify 
circulating influenza strains. With a better understanding of transmission of zoonotic influenza 
in these specific populations, pandemic planning can be strengthened by including measures 
that will prevent influenza transmission within this population and to other groups at risk. 
Monitoring of Avian Influenza in Wild Birds, Peru 
Migratory waterfowl are currently considered to be the primary reservoirs for avian influenza 
viruses. Although influenza surveillance in wild birds has been occurring in Europe, North 
America, Asia, and Africa, few activities are present to date in South America. 
Approach 
To determine genotypes of avian influenza circulating among wild birds in South America, we 
have been collecting environmental fecal samples from 5 wetlands along the central coast of 
Peru since June 2006. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
To date, we have collected and tested 6,587 fecal samples and have recovered 21 AI isolates, 
representing 9 different strains (7 different hemagglutinin and 6 neuraminidases). 
Surveillance for Avian Influenza in Live Bird Markets of Peru 
AI and other avian diseases in birds in Peruvian wet markets and those seized during 
government confiscations are currently being tested. This will allow us to assess the potential 
direct threat of AI and other zoonotic diseases to humans, as well as to livestock, in these 
settings. This study includes wild-caught birds (for exportation and sale to pet markets), exotic 
caged birds, and domestic avian species. Previous studies have shown that wild birds in Peru 
may serve as competent reservoirs for influenza strains. The risk of AI transmission may increase 
if these wild birds are housed along with domestic poultry or other domestic species, such as 
swine. 
Approach 
All samples are collected with the consent of the bird seller. Tracheal and cloacal swabs are 
collected for viral isolation in egg culture. Positive isolates are further analyzed by RT-PCR, 
followed by sequencing for confirmation and molecular characterization. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
To date, birds from 16 live bird markets (in 7 Peruvian cities) are being monitored and sampled. 
More than 1,700 samples (oral, cloacal, and fecal swabs and feces) have been obtained from 630 
birds. None have been positive (n = 793) for AI; however, 18 have been positive for Newcastle 
disease (Paramyxovirus type 1). 
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 Knowledge,Attitudes, and Practices about Avian Influenza in Wild Birds and 
Poultry Holders at Peruvian Wet Markets, Peru 
Wet markets, also known as live animal markets, provide optimal conditions for the 
amplification and transmission of disease agents, such as avian influenza. Such markets are 
quite common in developing countries of Asia and South America and are characterized by 
the presence of animals in densely packed cages with poor hygienic conditions. In addition 
to wild birds, local populations often bring domestically raised poultry to marketplaces for 
sale or slaughter. Furthermore, illegal trade of wild birds at wet markets introduces new and 
poorly studied potential risks. The aims of this study are to assess the knowledge, attitudes, and 
practices of wild bird handlers and poultry workers regarding AI, and to establish baseline data 
in order to develop educational and preventive intervention methods in this population. 
Approach 
The population under study includes wild bird handlers and poultry workers working in wet 
markets in 7 cities in coastal and rainforest regions of Peru (i.e., Pucallpa, Piura, Ica, Tumbes, 
Lima, Iquitos, Chiclayo). An information sheet explaining all the study procedures is given to all 
participants before recruitment. All participants are asked about sociodemographic information, 
general knowledge about avian influenza transmission and prevention, as well as attitudes and 
practices related to holding, slaughtering, and management of healthy, ill, and dead birds. 
Influenza Viral Surveillance in Swine Populations of Peru 
Pandemic influenza viruses have been the product of the reassortment of circulating human, 
avian, and swine influenza strains. Pigs are often blamed as mixing vessels because these animals 
may serve as hosts for productive infections of avian, swine, and human viruses. The goal of this 
study is to determine the different strains of influenza (swine, avian, and human) circulating in 
Peruvian swine populations. 
Approach and Timeline 
We are performing a serologic and virologic surveillance to monitor and study informal 
(backyard) and formal (mechanized) swine farms and slaughter houses. Studies are being 
conducted in multiple locations in Peru (i.e., Tumbes, Cuzco, Lima, Puerto Maldonado). This 
study uses infrastructure and workforce that have already been established by other NMRCD 
studies. Nasal and tracheal swabs and blood 
samples (antibody detection) will be collected 
from pigs 3 times a year from March 2009 to 
December 2010. RT-PCR, viral culture, and 
nucleic acid sequencing will be used to identify 
circulating strains of influenza. 
Progress and Initial Conclusions 
To date, no influenza isolates have been 
recovered from 300 slaughtered pigs from 
Tumbes. Serologic results are pending. 
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Influenza Cooperative Research 

at the Animal-Human Interface
 
In 2006, five 3-year cooperative agreements were initiated to establish a set of research projects 
related to detecting, preventing, and controlling zoonotic influenza. The agreements provide a 
more integrated public health response to avian and swine influenza outbreaks by human and 
veterinary health services. Collaborators included Colorado State University, the University 
of Minnesota, the University of Georgia, the National Institute of Public Health and the 
Environment (The Netherlands), and Mahidol University (Thailand). 
Colorado State University 
The goals of this study are to understand better the transmission of avian influenza in small bird 
flocks in the United States and Indonesia and to assess the potential risk for infection of people 
interacting with these birds. A survey of backyard flocks in urban Colorado was performed 
to understand the size of backyard chicken and duck flocks and the characteristics of flock 
ownership in urban areas. The results of this research will be combined with demographic 
information and used to develop a model to predict the spread of avian influenza in these areas. 
A nationwide survey of upland game bird facilities is being performed to understand flock 
characteristics, husbandry practices, disease management, movement, and biosecurity practices. 
Characteristics of human-to-bird interactions will also be examined, and this information 
will be used to evaluate the potential role of this bird population during an outbreak of avian 
influenza in the United States. Additional research is being performed in Indonesia to examine 
the prevalence of highly pathogenic avian influenza in ducks raised under differing management 
systems and to evaluate the interactions of these ducks with other poultry, wild birds, and 
humans. 
University of Minnesota 
The goals of this research are to evaluate avian, swine, and human influenza virus transmission 
at the human-animal interface. In order to accomplish this goal, studies are ongoing in 
several human and animal populations. Surveillance for avian influenza is being conducted 
among backyard poultry flocks and their handlers in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Surveillance 
is also ongoing among an urban wild geese population in Minnesota and the human 
recreational users of their habitat. Swine influenza virus surveillance is conducted to detect and 
characterize influenza A viruses from pigs and people who work with them in commercial and 
noncommercial operations in the Midwest. This surveillance is occurring where influenza A 
virus has been detected in pigs and where human cases of ILI have been reported. 
In Thailand, the prevalence and viral shedding of influenza virus is also being assessed in 4 rural 
villages where highly pathogenic avian influenza has been previously detected. The information 
from these studies will be used to identify factors that facilitate virus transmission from animals 
to humans, to characterize human illness caused by avian and swine influenza viruses, and to 
assess the use and effectiveness of interventions that interrupt transmission of influenza viruses 
from animals to humans. 
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University of Georgia 
The risk of human infection with avian influenza virus from an environmental source is not 
well understood. To understand that risk, studies are underway to estimate avian influenza 
virus loads associated with environmental sources of potential public health significance 
and to identify factors that may enhance or limit persistence of type A influenza viruses in 
these environmental sources (i.e., surface water, environmental surfaces, feces, carcasses). A 
quantitative risk assessment of the public health risk associated with environmental sources 
of avian influenza will be performed, and risk for exposure to the human population from 
environmental sources of avian influenza will be characterized to determine the exposure 
pathways, likely exposure amounts, and frequency and duration of exposure. Transmission 
studies will also be performed in ferrets and cats to examine the potential risk of human 
exposure from these species. 
National Institute of Public Health and the 
Environment (The Netherlands) 
An epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H7N7 occurred in the 
Netherlands in 2003 at commercial poultry farms. During this outbreak, 89 confirmed human 
cases of avian influenza were identified among poultry workers and their families, including 
1 death. This study will further evaluate this outbreak of avian influenza virus in humans. 
Researchers will estimate the level of virus exposure from poultry by studying the dynamics of 
avian influenza in the flock. Additional methods will be used to evaluate transmission of avian 
influenza subtype H7N7 to humans, and this information will be used to identify activities 
associated with increased risk for infection of avian influenza virus infection in humans. 
Mahidol University (Thailand) 
Since 2004, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 have occurred 
frequently in birds in Thailand, and numerous human cases have been identified. The goals of 
this research are to understand the incidence and prevalence of avian influenza virus infection in 
birds, humans, and other animals in Thailand, and to assess the transmission of avian influenza 
to people exposed to humans, birds, or other animals infected with avian influenza viruses. To 
determine the role of migratory birds in the transmission of avian influenza virus, the migratory 
routes of open-billed storks and lesser whistling ducks and gulls in and out of Thailand are 
being evaluated by the use of satellite telemetry. The prevalence of avian influenza in these 
birds and in nonmigratory birds, other animals, and humans who share a habitat with tracked 
migratory birds is being monitored. In addition, the prevalence of avian influenza in poultry in 
the area where avian influenza has been found in migratory birds is under study. The diversity 






Profiling Temporal and Spatial Phylogenic Evolution of HPAI 
In Laos, the U.S. CDC experts will assist to establish first-time sequencing capabilities in clade 
molecular characterization when profiling the temporal and spatial phylogenic evolution of 
HPAI. This activity has been delayed because of U.S. CDC’s focus on pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza. Nevertheless, this activity will be carried out in FY 2010. 
Proposed Timeline 
•	 Visit by U.S. CDC team to review sequencing information (July 2010). 
•	 Training of staff from National Center for Animal Health (NCAH) and NCLE in 
Atlanta to carry out sequencing with isolates from Laos (November 2010). 
•	 Installation of new (unused) sequencing machine at NCAH (February 2011). 




U.S. CDC’s Threat Reduction 
Collaboration 
The U.S. CDC’s Influenza Division and the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) collaborated in 2007. The CTR is an office located in the U.S. Department 
of State and works to enhance global health security and foster safe, secure, and sustainable 
bioscience capacity development. The CTR accomplishes this through joint scientific work, 
prevention, detection, and response to biologic threats and capacity building in nations and 
regions where terrorism, high infectious disease burden, proliferation of biotechnology, and high 
containment biology facilities coexist. The ultimate goal of the CTR is to foster long-term U.S. 
engagement with foreign governments and international organizations to harmonize biologic 
safety and security best practice guidelines. 
Through the collaboration, which was developed in 2007, the CTR has provided funds for the 
Influenza Division to supplement cooperative agreements in countries located in the EMRO, 
namely Afghanistan, Morocco, and Pakistan. The CTR has assisted to improve laboratory 
capacity by providing funds for laboratory equipment and training. The collaboration provided 
financial assistance to counties with cooperative agreements and technical assistance to countries 
related to biosecurity and biosafety. The CTR has graciously agreed to assist countries to ensure 
quality biosafety and biosecurity in laboratories in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Through their work with these EMRO countries, the CTR identified a need to have the 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th Edition (BMBL) translated into the 
predominant languages used in these countries. Through an interagency agreement with U.S. 
CDC’s Influenza Division, the BMBL document was translated into the following languages: 
Arabic, Bahasa, French, Mandarin, Spanish, Thai, and Urdu. These translations represent the 
languages spoken in many of the countries with whom the CTR provides financial or technical 
assistance. The Influenza Division and the CTR are hopeful these translations will provide the 
basis to improve biosafety practice and policy for laboratory workers. 
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      Influenza Burden of DiseaseWorkshop andVaccine 
Effectiveness Meeting, Bangkok, 2009 
During August 26–28, 2009, the Influenza Division sponsored a 3-day workshop in Bangkok, 
Thailand, with more than 40 participants from 15 countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, 
India, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. U.S. CDC staff from the Influenza Division and the 
International Emerging Infections Program were also in attendance. 
The goals of the meeting were to review the need for country-level disease burden estimation, to 
present burden of disease estimates from partners in attendance and to discuss the application of 
these estimates in informing vaccination, particularly in the context of pandemic 2009 H1N1 
influenza. 
Major topics addressed included 












•	 Country-based examples for different 

methods of disease burden estimation.
 
•	 Presentation of surveillance data and 

national disease burden estimates.
 




The next burden of disease meeting will be held 
July 2010 in Atlanta, Georgia. 
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Laboratory Training and Research
 
Training 
The Influenza Division and partners have led the development and use of training modules for 
improved infection control practices in health care settings and focused on reducing respiratory 
disease transmission in hospitals. The training program was developed by Thailand IEIP/GDD 
staff in collaboration with the REDI Center, Singapore, and Jhpiego. 
Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch 
International collaboration with Huan Nguyen at the International Vaccine Institute, Seoul, 
Korea, and scientists at the National Center for Veterinary Diagnostics, Department of Animal 
Health, Hanoi, Vietnam—to test the prophylactic and therapeutic effectiveness of avian 
antibodies against pandemic influenza. 
Passive immunization (the transfer of antigen-specific antibodies to a previously nonimmune 
recipient host) offers an alternative strategy to prevent and treat influenza virus infections. Even 
after targeted vaccines become available, passive immunization could still have a prophylactic 
effect and provide an additional countermeasure against influenza. Chickens produce a unique 
immunoglobulin molecule called IgY that is functionally equivalent to mammalian IgG. IgY is
found in the sera of chickens and is passed from hens to the embryo via the egg yolk. Egg IgY 
has been used to prevent bacterial and viral infections of the gastrointestinal tract and recently for 
protection against Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection of the respiratory tract of patients with cystic 
fibrosis. However, the prophylactic and therapeutic effectiveness of IgY (isolated from eggs of hens 
immunized with H5N1 virus vaccine) against influenza virus infection has not been tested. 
The epidemic of HPAI H5N1 virus has resulted in serious economic losses to the poultry 
industry, mostly in Southeast Asia. Therefore, many countries, including China, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam have introduced mass vaccination of poultry with H5N1 virus vaccines 
that control the H5N1 epidemic to some extent. In this collaboration, the effectiveness of 
chicken IgY antibodies is being examined against H5N1 virus. We found that marketed chicken 
eggs in Vietnam, where mass poultry vaccination against H5N1 virus is mandatory, contain 
high levels of virus-specific IgY that provide protection against and therapy of H5N1 virus 
infections in mammals. Virus-specific IgY offers potentially inexpensive, yet highly safe and 
effective, alternatives for prevention and treatment against potential H5N1 pandemic strains. 
Libo Dong—International EID Fellow with the 
Pandemic Preparedness Team in the Immunology 
and Pathogenesis Branch 
Libo Dong, an International EID fellow, began her fellowship on October 16, 2008 with 
the Pandemic Preparedness Team, Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza 
Division at U.S. CDC. She comes from the National Influenza Center, Virus Disease Control 
and Prevention Institute at CDC-China in Beijing where she worked with the avian influenza 
surveillance group. Libo’s mentor at CDC-China is Xiuhua Lu. The purpose of Libo’s fellowship 
is to provide training on serological assays used for influenza serodiagnosis, on ferret and mouse 
animal models of influenza infection, and on techniques for working with highly pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses. Through Libo’s fellowship, we will be transferring technology to China’s 
National Influenza Center and strengthening the ties between the 2 institutions. 
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By March, 2009, Libo was an expert in the microneutralization and hemagglutination assays for 
influenza serodiagnosis. Her part in the Pandemic Preparedness Team’s response to the emerging 
H1N1 pandemic in April, May, and June was crucial. These early studies of cross-reactive 
neutralizing antibodies resulted in 2 publications; 1 in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
and the other in the New England Journal of Medicine. Libo continues to play a key role in our 
evaluation of the antibody response to the pandemic virus. 
Under Lu’s guidance, Libo and Feng Liu have developed methods to determine the specificity of 
the antibody response to the pandemic virus. At the same time, Libo is working alongside U.S. 
CDC experts in animal models of influenza, learning techniques and procedures. Libo returns 
to CDC-China in March, 2010. 
Laboratory Training Table 
Month/ Country Institute Location Influenza Training Type 
Year Division 
Laboratory 
Oct 2008 Nigeria HHS/CDC Nigeria Atlanta, GA Immunology Serology Training: 
and Pathogenesis Microneutralization and horse 
Branch RBC HI assay for the detection 
of neutralizing antibodies to 
influenza viruses. 
Oct 2008 Ghana Noguchi Memorial Atlanta, GA Immunology Serology Training: 
Institute for Medical and Pathogenesis Microneutralization and horse 
Research, University of Branch RBC HI assay for the detection 
Ghana of neutralizing antibodies to 
influenza viruses. 
Oct 2008 Uganda Uganda Virus Research Atlanta, GA Immunology Serology Training: 
Institute and Pathogenesis Microneutralization and horse 
Branch RBC HI assay for the detection 
of neutralizing antibodies to 
influenza viruses. 
Oct 2008 Morocco National Institute of Atlanta, GA Immunology Serology Training: 
Health and Pathogenesis Microneutralization and horse 
Branch RBC HI assay for the detection 
of neutralizing antibodies to 
influenza viruses. 
Feb–Mar National Center Vietienne, VSDB Diagnosis of influenza 
2009 for Laboratory and Laos infections 
Epidemiology, Ministry of 
Health 
Mar 2009 Cambodia National Institute of Phnom VSDB Diagnosis of influenza 
Public Health, Ministry of Penh, infections 
Health Cambodia 
Mar 2009 Thailand Armed Forces Research Bangkok, VSDB Diagnosis of influenza 
Institute of Medical Thailand infections 
Sciences (AFRIMS) 
Apr 2009 Egypt NAMRU-3 Cairo, Egypt Molecular Virology Genetic sequencing of influ­
and Vaccines enza viruses 
Branch 
Jun–Jul Chile Ministry of Health ISP Chile Molecular Virology Diagnostics 
2009 and Vaccines 
Branch 
Aug 2009 Kenya National Influenza Center Nairobi, VSDB Diagnosis of influenza 
Egypt infections 
Aug–Sep Mexico Laboratorio de Virus Mexico City VSDB Diagnosis of influenza 
2009 Respiratorios Infections 
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Laboratory Capacity Building and Technical Assistance to NAMRU-3, Cairo, Egypt 
•	 Two staff. 
•	 Ongoing collaboration to provide technical assistance (diagnostic/sequencing) to 
international counterparts performed at CDC-Atlanta. 
•	 No days spent overseas for global laboratory capacity building. 
Laboratory Capacity Building and Technical Assistance to the National Center for Veterinary 
Diagnostics, Department of Animal Health, Hanoi, Vietnam 
•	 Two staff. 
•	 Ongoing collaboration to provide technical assistance (diagnostic/sequencing) to 
international counterparts performed at CDC-Atlanta. 
•	 No days spent overseas for global laboratory capacity building. 
Technical Assistance to CEMIC University Hospital, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
•	 A full-time staff member for 1 week. 
•	 Five days providing technical assistance (diagnostic/sequencing) to international 
counterparts performed at U.S. CDC. 
•	 No days spent overseas for global laboratory capacity building. 
Laboratory Capacity Building and Technical Assistance to the Chilean Ministry of Health for 
pandemic 2009 H1N1 Influenza Response 
•	 A full-time staff member for 4 weeks. 
•	 A total of 20 days spent training international counterparts in laboratory activities 
(in-country). 
•	 A total of 28 days spent overseas for global laboratory capacity building. 
Laboratory Capacity Building and Technical Assistance to Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale 
delle Venezie, Padua, Italy 
•	 One staff member. 
•	 A total of 10 weeks of training to prepare prepandemic influenza candidate seed viruses 
performed at CDC-Atlanta. 
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